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Lin Tse-hsu (1785-1850), Imperial Commis¬
sioner and fore-runner, of China's resistance
movement to the West.
G
Ch'i-ying (d. 1858), Imperial Commissioner
and pioneer of China's policy of conciliation.
FOR MY PARENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I should like, above all, to express my thanks to my supervisor
Dr. J.D. Chinnery for his assistance, supervision and constant
encouragement.
I owe a deep sense of gratitude to Prof. V.G. Kiernan. As a
friend, he always showed his concern for me and as a teacher, he has
exposed to me new approaches of looking at history for which I am
very grateful.
I also like to thank Prof. Wang Teh-ch^ao, who gave a lot of
precious suggestions on my thesis during my teaching in the Chinese
University of Hong Kong between 197^-1976.
For access to unpublished documents, I am indebted to the
staffs of the Public Record Office and the British Museum. I would
also like to thank the Librarian of the Chinese-Japanese-Korean
Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University, who
offered me convenient research facilities during my two months there
in 19"7?.
I had received financial support from the British Council and
Mr. Hardman of the Edwina Mountbs.tten Trust in 1973. Without this
aid, I would not have been able to spend six months in London for
the collection of materials in that year.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents. Like many other
Chinese parents, they could not control their tears at the airport
when embracing their beloved son, who had decided to gain more









LIN TSE-HSU' S STRONG POLICY AND ITS INFLUENCE
CHAPTER
1 THE COMMISSION AND LIN'S STRONG POLICY 25
2 THE DIFFICULTIES OF LIN AND THE USE OF "WATER-BRAVES" 45
3 DISGRACE AND PUBLIC SYMPATHY 58
4 THE SAN-YUAN-LI INCIDENT 77
5 MILITIA (T'UAN-LIEN) AFTER SAN-YUAN-LI 99
PART TWO
CHI-YING'S CONCILIATORY POLICY AND ITS FAILURE
6 CH'I-YING AND THE TREATY OF NANKING 121
7 CH'I-YING CONCILIATORY POLICY AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS
IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 138
8 CH'I-YING'S REFUSAL OF THE POLICY OF "USING BARBARIANS
TO CONTROL BARBARIANS" 150
9 THE CANTON CITY QUESTION 175
10 THE AGREEMENT OF 6TH APRIL 1847 202





APPENDIX A; CANTON ARCHIVE (FROM SIR JOHN DAVIS TO CH'I-YING 268
STATING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF
NANKING REQUIRE THE ABOLITION RELATING RESTRICTIONS TO
ENTER THE CITY OF CANTON, FO 682/1201, DA.TE TK 25/3/2
8 APRIL 184-5)
APPENDIX B: CANTON ARCHIVE (FROM CHfI-YING TO SIR JOHN DAVIS 269
WARNING THAT THE ENTRY OF THE BRITISH TO CANTON
.WILL AROUSE UNREST IN THE CITY, FO 682/1263




Every nation lives with its past, even if unaware.
The Chinese remember with pride the time when they were
respected as a great civilisation and were a great power;
they also remember with bitterness the time when they
were despised as an inferior race. Chinese communists
firmly believe Lenin's saying: "Imperialism means aggres¬
sion and war." In their memory, imperialism from the
beginning of modern Chinese history (the Opium War) first
sapped China of her wealth and her people of their health,
later it detached her vassal states, and eventually turned
her into a "semi-colonial state."
Mao Tse-t'ung, like many other Chinese patriots in
modern Chinese history, was a self-confident and a resolute
character. He was fired with a burning desire to restore
China's pride as a big power by adopting a bold attitude
tov/ard the Americans, even when this involved heavy risks.
The attitude was reflected in many actions. In the infant
years of the "People's Republic", he unhesitatingly sent
a million "volunteers" to fight against the American
"invasion" of Korea in 1950, when he and his associates
had barely set up their regime. They played the role of
"big brother" to the North Vietnamese at the 195;+ Geneva
Conference, and extended to it substantial aid in its
war against the American-backed Couth Vietnamese govern¬
ment, despite their own pre-occupation with the Cultural
Revolution.
In spite of China's continuous resistance to American
"imperialism", Chou En-lai, the late Premier, suddenly
shocked the world by showing a sign of good will to the
Americans in his famous "ping-pong breakthrough" in 1969.
No doubt Chou shared the same hatred for the Americans as
Mao felt. But after a small but real war along the frozen
banks of the Ussuri River, the easternmost boundary between
China and the Soviet Union in March 1969, Chou, being a
pragmatist, realized that China's limited number of tanks
and insufficient anti-aircraft and artillery were no match
for the strong Soviet opponent. Under such circumstances,
he had to swallow the insult of losing "face" to draw the
United States to China's side in order to cope with the
Soviet Union which had replaced the United States as
China's "principal enemy." when President Nixon visited
Peking in February 1972, Chou rose from his sickbed to
welcome the highly esteemed guest at the Peking airport.
The British interest in China was centred more in
commerce than in sovereignity. No one could deny that
the British s\\7ord after the failure of the missions of
Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst in 1793 and 181 A- to
establish normal trade relations with China, had time
and again hacked away at Chinese stubbornness to cut
open a path for trade and enterprise. When the news
of Lin Tse-hsii's confiscation of the British stocks of
opium and his confinement of the British subjects in
Canton reached Whitehall in 1840, the hawks in parliament
asserted that a war would be fought anyway for the normali¬
zation of diplomatic and commercial relations as well as
for the protection of British lives and property. Lord
Palmerston, the then British Foreign Secretary blusteringly
declared that the only way to deal with China was to give
her a good beating first and explain afterwards. As a
result, the British parliament decided to send expedition¬
ary forces to Chinese waters.
In the Opium War, China suffered a serious defeat
by Britain. The Sino-British treaty signed in Hanking
on August 29? 1842 for the termination of the War set a
precedent for other states to impose harsh and humiliating
terms on China. Similiar provisions were embodied in the
Sino-American and Sino-Franco treaties of 1844.
In the decade after the 'treaty of Nanking, the British
government expressed clearly to the Chinese authorities
that the British treaty rights had to be secured and
British prestige maintained even though bitter anti-British
sentiment was prevalent in the country.
In early 1850's, the British merchants in China,
after digesting the treaty benefits from the Opium War,
demanded from China more open ports, steam navigation on
inland waterways, inland trade and residence and the
immediate redress of local grievances. They expected
their government to force open the Chinese oyster with
another sword in order to gather more pearls and they
found their government helpful. As J.O.P. Bland, an Old
China Hand, sometime Times correspendent in China, said
British foreign policy "represents in the main the col¬
lective opinions and interests of British traders."
After the Treaty of Tientsin and the Treaty of Peking in
1858 and 1860, the British traders had obtained all the
benefits which they expected from the Chinese government.
Like Mao, Lin was a man of undoubted talent and a
man of determination. we know much about Lin's strong
policy of suppressing the opium trade in Canton, and his
exile to Hi as his punishment for precipitating war with
China.
The Chinese communists pay homage to Lin Tse-hsii
partly because they regard him as a patriot, partly because
he was a pioneer in mobilizing the people to fight against
the British invaders in the Opium War. In 1954- a monumental
collection of Chinese materials on the Opium VJar: Ya-p'ien
chan-cheng (The Opium War) was published under the editor¬
ship of Ch'i Ssu-ho (^ }?. ftf), in which Lin's patriotism
and the mobilization of the people are richly recorded.
Later, a film entitled "Lin Tse-hsu" was produced in 1 58
in honour of this patriot. On the other hand, Ch'i-ying
(/H-%) (also spelt as Keying or Kiying), a Menchu grandee,
the negotiator of the Treaty of Nanking, and the Imperial
commissioner in charge of foreign affairs in the post-war
period, has been seriously attacked as a shameless capitu-
lationist and suppressor of popular resistance to the
British.
Many modern historians have done much research on Lin.
Arthur Waley's Opium War through Chinese Eyes (1958) makes
Lin's diary during his mission in Canton the basis for a
short discursive account of the Opium War. Hsin-pao Chang's
Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (1964) is a painstaking
reconstruction of the coming and early course of the con¬
flict; however, it ends abruptly in 1840. Peter Fay's The
Opium War: 1840-1842 (1975), as he himself points out, is
"about the first step in the opening, not the whole process.
Jack Beeching's The Chinese Opium Wars (1975) is a precise
description of the two Wars which relies completely upon
English sources. These scholars scarcely mention the in¬
fluence of Lin on his country, and specially, on the people
of Kuang-tung, after his exile to Hi.
As a matter of fact, the famous incident of San-yuan-li
in May 1841 (in which the people of Kuang-tung under the
command of the local gentry killed several British soldiers
in an attack under cover of a heavy storm), and the imperial
decision to revive the militia (t'uan-lien lD £$) in Kuang-
tung, were strongly influenced by Lin's "patriotism", the
people hailed him as a national hero and swore to continue
their "struggle" against the British invaders. Here, a
question deserves o\ir attention: Did the people of Kuang-
tung have greater innate predisposition to anti-foreignism
than Chinese in other provinces ?
A group of war advocates, usually regarded as War Party
1. Peter W. Fay, The Opium War (University of Forth Carolin
Press, 1975), p.xii.
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Athe Opium War, and mainly composed of members of the Board of
Censorate in Peking, were strongly against China's submission to the
British demands embodied in the Treaty of Nanking. They shared a
prevailing ignorance of the military strength of the British forces,
they believed by that employing the people and their militia, China
would be able to cope with further British encroachments. These
censors had a feeling of solidarity with Lin's resistance, and a
violent hatred of the British.
On the other hand, Ch'i-ying was responsible for the management
of China's foreign affairs in the post-war period. At the beginning
a
of the Opium War, he also had been/dedicated war advocate. But
towards the end of the war he had occasion to spend some time in
Central China, where first-hand observation of British arms convinced
him of the necessity of concluding peace. Ch'i-ying observed that
the Emperor was too obstinate in fighting the British: as soon as
one soldier fell, he was determined to call another to fill his place.
In order to persuade the Emperor to allow him to negotiate with the
British, Ch'i-ying exaggerated the might of British weapons by saying
that the range of the British cannon was up to ten to twenty li. (one
li is about l/]5 mile), while that of the Chinese was only a few li.)
Ch'i-ying's post-war career has not yet been treated at full
length. John Fairbank's "The Manchu Appeasement Policy of 1843"
(1939) has offered us much insight into Ch'i-ying's policy of
conciJ iation from 1842 to 1844. His book, Trade and Diplomacy on
2. See Shih-liao hsnn-k'an (Historical materials published thrice
monthly) (Peiping: Palace Museum, 1931. Photolithographic
reprint, Taipei, 1963) 35, ti, 288b-289a. I am indebted to
Professor V.G. Kiernan for calling my attention to this point.
the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (1953)
is the best diplomatic history of this period, and in it Ch'i-ying's
diplomatic career from 1844 to 1848 is briefly described. Frederic
Wakeman's Strangers at the Gate; Social Disorder in South China.
1839-1861 (1966) is "An attempt to assess the social effects of the
3
Opium war upon Kwang-tung province." In his book Wakeman touches on
Ch'i-ying's management of foreign affairs from 1842 to 1848.
Wakeman's mastery of the Chinese language is impressive, but he has
been confused by certain Chinese expressions, which have misled him
into some dubious conclusions.
Conciliation was the hallmark of Ch'i-ying policy in the post¬
war period. Like Premier Chou, Ch'i-ying was a pragmatist and a wily
diplomat. He decided to build up a personal friendship with the
British plenipotentary, Sir Henry Pottinger, a bluff, straightforward
administrator from India, and thereby to gain over British policy a
useful influence. He believed that both sincerity and condescension
were necessary in this course. Ch'i-ying sang operatic airs, played
"guess-finger", drank to everyone's health at one of the banquets
with Pottinger in June 1843. Such behaviour was designed to show
personal warmth to the British plenipotentary. Premier Chou behaved
similarly towards President Nixon in February 1972. At one of the
banquets given to the president at the People's Hall in Peking,
Western reporters observed that Chou selected morsels of food from
his own plate and deftly transferred them to Nixon's; a gesture
common enough between close friends, but by no means a casual courtesy.
3. F. Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China. (New York, 1975)> p.262.
Apart from this, Chou insisted on drawing on his personal collection
of wine when he invited the president to join him in a toast to the
two countries.
Ch'i-ying's career in Canton relied heavily upon the assistance
of Huang En-t'ung (a Chinese whom the foreigners respected
4
much. Both Ch'i-ying and Huang repudiated the traditional Chinese
tactics of "Using barbarians to control barbarians" which Lin and
his colleagues once advocated during the Opium War.
When Sir John Davis succeeded Pottinger as British plenipotentiary
in the middle of 1844, the honeymoon period of Sino-British relations
deteriorated. Ch'i-ying at first tried to make Davis an "intimate"
friend as he had done with Pottinger, but Davis gave him the cold
shoulder. From 1845 Ch'i-ying was caught between the ever-increasing
pressure of Davis for British entry to the city of Canton and the
stubborn resistance of the gentry and the people of Canton. When
he bowed to the pressure to proclaim the opening of the city to the
British in January 1846, he himself became the focus of attacks by
the people in Canton and the censors in Peking. His inferior, Liu
Hsin ( S'| ), the Canton prefect was attacked in his office by a
mob which suspected him of having arranged the entry of the British.
Huang En-t'ung, was degraded by the Emperor for his open criticism
of the anti-foreign sentiment of the people.
The year 1847 had been unkind to Ch'i-ying. Friction between
4. Of this Huang, a foreigner remarks: "Whang is
considered one of the most rising stal^smen in China, and his
manners and conversation marked him a perfect gentleman. I do
not remember ever having met, even in my own country, a person
of more gentle and polished manner or courteous breeding than
this Chinese, so different from the majority of his countrymen
in their intercourse with foreigners." See Granville G. Loch,
The Closing: Events of the Campaign in China (London, 1843), p.150.
the people and young British merchants had increased since 1846.
In April 1847 Davis directed British warships carrying 900 soldiers
to force their way up the estuary into the inland waters to force
Ch'i-ying to accept the British entry to the city at the end of two
years and punish those Chinese who had offended the British. Ch'i-
ying's concession to Davis had tarnished his public image in Canton
and lost him the imperial trust in Peking. In December 1847 war
between Britain and China seemed inevitable when six British
merchants were killed in Huang-chu-ch'i village near Canton, though
Ch'i-ying was able to prevent a war by executing four Chinese culprits.
By these acts he antagonized not only the Cantonese but many censors
in Peking who accused him of being an oppressor of the people and an
ally of the British. At this stage all the Emperor's trust in
Ch'i-ying evaporated. In early 1848 the Emperor accepted the request
of Ch'i-ying for his transfer to Peking from Canton. A new policy
of relaxing control over the anti-foreign elements at Canton then
began.
In this thesis, I propose to examine the genesis of Lin's policy
of resistance during the Opium war and its influence contending with
Ch'i-ying's conciliatory policy in the post-war period. By
analysing Lin's victory and Ch'i-ying's failure, we can observe that
China's management of its foreign relations during and after the
Opium War .suffered from pride, prejudice and hatred against the
Westerners. These elements jeopardized the conciliatory policy of
those open-minded persons who insisted that must be
in order to prevent conflicts between China and the West.
My basic sources of information are furnished by Chinese materials
both published and unpublished, specially the F0682 Canton archives
of
from the yamen of the governor-general^Kuang-tung and Kuang-si in the
Public Record Office, London, supplemented by the rich western
accounts and archives. Before embarking on a detailed scrutiny of
the happenings of the period covered by this thesis, it will be well
to describe these elements before the Opium War.
Pride
Chinese civilization had its origins over three thousand years
ago. The ethos of Chinese civilization was based on "the way of
Confucious." Way-tao (ii, )-meant the principles governing the
nature of man and the cosmos. The Chinese believed they had
devised man's most perfect system of government and society by the
understanding of tao.
Unlike the countries of Europe which for centuries challenged
each other, China, geographically surrounded by small states with
lower culture in East Asia, did not receive much challenge from them.
The Chinese viewed their empire as the sole centre of civilization
and believed that they had nothing to learn or gain from other countries.
The Chinese, with the conception that they were people of the
Middle Kingdom (chung-kuo ® ), had been emphasizing their cultural
superiority over other nations, upon which they distinguished
themselves from barbarians i_ (-^), who had not embraced Chinese
culture. The term jl is used in classical Chinese to denote: "rude
and barbarian tribe," specially those tribes in the east of China in
5
ancient times. These tribes, said Confucius: "Even with their
princes were still not equal to China with their anarchy."^ With
such a conception, the Confucian disciples developed a sinocentric wzy o'f
thin Ring crystallized in the saying of Mencius: "I have heard of
men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but
7
I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians."
5. Legge, Chinese Classics. 3rd ed. (Hong Kong, I960) v.l, p.328.
6. Analect. Ill, 5; Legge, op.cit.. v.l, p.20.
7. Mencius. IIIA, 4, 12; Legge, op.cit.. v.2, p.129-130.
The Chinese classified all barbarians in different categories
based on geographical considerations. With the Middle Kingdom as
the centre of civilization, non-Chinese states more distant from
China were presumably less civilized, their people were bound to
receive less Confucian rites and were thus placed much lower in the
hierarchy, like a ladder starting from China descending from higher
civilization to the lower rungs of barbarism. To the Chinese idea,
Europe, separated from China by vast gulf (ocean) was much more
uncivilized than the small states in Asia: Korea, Vietnam (Annam)
and Burma. The Europeans were supposed to be morally and intellect¬
ually uncultivated. The Chinese were not eager to know about the
Europeans. Why should a superior study an inferior, as they might
ask.
On the other hand, the Chinese thought that their country being
a large and fertile state bounding in all good materials, had therefore
no need to import the materials of outside barbarians in exchange for
their own products. But materials such as tea and silk which China
produces were necessities to other countries. Opinionated by this
idea of material superiority, together with the prejudice of cultural
tAe
superiority, the Chinese set up the tribute system as^principal
assumption in her foreign relations.
The principle of the tribute system was that kings of non-
Chinese states who desired to partake of the benefits from trade with
China were requested to send tributary emissaries to Peking to perform
the full ceremony of the kowtow-three kneelings and nine knockings of
the head on the ground-before the Chinese emperor. Traders attached
to the tributary missions enjoyed privileges of bringA^heir goods to
China duty-free. Tributary relations were costly to maintain for
■tf
China, as all travel expenses and,,maintenance of the tributary
missions were borne by the Chinese government. Both the tributary
kings and the Chinese emperors enjoyed the system. The former were
eager to heighten the cultural and economical ties with the Middle
Kingdom, and in the case of foreign invasion and natural disasters,
China would send troops or funds to help them. As for the latter,
it was an immense pleasure and satisfaction to see the myth of their
universal overlordship acknowledged.
During the Ch'ing times, the Manchu emperors insisted that the
time-honoured tribute system applied not only to the small states of
Asia but also to all other European states that wanted to trade with
China. Tempted by trading benefits, Western envoys from Portugal,
Holland and Russia did perform the ceremony of kowtow, albeit
reluctantly, during the imperial audience. Although Russia and the
Western European nations were not formally included in the tribute
system which existed between China and its vassals in Asia, the
Manchu government did treat the Western missions as though they were
tributary missions.
In the Ch'ing times, the Chinese kept a pride to the Western
nations because they were not aware of the strong West. A couple of
factors - the expansion of the empire and the scepticism of the
westerner's-were responsible for their unawareness.
The Manchu empire embraced a good deal more than China proper.
Before 1644 the Manchu' had achieved the final and definite conquest
of the Mongol tribes of the north, who had for centuries raided
China and conquered Sung China. The "Ten complete victories"
(Shih—ch'nan wu-kung t of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor (1735-1796)
had brought the territories of Tibet and Turkestan under the rule of
the Manchu government. In Ming times, Li Pu %%, (Board. of Rites)
arranged state ceremonial sacrifices, court banquets for state
occasions.. It was also responsible for relations with the tributary-
countries. But in Ch'ing times, the affairs in the newly occupied
territories were too burdensome for the Board. The Manchu government
had to establish the Li-fan-yuan (Court of Dependencies), a
special agency for the handling of Inner Asian Affairs, including
control of Tibet and the Mongol tribes and princes. Before the
nineteenth century, Inner Asia had been the focus of the dynasty's
foreign policy and the government did not pay much attention to the Vest
The scepticism of the Manchu rulers towards the Westerners
had totally denied them the chance of knowing the West.
Chinese history abounds with examples of how an alien nation
replaced an existing Chinese government: the Mongols conquered
Sung China in 1279; the Manchus themselves overthrew Ming China
in 1644. Naturally, the Manchus possessed a morbid fear of outside
powers, especially those they never dealt with.
During the Ch'ing times there were two places from where the
government could acquire Western knowledge: Peking and Canton.
Ik-om the late Ming period -until middle Ch'ing, a total of about five
hundred Jesuitspioneered by Matteo Ricci came to China. They first
got the Ming literati interested in maps of world which showed strange
countries to the West. Unfortunately, the early Manchu emperors
were not interested in Western maps, but in science subjects.
The Shun-chih Emperor (1644-1661) did keep the Jesuit Adam Schall to
run the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy. The K'ang-hsi Emperor (l661-
1722) himself was fond of mathematics. He employed a Jesuit to
teach selected young students the subject. The Yung-cheng Emperor
(1722-1735) developed a dislike for Western missionaries because some
of them had taken the side of his opponents on the issue of his
succession to the throne. His son, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor also
disfavoured the missionaries. He refused to use them in the government
departments and stopped their long-continued activities. It was a
pity that the Manchu emperors and the officials were not interested
in Western maps, which were important tools "for- understanding
geography of the West.
As for the situation in Canton, Since 1757 maritime trade by
foreign ships in China had been limited to the single port of Canton.
tiA'cA
The trade in Canton was under the "Canton system" uho(erAa group of
Chinese traders known as Hong merchants had monopolized trade with
the West. The Hong merchants were personally responsible for the
activities of foreigners. No direct communication was permitted
between the foreign traders and Chinese government officials, i.e.
the governor-general, the governor, and the Hoppo (Customs
superintendent) at Canton.
The Westerners were confined in the "Thirteen Factories" outside
the walled city of Canton. They were not allowed to learn ..Chinese
language. The Western merchants could only communicate with the
d.
Chinese compradors Alinguists through a special language - pidgin
English, a mixture of English, Portuguese and Indian words being
w'i'cA.
spoken and not written,Achanged rapidly with the passage of time.
It is not difficult to understand why the Manchu government
ccrifmeti. the foreign merchants to the Factory area. There was
four-fold stratification in old Chinese society: scholar-gentry,
-tt
peasants, artisans and merchants. According to*Chinese conception,
Western merchants were the lowest form of people in barbarian countries.
How could the officials of the Middle Kingdom communicate with them?
Me
In 1759 James Flint, a translator of*British East India Company
sailed to Tientsin to hand officials there a bitter request, written
in Chinese, complaining of the strict restrictions on British trade
imposed by the Hoppo in Canton. The then Ch'ien-lung Emperor was
shocked at Flint's presence at Tientsin and his ability of writing
Chinese. He blamed the authorities in Canton and dismissed the Hoppo.
After the Flint episode, Li Shih-yao ( 3cJ )y the Governor-
general of Llaog-Kuang (Kuang-tung and Kuang-si) submitted to the
Emperor for his consideration a draft of "RegulationSfor the Control
of Foreigners Part of the draft reads:
"...It is my humble idea that when untutored barbarians,
who live far beyond the border of China, come to our
country to trade, they should establish no contact
with the populations, except for business purposes.
Therefore, it is better to take precautionary measures
to restrain them than to punish them after they have
transgressed ..." 8
Li's suggestion had obviously impressed the Emperor; the latter
ordered the officials in Canton to restrict dealings between Westerners
and local Chinese.
The expulsion of the missionaries in Peking and the exclusion of
8. Shih-liao hsun-k'an 9, ti. 507.
Westerners in Canton had deprived the Manchu government of all
opportunities of knowing what was happening among the Western
countries. At the end of the eighteenth century, the British
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie vfa<{gained much more political
strength in parliament^ whic/i reinforced their drive towards
overseas expansion. The Anglo-French conflicts in India during the
eighteenth century hardly touched the Chinese ears. After the
domination of India, the British brought their base for trading and
military activities in the Far East considerably nearer to the Chinese
coast. They were knocking at the door.
17
Prejudice
The prejudice of the Manchu government and its officials towards
the Westerners can he observed from two rumours. The first rumour
spread in Canton; the second in Peking. These two rumours had 4 di'scKsrit-cus.
influence on China's $"g/vf during the Opium War.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, tea gradually
became a national beverage for the British. In 1793 Lord McCartney
went back to Britain with an imperial edict after his mission to
Peking, In the edict the Ch'ien-lung Emperor proudly stated:
"... there was no need (for China) to import the
manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for
our own products. But tea, silk, and porcelain,
which the Celestial Empire produces, are absolute q
necessities to European nations and to yourselves..."
Rhubarb, a purgative root fromAhinterland of Canton, was depicted by
the Canton authorities as being physically essential to the British
with their greasy meat and boiled vegetables. In 1834 Lu K'un (j^. ),
the then governor-general of Liang-kuang reported to the Tao-Xuang
Emperor (1820-1850) that rhubarb, like tea, was essential to the lives
of foreigners.10
Later, both tea and rhubarb were greatly exaggerated as consti¬
tuting a matter of life or death for the Westerners. Chou Hsiang
censor of Kiang-nan Circuit ( >x l|L )> impressed the
Emperor that if the Westerners did not take tea and rhubarb for several
months, they would lose their eye-sight and their intestines would be
obstructed. Chou concluded the foreigners might lose their lives
9. E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of
Peking (London, 1914), p.326.
10. Shih-liao hsun-k'an. 21, ti, 769.
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because of the lack of those two materials.^"'" Wei Yuan-lang
Governor of Fukien also held the idea that depriving the foreigners
] 2
of tea and rhubarb could bring about an end to their lives.
Before the outbreak of the Opium War, Canton officials had
considered using tea and rhubarb as tools to halt the overbearing
manner of the Westerners. They were quite confident that the
Westerners would give in to the Chinese authorities because of the
two materials. Teng T'ing-chen ( ), the Governor-general of
Liang-Kuang and Wen Hsiang ( X ), the Hoppo of Canton, mentioned
in their joint memorial of 2nd February, 1838: "rhubarb, tea... are
necessities for the foreigners. When the foreigners defied the
Chinese authorities in the thirteenth year of Chia-ching reign (1802);
ninth and fourteenth years of Tao-kuang reign (1829 and 1834). Our
government declared a halt in trading with them that brought them to
their knees. Judging from these precedents, we believe that foreign
13
countries could not but bow to our order."
AacI
WhyAthese high-ranking officials in Canton such wrong ideas AAemt
tea and rhubarb? Restricted by the "Canton system", they were not
able to communicate with the Westerners directly. Their information
about the Westerners depended deeply on a group of Hong merchants and
ignorant petty officers. Among them there were charlatans. As
11, See Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-oan i-wu shih-mo (The complete account of
the management of barbarian affairs) (Peking, 1930), Tao-kuang
section, 2.10a, hereafter cited as IWSHf TK.
12. IWSH. TK 4.30a.
13. IWSH. TK 2.26-3a.
Captain Charles Elliot, the chief superintendent of British trade
in China during the Opium War commented: "In ninety-nine cases out
of a hundred, connected with foreigners, which are submitted to high
Chinese authorities, their determination must be taken upon the report
of low and corrupt officers and the higher functionaries are not in
a situation to detect error, or to repair it when made.""'"'1''
The second rumour was concerned with the physical weakness of the
Westerners. Their beak noses, tawny hair, red complexion, deep eyes,
long legs and thin waists are different from those of the Chinese.
With prejudice, the Chinese thus belittled their functions. Among
the body organs of the Westerners, their waists and legs which are
tightly bounded with trousers were very much disparaged. (Chinese
trousers were comparatively wider than the Western ones with much more
room for legs inside to exercise.) During the Opium War, the Chinese
war junks were no match for the powerful British warships. Some
Chinese officials thus advocated land battle with the British by
toying with such an idea. Chin Ying-lun ( ^ censor in Peking
remarked: "the uppers of the foreigners' bodies are protected with
bovine skin that is able to resist attacks from knives and arrows of
our Chinese soldiers, but their waists are unbending. Once they fall,
they will not be able to stand up again.Ch'eng En-tse ( if. Hf" ),
vice-president of a department in Peking mentioned in his letter to
Yuan Yuan ( XL ) a grand secretariat that once the foreigners came
ashore, their legs would become weak. When they fell their bodies
would not be able to remain upright. When this happened, the
14. Parliamentary Papers: Additional Papers relating to China (1840),
p.5.
15. IWSH. TK 41.4a.
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weakest among the Chinese people would be able to use their cudgels
to beat them down; and the stronger ones could easily use the spurs
of their shoes to kick them down.
I
J.K. Fairbank says that the origin of such rumours concerning
the physical weakness of the foreigners is unknown."^ But in my
opinion the rumour about the weakness of Westerners' legs might have
originated from the British missions. Unlike the rumour of tea and
rhubarb that derived from foreign trade in Canton, this rumour was
widely spread in Peking. In 1793 when Lord Macartney refused to
performAkowtow, the imperial court spread a saying that the British
envoy could not perform the ceremony because his knee buckles and
garters were tightly bounded with cloth. The Chinese escorts to Lord
Macartney were instructed to suggest to the British envoy to remove
17
the articles of clothing temporarily in order to fulfil the kowtow.
However, the British envoy did not agree to do so. This might have
added support to the mistaken idea of the Emperor and his courtiers.
£/ie
In 1816 Lord Amherst bluntly refused to perform^kowtow again. It is
possible that the courtiers in order to save the dignity of their
emperors could have spread the rumour that the British envoy was not
able to bend their legs in order to perform kowtow, as a tributary
envoy should.
16. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy. I, p.20.
17. J.L. Cranmer-Byng, ed., An Embassy to China; Lord Macartney's
Journal 1793-4 (London, 1962), p.98, 119.
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Hatred
Although the Manchu emperors were able to resist the demands of
trading benefits from the British envoys in 1795 and 1816, they were
not able to thwart the smuggling of Indian opium by the British
merchants.
Opium had been used as a medicine in China for over a thousand
years. However, in 1620 some Formosans began mixing it with tobacco
and smoking it. This practice later spread to the coastal areas of
Fukien and Kuang-tung. The Chinese eventually developed their own
mode of consumption by burning opium extract, a refinement of the raw
stuff, over a lamp and inhaling its fumes through a pipe.
Teas and silks were the major purchases made by the British firms
in Canton. The British commodities to China, mainly Indian textiles^
did not alone suffice to generate enough silver dollars to buy all
the teas and silks which the British merchants required. British
merchant ships coming to Canton for trade had to bring more in silver
dollars than in goods. The British did not want to go on paying for
Chinese goods with silver. The sources of British silver were from
the mines of Peru and Mexico. However, the American Revolution in
1776 cut Britain off from the Mexican silver supply. Lacking the
bullion to pay for teas and silks, the British merchants and other
Western merchants engaged ih the large-scale smuggling of opium to China.
* 18
Opium wasAhighly profitable commodity with a good sale in China.
18. Shortly before the Opium War, William Jardine, the leading British
opium dealers, disclosed in a private letter that "in the good
years... gross profits were sometimes as high as $1,000 a chest."
Quoted in Michael Greenberg, British Trade ana the Opening of
China 1800-42 (Cambridge University Press, 1951) p.105, n.2.
While the American merchants brought the Turkish opium into China,
their British counterparts smuggled the Indian opium. The
development of smuggling and the consumption of opium in China led
to a shortage of silver that had an erosive effect on the monetary
system. The sale of Chinese goods to Westerners no longer balanced
Chinese purchases of Opium, and the difference was made up by the
export of Chinese silver. Worst of all, the smuggled opium brought
terrible calamity to the nation. At first only aristocrats and rich
merchants smoked the opium. Later, court eunuchs, yamen runners,
Buddhist monks and nuns and soldiers became addicts. Prohibitions
of opium were decreed in 1800, 1813 and 1815, but all to no effect.
In 1821 the new Tao-kuang Emperor took strict prohibition measures
by ordering the removal of the Westerners' opium ships from Canton
waters. However, the smuggling continued on an ever-increasing scale.
In 1832 it was proven beyond doubt that the opium addiction in
certain parts of the army had become so serious that the troops were
incapable of combat. The garrison troops of Kuang-tung in that year
suffered serious defeats against the Yao rebels in the area of Lien-
chou { in northwest Kuang-tung). Hsi-en was appointed imperial
commissioner to investigate the case. He reported to the Emperor
that: "six thousand combat troops were sent (from Kuang-tung), but
they were not used to the mountains; and many of the troops from all
the coastal garrisons were opium smokers, and it was difficult to
get any vigorous response from them." Lin Hung-pin ( the
governor-general of that province and Liu Jung-ch'ing (^'l'^/^) the
provincial commander (t' i-tu Ll:i§) were exiled to Urumchi and Hi
respectively by the Emperor on charges that they failed to eradicate
23
19the opium smoking from among their troops.
In the late 1830's, the Manchu government officials gradually
divided into two groups on the opium problem: one advocating
legalization and other thorough suppression. The advocates of the
first group held that legal measures however stringent, could never
eliminate the use of the opium, so, in face of the constant silver
outflow, it would be possible just to put a tax on opium to relieve
the financial problems of the country. Those in the second group,
dissatisfied with the loose and superficial policies on the existing
problem, demanded that both opium dealers and addicts should be dealt
with severely.
In May 1836 Wang Yueh ( lilfl), a censor of Hu-Kuang Circuit ( $ ijfe )
memorialized that the government should strictly prohibit the opium
smoking among the troops; other opium smokers, the "vagabonds" could be
left alone and allowed to smoke.2<^ In June, Hsu Nai-chi ( t*f ), a
minister in charge of the Court of Sacrificial Worship^ supported the
suggestion of Wang Yueh and advocated the legalization of opium. For
Hsu reasoned that though opium smoking certainly shortened people's
lives, China's population was growing so there was no need to worry
that it might start to fall. He also advised a permissive policy on
the cultivation of the poppy, allowing anyone who wished to do so.
Hsu believed that when enough people did the cultivation, the foreign
opium poppy would no longer be profitable and the foreign merchants
21
would abandon the opium trade of their own accord.
19. See the biography of Li Hung-pin in Ch'ing-shih Lieh-chuan
(Biographies of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Taipei, 1962), 36:46b.
20. Liang T'ing-nan, Yueh hai-kuan chih (Gazetteer of the maritime
customs of Kuang-tung) (Canton, post-1839), 18:26.
21. Details of his memorial, see IWSM. TK l.la-4a.
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In 1858 Huang Chudvtzu i^>), a minister in charge of the
Court of State Ceremonial, warned the Emperor that the opium ban
had been ineffective in the past century. If the situation was
allowed to continue, the price of silver vis a_ vis the other exchange
medium - copper coin - would go on rising. The silver resources,
which were the state's main source of revenue, would thus keep on
diminishing, and the government would soon have no funds available
to meet expenditure. In order to avoid this situation, he stressed
22
that capital punishment should be inflicted upon opium addicts. A
heated debate on the opium ban had thus begun. The Emperor sent the
proposal of Huang Chbeh-tzu to all the provincial governor-generals and
governors to invite their opinions. The outcome was eight for the
proposal and twenty against. Lin Tse-hsu, the then Governor-general
of Hu-Kuang (Hupeh and Hunan) was in the minority party. Being a
faithful supporter of Huang's idea, he cautioned the Emperor with his
famous saying: "Opium is extremely harmful and must be relentlessly
suppressed. If things are left to slide, I am afraid in a few decades,
China will have no soldiers capable of resisting its enemies and
23
insufficient silver to finance its armed force." The Emperor was
deeply impressed by Lin's saying. On the last day of 1838 the
Emperor appointed Lin as imperial commissioner (ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en
§: ) to Canton with command of the "water-force" in Kuang-tung
24
to suppress the opium trade.
22. IWSM. TK 2.4a-9b.
23. Ch'i Ssu-ho, et al.. eds. Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The Opium War)
(Shanghai, 1954), 2:142, hereafter cited as YPCC.
24. IWSH. TK 5.16b-17a.
PART ONE
LIN TSE-HSU'S STRONG POLICY AND ITS INFLUENCE AT CANTON
CHAPTER 1
THE COMMISSION AND LIN'S*STRONG POLICY
Before his appointment in 1838 Lin was already laden with honours
for civil service. Born in Hou-kuan ) Fukien in 1785« Lin
became a chin-shih (a successful candidate of the national civil
service examination held at the imperial capital in the Ch'ing dynasty)
at the age of 27 (in l8ll), and he started his career as a bachelor
of the Hanlin Academy in Peking. In 1820 he was appointed intendant
of the' Hang-Chia-Hu Circuit ( ) in Chekiang as an
administrative official. In 1822 he was made acting salt controller
in Chekiang, and he became the provincial judicial of Kiangsu in the
following year. His uprightness in the judg ment of cases so impressed
the people that they called him "Lin Ch'ing-t'ien" (Lin, the Clear Sky).
At the age of 49> Lin was made governor of Kiangsu in 1832. Before
his office in Kiangsu, the Emperor received him in a court audience,
reminding him that the government had great expectations of him and
adding that he should make himself a good governor, Lin kept his post
in Kiangsu until 1837« During this period, he twice acted as governor-
general of Hu-kuang (Hupeh and Hunan) staying in this post until his
appointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton on the last day of 1838.
Apart from his brilliant civil records, Lin was also famous for
his work in local matters, such as sea transportation, salt
administration and in particular, flood control. In 1824 even though
he was still in his period of mourning over his mother's death in his
1. Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)
(Washington, 1944)» I> 51L*
home town, he was summoned by an emergency imperial decree to repair
2
a broken dyke on the Yellow River in Kiangsu. Again in the autumn of
1841, he was sentenced to exile in Hi, Sinkiang, as a result of his
strong policy with regard to the opium trade. The Emperor delayed his
exile and ordered him to hasten to Kai-feng ( $1 ), in Honan to
assist Wang ring ( tflf ), the then grand councillor, in conservancy
work.^
Lin did not engage in military affairs before his imperial
commission except in a coincidental case in 1823. In that year a
flood of the Sung River ( ) in Kiangsu drove the stricken people
to the verge of revolt. Lin, being the judicial commissioner of that
province, went in one boat to plead with the people. He succeeded in
quieting them and bloodshed was avoided.^
In the middle of 1838 Lin carried out an anti-opium programme
within the territory of his viceroyalty - Hupeh and Hunan, by destroying
the equipment of smokers, and arresting opium addicts. In September
of the same year, Lin reported to the Emperor that in his two provinces
he had searched out and confiscated some 5*500 pipes and some 12,000
Chinese ounces of the drug opium. At the same time, innumerable opium
5
users were arrested. This achievement gave him confidence to urge
the Emperor to attack the opium problem on three fronts simultaneously.
2. Hsin-pao Chang, Commission Lin and the Opium War (Harvard University
Press, 1964), p.124 .
3. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 513.
4. Ch'i Ssu-ho, et al. (eds.)» Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The Opium War)
(Shanghai, 1954), 6:320, hereafter cited as YPCC.
5. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 5H•
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First, there should be medical care to cure the opium addicts, with a
death sentence for violators; second, Chinese opium dealers had to be
rounded up and punished until the domestic distribution network was
completely smashed; and third, foreign stocks of opium had to be
confiscated and the signing of a bond for the termination of opium
smuggling by foreign merchants was indispensable.
Before his appointment as Imperial Commissioner, Lin had little
experience in foreign (barbarian) affairs. However, he already had a
bad impression of the British. In 1832, when the Lord Amherst,the
surveying ship at Canton branch of the East India Company under the
/
v
joint command of H.H. Lindsay and Charles Gutzlaff tarried along the
coast of Shanghai, Kiangsu, Lin, the then governor of Kiangsu,
immediately gave instructions to the commander-in-chief of that province,
Kuan T'ien-p'ei ( f|f K *% ) to drive off the British vessel. Lin
remarked that his instructions were necessary as the barbarians were
7
deceitful and roguish by nature; a watchful eye on them was requisite.
Like other Chinese statesmen of that time, Lin did not have much
knowledge about the West. He treated the Western countries outwith
Chinese civilization as vassal states, not strong powers. Thus, in
his imperial commission to Canton in 1839* Lin's manner towards the
British was bound to be arrogant. It was difficult for such a character
//ie
to sit down beforeAnegotiating table to iron out difficulties with
his British counterpart, except with an inflexible and uncompromising
approach.
6. Lindsay was then a. merchant to East India Company. Gutzlaff
v/as described as "the Prussian buccaneer missionary interpreter",
see Arthur' v/aley, The: Opium War throuah Chinese Eyes (London,
1958), p.110.
7. YPCC. 1 :106, 107.
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The appointment of the imperial commissionership put much
psychological pressure on Lin. In Ancient Chinese society, the terms
"Chih-yu chih-en Viif HS- " (Literally, the debt one owes to somebody
who understands one and has treated one well) and "Chu-kung chin-ts'ui
" (Literally, to devote oneself to state affairs body and soul)
were deeply involved in the relationship between the emperor and his
official. Chu-ko Liang, ( famous premier of Shu Han ( H ^ )
during the' Three Kingdoms Epoch (A.D. 220-265) was at first a recluse.
Later, Liu Pei ( ^?'| ), the ruler of Shu Han, went to visit him at
his remote farm in Nan-tien ((5;©) to discuss current affairs. Liu
realized that Chu-ko was a man of parts, and so he implored the latter
to help his regime and offered him the post of premiership. When
Liu Pei was at death's door, he asked Chu-ko to help his son to cope
with the other two rival regimes (Wu-fkand Wei $&.). Chu-ko consoled
the dying ruler, saying that he had always felt that he owed the ruler
a great debt for his understanding and good treatment of him, and
adding that he would devote himself to help his son body and soul.
Before his mission to Canton, Lin received from the Tao-kuang
fAese
Emperor similar words Chu-ko received from Liu Pei who was at
death's door. In one of the imperial audiences, the emotional
Emperor even said to Lin with wet eyes: "How, alas, can I die and go
to the shades of my imperial fathers and ancestors, until these dire
8
evils are removed!" In order to remove the anxiety of his gracious
Emperor, Lin had to fulfil his obligation to stamp out the opium
trade. Even when he failed in his mission and was exiled to Hi in
the middle of 1.841, he did not blame the Emperor for his harsh
8. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.120. This is a translation of Chang.
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punishment, but regretted his inability to complete his job in Canton.
In his mission to Canton Lin also took with him the hopes of the
scholars of the chin-wen t),*the"modern text" school. The chin-
wen scholars interpreted the teachings of Confucius as being in favour
of reforms. The chin-wen school rose as a protest against the Ch'eng-
Chu-Li-Hsueh ^f. (the "Sung School of rationalism" by the Ch'eng
brothers /cHeng Kao and Chieng I and Chu Hsi ( ).
Immanuel C.Y, Hsu describes' it thus:
"The Sung school of Rationalism (li-hsueh), commonly
known in the Western world as Keo-Confucianism, was
a syncretic philosophy which contained elements of
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, and which
provided a system of metaphysics to sanction the old
Confucian moral order. Its most eminent apostles
were Ch'eng Hao (1031-85), Ch'eng I (1032-1107), and
Chu Hsi(1130-1200). These Sung scholars advanced the
dual concepts of the rational principle (li) and its
material manifestation (ch'i). According to this
school, everything has a rational principle for its
being. "All things under heaven, "Ch'eng I wrote,
"can be understood in the light of their (rational)
principle. As there are things, there must be their
specific (rational) principles. One thing necessarily
has one principle." Thus, a tree or a blade of grass
has its ov/n rational principle which makes it what it
is. There is only one universal rational principle,
although there are many manifestations of it. For
instance, the concept of jen, often translated as
humanity of benevolence, is manifested in filial piety,
in affection to one's children, in loyalty to one's
ruler, etc. Thus, there is only one jen but many
manifestations." 10
9. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih (General history of the Ch'ing
period), II, 993.
10. Hsu, Rise, p.106.
The Ch'eng-Chu Li-jhsueh became the main stream of intellectual
thinking because of the support of K'ang-hsi Emperor (l6 62-1722), who
honoured Chu Hsi as a great philosopher. The support of course had a.
political motive, for Chu Hsi's ideas of the importance of honouring
the ruler were helpful for the Manchu domination of the state. Chu
Hsi's learning was even more emphasized by the high-handed Y ng~cheng
Emperor (1723-35)- In 17^9 Hsieh Chi-shih ( jftitf ) was sentenced
to hard labour by the Emperor for his criticism of the learning of Chu
Hsi and the Ch'eng brothers."'""'" Time-serving scholars in the country
therefore flocked to study the philosophy of the Ch'eng brothers and
Chu Hsi}2
On the other hand, the cruel suppression of anti-Manchu thinking
in the literary inquisitions during the reigns of Yung-cheng and
Ch« ien-lung was a nightmare to scholars in later generations. These
scholars found refuge in the Li-hsueh which was politically safe.
They spent all their time and energy in antiquarian research. As a
result, no scholars paid attention to current political affairs.
The chin-wen learning was pioneered by Chung Ts'un-yu ()
(1719-1788), who emphasized the reformist spirit as shown in the Kung-
yang Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals of Confucius. The
learning after its development by Liu Feng-lu (1776-1829) stressed
the spirit of "t'o-ku kai-chih ft, £"££#</" (literally, finding in antiquity
the sanction for present-day changes). In the 1830s the chin-wen
11. For details of Hsieh's life, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I,
306-307.
12. Hsu, Rise, p.44-
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scholars advocated the pursuit of knowledge for practical use.1^
They criticised the scholars of Li-hsueh, who being immersed in ancient
textual research and commentaries had lost contact with the reality
of society and deprived the country of practical leadership.
Lin belonged to the chin-wen school. When he took office in
Peking (l8ll-l8l8), he joined the "Hsiao-han Shih-she (Poetry
Club Concerning the Method of Dispersing Poverty) which was formed by
chin-wen scholars in Peking in 1814. The poetry club consisted of
reformers and officials with progressive views. They made a conscious
effort to solve economic and social problems. It is interesting to
note that there was no Manchu in that poetry club in Peking which
was the very heart of the Manchu administration.
In 1830 Lin, together with Kung Tzu-chen and Wei-yuan (4)1 )
regenerated the "Hsiao-han Sh'th— She " and changed its name to the
"Hsuain-nan poetry-Club ( '3? >$-?*•)". The new poetry club became the
"think-tank" of the chin-wen scholars who shared a common feeling that
reforms in both social and economic affairs were urgently needed.
Abolition of the evil opium traffic was■the most serious issue of all.
In my opinion, among the "Hsuan-nan" members by this time there had
emerged the patriotic spirit of the early Ch'ing nationalist, Ku Yen-wu
/A$. (1613-1682), who cried out for the growth of the national
consciousness which was lacking among the li-hsueh scholars, saying
that: "The rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen."
In one sense the imperial commissionership of Lin was the first,
success of the "Hsuan-nan". If Lin succeeded in stamping out. the
13. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.123.
opium traffic, the members of the poetry club would earn the Emperor's
confidence and more of his support for their reforms in other areas,
such as local administration, land and taxation systems and military
organization.
Lin's mission to Canton was blessed by all his "Hsuan-nan"
collaborators, especially by Kung Tzu-chen who was his bosom friend
and co-founder of the poetry club. When Kung heard of Lin's mission,
he expressed his eagerness to go with Lin to'Canton. As it was
impossible for Kung to join the imperial commission, he wrote two
letters to Lin, suggesting to him possible measures for abolishing the
opium trade.Kung also wrote a parting poem for the Imperial
Commissioner. He praised courage and righteousness of Lin in taking
up such a meaningful and difficult mission, adding that the future of
the nation depended upon him. Kung wished that he could stamp out the
opium traffic so that the outflow of the silver could be stopped; if
the corresponding rise in commodity prices (in the eighteen provinces)
of the empire could be controlled, then the Chinese people would be
15
able to enjoy peaceful and prosperous lives.
We can understand how Lin must have felt under the shadow of the
gracious appointment of the Emporor, and with the blessing of his
"Hsuan-nan" collaborators. Before he started his journey to Canton on
8th January 1839» he wrote to a friend that he would exert himself
14. For details of Kung's letter, see Chang, Commissioner Lin,
p.126-127.
15. Feng Yu~lan, "Ya-p'ien chan-chang yii Lin Tse-hsu" (The Opium War
and Lin Tse-hsli), Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang shih lun-wen chi
(Collected essays on modern Chinese intellectual history)
(Shanghai, 1958), p.6.
fully in the matter of eradicating the evil opium traffic, adding
that he was ignoring all the negative results which might befall him
. . . 16
in his mission.
After the appointment of Lin as the Imperial Commissioner, the
Emperor sent an edict to Teng Ting-chen, the Governor-general of Liang-
kuang, and I-liang, a Manchu, the Governor of Kuang-tung, to demand
17full support for Lin's mission.
In the great debate in 1838, Teng supported the proposal of Huang
Chueh-tzu that the opium traffic should be abolished, but he did not
agree that capital punishment should be inflicted on the Chinese
smokers. Teng suggested punishing the smokers by tattooing the face
on the left cheek with four Chinese characters, "Hsi-3hih ya-p'ien
" (smoking opium). If the offenders smoked again, they should
be flogged, and tattooed with another two characters "Tsai-fan
(a second-time offender), or "San-fan ^^"(a third-time offender) on
their right cheek. For those repeated offenders, Teng deemed it right
18
to be exiled to Sinkiang. I-liang held the same idea on the
punishment of the smokers. He also did not agree with capital
punishment
As a matter of fact, Teng had been ordered by the Peking government
to stamp out opium and' to devise a long-range plan of control in
16. Chen Sheng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsii ti i-sheng" (The life of Lin Tse-
hsu). Chung-kuo chin-tai jen-wu lun-ts'ung (Collection of articles
on modern Chinese personalities) (Peking, 1965), p.6.
17. IWSM, IK 5.l6b-17b; YPCC, 6:320.
18. IWSM. IK 5.2b-3a.
19. IWSM. TK 5.6a.
September, 1836. Within one year Teng had prosecuted many Chinese
and 20
opium dealers,<1 many opium addicts had been arrested. ' At the same
ciea I
time, Teng had destroyed "fast crabs" and the native smuggling
networks outside Canton. However, Tens's achievement proved a humble
one in comparison with Lin's. By mobilizing and organizing the gentry
and literati to assist in his anti-opium campaign, Lin arrested 1,600
opium violators and confiscated 28,845 catties of opium and 42,741
opium pipes within his first nine weeks in Canton. In the following
seven weeks, 192 more violators were arrested and 11,000 catties of
opium and 27,538 opium pipes were confiscated. In sixteen weeks Lin
arrested five times as many opium violators and confiscated seven times
21
as many opium pipes as Teng' had done in three years.
After his arrival at Canton, Lin's efforts were directed first to
forcing the surrender of British stocks of opium and then to eliminating
the source of the British imports.
In the first place, Lin told the British merchants that their
import, of opium was illegal and immoral. He requested that all the
22
opium should be surrendered and none should be concealed. Later,
Lin used moral remonstrances in a letter to the Queen of England: "I
have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by
your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly
20. Teng arrested about 345 opium addicts but did not inflict serious
punishment on them. See Chinese Repository. E.C. Bridgman and
S. Wells Williams, ed. (Macao or Canton, 1832-1851), 7:112,232,
336, hereafter cited as OR.
21. See Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.129.
22. Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1928, tr. and
ed. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton, 1956X p.30.
understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country
then even less should you let it be passed on to the harm of other
23countries - how much less to China." When these methods did not
succeed in bringing about the surrender of British opium, Lin decided
to take coercive measures.
Lin knew the important role of the Hong merchants in the business
transactions of the Canton trade. When foreign merchants came to
trade with China, the Hong merchants offered them compradores,
linguists, shroffs,^ and servants. Also, they managed the selling
25of foreign commodities and the purchase of Chinese goods. The
British merchants alone could not do their trade with China without
the Hong merchants. When the British ignored the request of Lin, the
angry Imperial Commissioner threatened to decapitate the two leading
26 L -*-r
hong merchants, Howqua and Mowqua )• The British
merchants gave in and surrendered 1,036 chests of opium. Lin of
course was not satisfied with such a small amount of opium. He
informed the British that until they had completely surrendered their
opium, they would not be allowed to leave Canton. Garrison troops
were ordered to barricade the factory area, and gunboats were sent to
27
patrol the river in front, of the factories.
23. Teng, S.Y., and J.K. Fairbanks, China's Response to the West
(Harvard University Press, 1954)? I? 25•
24. Shroff - an Indian word for an old-style banker. For detailed
description, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.234, n.32.
25. Hsu, Rise, p.190.
26. Lin was hostile to the Hong merchants because they supported
repealing of the opium prohibition in 1836, and dealt with the
opium traffic at Canton. See Li, Political History, p.28.
27. CR, 7:621.
During the siege of the factories, Lin demanded Lancelot Dent,
the alleged leader of the opium trade, as a hostage, but the British
refused to hand over their countryman. On 24th March, Charles
Elliot, the British superintendent of trade, tried to rescue the
20
confined merchants. The troops on guard allowed him to enter the
factory, but he was not permitted to leave. When all the British
merchants were confined with their leader, Lin then ordered the
withdrawal of the Chinese compradores and servants from the factory
and informed Elliot that the stoppage of trade would forever be in
force. Elliot wrote a letter to Lin requesting passports for the
British to Macao, but he got the reply that until the opium was
completely surrendered, his request would not be considered. It
seemed to Elliot that surrender of the opium would relieve the weary
confined British merchants and make possible the continuation of the
trade. On 27th March, Elliot ordered the British merchants to give
up all their opium to Lin, pledging them that he himself and the
Her Britannic Majesty's Government would be responsible for their loss.
When the total number of 21,306 chests of opium were surrendered, Lin
allowed the British to leave the factory. All the British subjects
thus took refuge in Macao.
Lin's achievement in forcing the surrender of opium was that he
28. CH, 7:623-625.
29. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.264-265.
made full use of the available Chinese forces. He ordered the soldiers
to blockade the factory, but reminded them not to stir up trouble.
After the complete surrender of the opium from the British merchants,
he reported to the Emperor with satisfaction: "Our policy is t.o
control the moving with the quiet, and to be rigorous without resorting
to any offensive action. But the barbarians, revering the Virtue of
the Emperor and dreading his Authority, already have begun to tremble.
The surrendered chests of opium were publicly destroyed between
3rd June and 5th June, on a beach at Bogue, with foreigners among the
many spectators."^ At this time Lin started to eliminate the source
of the opium imports. He insisted that the captain of each foreign
merchant ship entering Whampoa ( "W *$1 \ the port at Canton should sign
a bond that his ship would never carry opium to China. Lin made it
clear that if the foreign captains broke the pledge, "the cargo will
be confiscated, and the persons involved will receive due punishment
32
according to law."
Elliot considered the signing of the bond to be intolerable:
punishments under the Manchu code had a touch of brutality-beating with
the light and the heavy bamboo, transportation, banishment and death
30. IWSM, TIC 6.13b-14a.
31. Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (London, 1975)» p.84-85.
32. CR, 7:648.
by strangulation or decapitation. Elliot did not approve that the
merchants should individually sign the bond.
On 7th July a critical incident, occurred at Chien-sha-tsui, (% "J,
Kowloon, in which a Chinese villager, named Lin Wei-hsi (#vK>£-f- ) was
beaten so badly by a group of British sailors in a quarrel over a wine
order that he died the following day."^ Lin repeatedly demanded the
surrender of the culprits, but Elliot refused to submit British subject!
to Chinese law. Elliot organized a navy court aboard the Fort William
and himself acted as judge in the trial of the British suspects. Lin
argued that since the murder was committed in Chinese territory where
British jurisdiction was not recognized, the culprits should be
surrendered and tried by a Chinese court. However, Elliot did not
surrender the culprits, saying that he was not able to find out the
murderer.
Elliot's reply made Lin very indignant. Lin decided to expel
all the British subjects who took refuge in Macao after the siege of
factories ordered by Lin in March as a reprisal. In an edict to the
Governor of Macao, he ordered the latter to order all the Portuguese
who had rented their houses to the British, to oblige them to quit.
But his edict added: "So soon as the English be brought to repentance,
and deliver up the murderer ... you can then rent their houses as
heretofore.""^ The departure of all British subjects from Macao was
demanded by the Portuguese governor. On 26th August, the British took
refuge in their ships and some of them left for Hong Kong. Although
33. CR, 8:180.
34. Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books). Correspondence Relating to
China (1840), p.438, hereafter cited as PP: China Corr.
they later requested the permission of the Portuguese governor to move
back to Macao, the governor refused their request under the pretext of
3b
preserving strict neutrality. y
In addition, the supplies of food and v/ater were cut off because
of Elliot's refusal to give up the murderer. The springs along the
coast were poisoned. Driven by hunger and thirst, Elliot ordered
Gutzlaff, to lead three armed vessels - his cutter Louisa, together
with schooner-rigged Pearl and the Volage's pinnace - to make their
way to.Kowloon to demand provisions. Three large Chinese war junks
appeared to greet the British vessels; the battery on shore was also
ready for conflict.
Gutzlaff, unarmed, went ashore to try to present two letters
written in Chinese to the Chinese officials. The first letter warned
the officials that if the British were not supplied with food, the
officials were bound to su ffer reprisals. The second was addressed
to the natives on the coast urging them not to poison the springs of
fresh water. The Chinese officials told Gutzlaff that they lacked
authority to accept the British letters.
In the afternoon, Elliot sent the Chinese officials an ultimatum:
if the British did not get supplies within half an hour, they would
35• The Portuguese obeyed Lin's order to expel the British subjects
from Macao because the sovereignty of Macao at that time still
belonged to Chinese government (China officially lost her
sovereignty over Macao after the murder of Portuguese Governor
Amral (in Macao) by Chinese aggressors in August, 1849)*
Hostilities between China and Portugal at that time would affect
the political situation of Macao. Besides, Lin might have
declared the stoppage of trade with the Portuguese if they had
not expelled the British from the island.
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sink the junks. When the full thirty minutes had expired, the
British fired the first shot of the yet undeclared Opium War. The
fight lasted till two o'clock in the morning. Both the Chinese and
the British suffered minor damage on their vessels. But Lin exaggerated
the victory on the Chinese side. In his report to the Emperor, he
said that a two-mast British ship had been sunk and several British
marines were shot dead by the Chinese water-force."^ On hearing the
report of the Chinese victory on 4th September, the Emperor instructed
Lin: "Since such action (in Kowloon) had taken place already, weakness
should not be shown. It is not our worry that you might be reckless,
37
but we want to warn you not to be timid."
In retrospect, Lin's own will had, caused the coercive measures in
the abolition of opium. Lin was firmly of the idea that the
greed of the barbarians was boundless. A short time after his arrival
at Canton he expressed his opinion about the nature of the barbarians
in one of his reports: "If we hold firm in our position (by one
CChinese) centimeter), they will stay where they are if we yield one
step, they will move one step. The nature of the barbarians is
unpredictable and changeable." Later, Lin cautioned the Emperor
36. IWSM, TK 8.15a.
37- IWSM, TK 8.17b.
38. IWSM,' TK 8.27b. The War Party members in the post-war period
were influenced by this idea. Take Hsu Kuang-chin as an example,
he thought,that China's appeasement policy in the post-war period
was out of question. Since "the barbarian's nature is to covet
Profit." He continued, "no matter what China does, the
barbarians would continue to demand more and more territory and
resources."
that if the government was not able to startle the barbarjans, once
the barbarians of one country had succeeded in benefiting from the
empire, other barbarians would follow their example and demand benefit
39
from the country.
Lin shared with his contemporaries the view that the Canton trade
was beneficial to the foreign merchants, but not to the Chinese people.
ntso
Besides, he^believed that the tea and rhubarb were essential to the
health and the livelihood of the foreigners. In his letter to Queen
Victoria in 1839> he said: "Take tea and rhubarb for example, the
foreign countries cannot get along for a single day without them.
If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are
to suffer, then what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves
alive?"^ In a joint memorial with Teng, in March 1839 Lin told
the Emperor: "Tea and rhubarb are basic needs for the foreigners ...
if such exports were suspended, we would bring about the end of their
lives and retrieve the right of making profit.Lin could not
allow the British merchants to come to covet China's wealth and destroy
the lives of the Chinese people with their opium. When the British
refused to surrender their stocks of opium and sign the bond, Lin did
not hesitate to order the "forcible detention" of the factories in
order to clip the wings of the arrogant British merchants.
As for the dispute over the murder of Lin Wei-hsi, Lin was
convinced that the British merchants, while enjoying enormous profit
39. IWSM, TK 16.21a.
40. Teng, China's Response, p.23.
41. YPCC, 2:144, 148.
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from the Chinese trade, should be regulated by Chinese government and
_ 42 +*
laws. Lin had already reminded the merchants on 18*March, 1839
that since the merchants had come into the territory of China, they
should pay obedience to its laws and statutes, equally with the
natives of the land. After the murder of Lin Wei-hsi, Lin emphasized
the Chinese code that: "He who kills a man must pay the penalty of
life." Prom the point of view of China's sovereignty, Lin's demand
for the British culprits was rightful and lawful.
Elliot's refusal to give up the murderers was not. surprising.
In 1837> when two lascars were accused of wounding Chinese subjects,
Elliot refused to surrender the two attackers. He wrote to Lord
(tLs la.sc.o~ts)
Palrnerston on 20 September, 1837: "They/.have been in my custody ever
since; and your lordship may be assured that I will never give them
up to any other form of trial than that to which I have pledged myself,
namely, a trial according to thq^orms of British laws."^ Yao T'ing-
fang ("fY As> f) had mentioned in his book on Opium War that in the
nineteenth century when foreign sailors, especially the Portuguese
sailors, caused harm or death to natives, the Chinese authorities
always insisted on the surrender of the culprits to be tried according
to the Chinese laws. Eventually, the foreigners learned how to use
money to smooth over a homicide. They gave money to the victims'
families and asked them not to take the lawsuits to the murderers.
At the same time, they bribed the Chinese authorities not to take
42. Lin estimated that the British merchants could obtain 300^ of
profit by selling their commodities in China, See IWSM. TK 6.30a.




official action to investigate nhe cases. Elliot took
a leaf out of the Portuguese book to smooth over the murder
of Lin Wei-hsi. After the murder, he sailed to the village
where the murder had taken place, handing out $15oo to the
family of the victim; $200 as a "reward for evidence con¬
victing the real murder", $100 to distribute among the
45
villagers, and $400 to bribe local officials. ^
H.B. Morse has impressed on us that the Tao-kuang
Emperor took a "stern policy of repression" as regards
the opium trade, adding "of all the problems he (the
Emperor) had to deal with, none exceeded in importance
46
the opium question, and on this he showed no hesitation."
Commissioner Lin had more unrelenting vigour
in the abolition of the opium trade than the Bmperor.
When Lin ordered the foreign merchants to surrender their
opium stocks on 18th march 1839* he stated resolutely:
"I will not leave Canton until the flow of opium is
stemmed. I have solemnly pledged to see this matter satis¬
factorily dealt with and nothing can obstruct me in this
47
respect." '
However, the Emperor after Lin's success in confis¬
cating 21,306 chests of British opium felt that this was
already a great achievement. He feared that Lin's further
44. lao T'ing-fang, Ya-p'ien chan-chen^ yu Tao-kuang huang-
ti, Lin Tse-hsti, Ch1i-shan, Ch'i-yxng (The Opium Wer
and the Tao-kuang Emperor, Lin Tse-hsii, Ch'i-shan and
Ch'i-ying) (Taipei, 1970), I, 192.
45. Beeching, Opium wars, p.88.
46. Morse, International delations., p.214.
47. YPCC, 2:243-244.
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coercive measures on British opium traders might eventually
stir up frontier conflict. On 22nd April, he issued an
edict to Bin urging the latter to leave Canton for Nanking
to take up his new appointment as governor-general of
Jjiang-kiang. Eventually, Lin insisted on remaining in
Canton to carry out the thorough eradication of the opium
48. TPCC, 2:103, 147-14-9.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DIFFICULTIES OF LIN AND THE USE OF "WATER-BRAVES"
In October, 1839 Lin's anti-opium campaign was very close to full
success, when Mr. Warner the British captain of the merchant ship, the
Thomas Couttes entered Whampoa to trade after signing of the following
bond i
A truly and willing bond"''
The foreigner ...... commander of ship belong
to under....... consignment, present this
to His Excellency the Great Government of Heavenly
Dynesty, and certificate that the said ship carry
....... goods come and trade in Canton; I, with my
officer, and the whole crew are all dreadfully
obey the new laws of the Chinese Majesty, that they
dare not bring any opium; if one little bit of
opium was found out in any part of ray ship by
examination, I am willingly deliver up the
transgressor, and he shall be punished to death
according to the correctness law of the Government
of Heavenly Dynesty; both my ship and goods are to
be confiscated to Chinese Officer; but if there
found no opium on my ship by examination, then I
beg your Excellency's favor permit my ship enter
to Whampoa and trade as usual; so.if there are
distinguish between good and bad, then I am
willingly submit to Your Excellency: and I now
give this bond as a true certificate of the same,
Heavenly Dynesty, Taou-Kv/ang
year....... moon....... day,
Name of Captain Ship " Officer...
Warner's action had influenced another British merchant Mr. Danne
ic




October^ intending' to enter Whampoa for trade shortly. More
British merchants gathered their ships at Ling-ting Island %
(at the mouth of Pearl River)yi#4cA/7jg' a wait-and-see policy. On 25th
October Elliot received a peremptory edict from Lin for the immediate
surrender of the murderers of Lin Wei-hsi, and demanding that the
ships gathering at Ling-ting, should, either enter to trade or sail away,
2
otherwise the Chinese authorities would use fire-rafts to burn them.
Elliot responded to Lin's edict by ordering Captain Smith to lead
a fleet as a precaution to Chuen-pi ( JjjF- i| ) outside the Bogue,
At the same time, Lin instructed Kuan T'r'en -p&i to send war junks there to
watch the British fleet.
On 3rd November when the Royal Saxon was approaching Whampoa,
Captain Smith despatched two war ships to obstruct her, A shot was
fired across her bow from Captain Smith's Volage. Kuan,
trying to protect the Royal Saxon responded with shots. The naval
engagement lasted in two hours at Ch'uen-pi, Of the twenty-nine
Chinese war junks, one was blown to pieces immediately, three were
sunk, and several more were seriously damaged, but the British ships
3
did not suffer serious damage.
After the Ch'uen-pi conflict, Elliot ordered attacks on Kuang-
yang ('§;'/§ ), in Kowloon six times from 4th to 13th November, 1839.^
The Emperor was already angry on account of the British action in the
2. Korse, International Relations, p.245.
3. _CR, 8:491-4935? cf. IWSM, TX 8.29a-30b.
4. IWSM. TK 8.32x-3kb.
Kowloon clash on 4th September. This time he ordered hostilities
against the British in an edict; "Lin Tso-hsu and his colleagues are
hereby enjoined to consider the present situation at Canton, and to
bring about the stoppage of the trade with the British. All the
ships of that country should be driven out from the port. Do not
require them to sign the bond any more. Nor is it worth while to ask
5
them to surrender the offender in the murder of the native."
On 5th January, 1840 Lin carried out the imperial edict and
proclaimed the formal closure of the port of Canton and the stoppage
of British trade. The British ships in Lingting Island were ordered
to leave, but the British captains turned a deaf ear to the order.
They continued to anchor their ships there under the armed protection
of the Volage and the Hyacinth.^
By the end of January Lin received an imperial edict, ordering
him to take over the governor-generalship of Liang-kuang from Teng
T'ing-chen while the latter was ordered to leave Nanking to take up the
7
new post. War clouds were getting thicker in Canton. But was
Lin's confidence in the on-going confrontation with the British
getting greater?
Lin faced two problems in contending with the British. The first
one was the weakness of the "water-force" of Kuang-tung which the
Emperor entrusted to him in his imperial commission.
5. IWSM, TK 8.36b.
6. CR, 8:442.
7* Tung ITua LufThe record of the Tung-hua jugate) ) (Peking, 1887), Tao™
lcuang period, 40:6.
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The "water force" of Kuang-tung was a fleet of various size of old
junks. One~niast junks were the backbone of the force. These junks
were made of sort of hard timber called t'c&K -Jti- ma (ivf\ ,
Each of these junks had ten guns. The defect of the junks was that the
hull was too thin. When they sailed in the high seas, the vessels could
easily be shaken by waves. Besides, the sailors found it difficult to
fire accurately at their targets.^ The'water-force" was mainly designed
for inland-river patrols and anti-pirate operations along the coast.
Like "water-forces" in other coastal provinces, the"water-force" of
Kuang-tung was a subordinate part of the provincial organized Chinese
o
Green Banner troops." It had nine grades of officers from admiral to sub¬
lieutenant. The admiral was under the instruction of the Governor-
general."^ Kuan T'ien-p'ei, the admiral of the"water-force" of
Kuang-tung was a dutiful and brave old man. Before he took charge of
the"water-force", he had been the commander-in-chief of Su-Sung Circuit (.% s;
Kiangsu. At that time, he became acquainted with Lin who was then the
governor of Kiangsu. The admiral was famous for his clemency to his
inferiors, but this made it hard for him to discipline them.'1'''
Before his arrival at Canton, Lin had already heard of the
8. Juan Yuan, ed., Kuana-tung t'ung-chth (Gazetteer of Kuangtung)
(compiled 1818, reprinted 1864), 124:2434-2435, passim. More
information concerning the Chinese fleet can be obtained from
Yukien (a Mongol), the then governor-general of Liang-Kiang in
1841. He once told the Emperor that the war junks were equipped
with bamboo masts and wooden anchors. See IV/SN. TX 20.11b~12a.
9. John I. Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development 1839-
1895 (Harvard University Press, 1967), p.106.
10. Vrang Hsien-ch'ien, comp. Tung-hua hsu-lu (Continuation of the
record of the Tung-hua (gate)) (editor's preface 1884), Tao-kuang
period, v. 38.
11. IWSM. TK 19.13a.
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j
corruption in the "water-force": the members accepted bribes from
opium smugglers to smooth the opium traffic; the officers submitted
regularly to the local government opium and silver provided by
smugglers. They got promotion from the pretended accomplishments.
Worst of all, Lin found out that many of the members of the force were
opium addicts. He remarked: "... the men (marines) remain on board
with nothing to do. One or two fill in the time by having a pipe of
opium, and soon the rest follow suit... It happens, too, that when in
the course of their duties they capture a cargo of opium, they do not
hand the whole of it over to the authorities, but abuse their official
capacity by keeping some of it for themselves, either for their own use
12
or to sell..." Shortly after his arrival in Canton, Lin personally
tried many of those corrupt officers of the "water-force" and seriously
punished them. Afterwards, he put the force directly under the
command of his own men, and planted detectives in the midst of the crews
33
to try to stop their corruption.
In order to acquire information about the West Lin organized a
staff of translators to collect and translate European language materials.
From the translations af the Canton Press and the Chinese
Repository, Lin learned that the foreigners held a low opinion of the
"water-force." The "water-force" in return feared the prestige of
Britain. Lin complained to the Emperor that the "water-force" was not
able to drive out the British ships in certain waters where the foreign
L2. Arthur Waley, The Onium War through Chinese Eyes (London, 1958),
p.26. This is a translation of Waley.
13. YPCC. 2:168.
vessels had never officially been permitted to pass; occasionally, the
British ships threatened the junks of the'water-force'with their guns
in those restricted areas when the latter tried to approach them."*"^
The second of Lin's problems was the lack of funds for warfare
with the British. Before his appointment to Canton, Lin's contribution
to local affairs such as improving dams, dykes and various forms of
social relief were achieved by his hard work with the local people.
When Lin was the governor of Kiangsu in early 1832, the people of
that province were suffering from a flood disaster. Lin could not
forget when he petitioned to the Emperor for the postponement of the tax
collection owing to the natural disaster, the Emperor approved his
request with remarks that the taxation was very important to the
government; Lin should work hard against the difficulties instead of
15
petitioning postponement of taxation. Lin then struggled with the
repair work by raising funds from the donation of the local merchants
and wealthy gentry.
The Emperor was notorious for his meanness. His imperial gown
was badly darned, but he refused to change it for a new one. The
Emperor limited annual expenditure for the palace to 200,000 taels
which made it difficult for the palace keeper (warden) to run the huge
place. The Peking opera had been a favorite of the Emperor. But
when he realized that it was costly to perform, he gave it up.'^J The
14. IWSM. TK 7.10b.
15. See Chen Sheng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsu ti i-shang" in Chung-kuo chin-tai
jen-wu lun-ta'ung. p.2.
16. See Chiang T'ing-fu, "Chung-kuo yu chin-tai shih-chieh ti ta-pien-c/?
(China and the great changes of the modern world), in Chung-hua min~
kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien (Collection of materials on the
origins of the Chinese Republic), First series, v„3» p.43»
51
Emperor also abstained from expensive foodstuffs. Early Ch'ing rulers
always gifted thoir fri'/^ured officials and ounuchs with precious materials
eunuchs
such as gold, silver or pearls. But such officials mcl^ during the Tao-kuang
reign could only receive satin, porcelain. Sometimes, they even
It is not difficult to understand that the thrifty Emperor highly
appreciated the ability of Lin and even hailed him as the most capable
official in the empire as Lin was able to fulfil difficult obligations by
himself without asking for funds from local or central governments.
The Emperor simply did not have the conception that war is made
.with money. He should have realised that his grandfather, Ch'ien-lung
Emperor achieved the"Ten Complete Victories tdhE\zVby spending 600 million
taels; his father the Chia-ching Emperor used up 200 million t4els to
put dorm the White Lotus Revolt. Unfortunately, when Lin needed to
struggle against his strong British opponents during the Opium War, the
Emperor did not give him financial help.
After the surrender of the British opium in April 1839, L.in sent
a report to the Emperor requesting imperial approval to allow him to
grant five catties of tea to each chest of surrendered opium as
compensation to the British merchants. He mentioned that, for the tea
would not be taken from the government treasury but would be contributed
18
by Teng, I-liang and himself. ' After the Chuen-pi battle, Lin set up
a defence scheme and requested the Emperor to permit him to draw funds
from the local treasury to support it. The Emperor" approved his
37. Fan Wen-Ian, Chuny-kuo chin-tad shih. ( Hisforij cf modern CAlna) , K. /, p.33.
received fruits as gifts from their Emperor.
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scheme but nevertheless did not allow him to take money from the
l o
treasury. Since then, Lin did not again petition for funds from
the Emperor. Later, when the War with Britain caused the Emperor to spend
ffluoh fflOfi-ey on. coastal. defence, Lin was harshly accused by the
Emperor for financial reasons. The angry Emperor sent an edict to
the Grand Secretariat: "Internally, they (Lin and Teng) were not able
wipe out the outlaws (opium smokers and smugglers); externally they
were not able to eliminate the opium source. The English barbarian
ships came to tarry along our coast this year. As a result, such
provinces as Pukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Shantung, Chihli, and Mukden,
made haste to collect troops for resistance, and that resulted in vast
military expenditure and waste of men. All these were caused by the
20
incompetency of Lin Tse-hsu and his colleagues," Again on 24
September Lin reported to the Emperor that if China had used one-
tenth of the Canton customs revenue for making gunboats she would have
no difficulty in tackling the barbarian problem. The Imperial ver/»i(<on
21
t on his proposal was : "All nonsense."
In January, 1840 Lin failed to carry out the imperial instruction
to drive the British ships off the Ling-ting Island with the feeble
"water-force". He gave the Emperor an unconvincing reason for not
taking naval action: "If we send the whole fleet of our"water-force"
19. Chiang T'ing-fu, "Ch'i-shan yu ya-p'ien chan-cheng'h in Chung-hua
min-kuo k'al-kuo wu-shlh nien wen-hsien. First series, v.4» p.110.
20. IWSH. TK 15.11b.
21. YPCC, 4:67-68.
to the outer ocean to drive off the foreign ships, there will be no
problem about success. We can even destroy them without much
difficulty. But our boats, after being sent out to sea, would not be
able to return immediately... the ocean is of high waves and changeable
winds... if one or two of our boats meet accidents, what we achieve
will not be worth our loss." "" In fact, the"water-force had proved
powerless to drive the British ships off Nan-ao (off eastern Kuang-tung)}
where foreign vessels had never been officially permitted to stay>in
June 1839. Lin was angry with the impotence of the force and he '
23
requested the emperor to dismiss some of its high-ranking officers.
Lin learned from the translations of Western materials, that the
British feared coastal pirates and Tanka people (boat dwellers) the most
?4
hardy and venturesome classes at Canton.
When Lin urged Elliot to surrender the British opium in 1839, he
warned Elliot that coastal people were amphibious, they treated ocean
as land. If the British incurred their anger (in smuggling opium),
25
they could destroy the receiving ships of opium easily.
In April 1840, Lin and Admiral Kuan drew up defence plans by
26
enlisting fishermen and Tanka people as "water-braves." Lin paid
22• IWST'T, TK 10.5b.
r
23. See Chang, Commissioner L:in. p. 130-131.
24. YPCC. 4:345.
25. YFCC. 2:302.
26. Waley, Opium War, p.99-100,
each member six dollars a month, and .another six dollars to the brave's
family. Later, he recruited another 5,000 strong men, pirates and
27
small boatmen to strengthen the defences of the Canton river.
erf
Lin accepted the idea of Admiral Kuan, using fire-rafts to attack
?s
the British ships in the outer ocean." On 8 April, Lin sent a report
to the Emperor, telling him that he and Admiral Kuan had considered
using large and small fire-rafts which were constructed during peace
time. They would recruit fishermen and Tanka people as"water-braves"
and teach them how to sail boats and operate f5.re tactics. When all
training was finished, they would send those water-braves to off-shore
islands to lie in ambush. When all the treacherous Chinese and
British barbarians on the ships had slept, he and Admiral Kuan would
order those concealed"water-braves" to sail their bcat3 up to the British
ships and set fire to them. Lin also suggested that thel,water~braves"
29
should be rewaxkied.
In order to encourage the combatant spirit of the"water-braves" and
people,Lin offered rewards for the capture and destruction of British
ships, and the capture or death of British officers and men, the money
30
rewards being on the following scale:"
27. Shih Ch'eng, ed. Kuan^r-chou fu-chih (Gazetteer of Kuftrtg-chou
prefecture (1879), 81:34b, hereafter cited as KCFC. Lin's recruit¬
ment in 1840 was very different from Tseng Kuo-fan (a 'SI M-)'s in
1852.. When Tseng was ordered by Peking to organize an army in his
home province (Hunan) he recruited his men not from the available
unemployed, but from the hardy and loyal peasantry, especially from
the mountain villages to form hisHsiang-chun Ail !$[ (Hunan Army).
28. IWSH. TK 10.5b, 14a-b.
29. IWSH. TK 10.6a-b.
30. See Morse, International Relat:'ons. 263, passim.
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For the capture of an 89-gun ship-of-war $20,000
For the capture of a merchant ship /Sio.ooo
For t?ae capture of a barque $ 5,000
For the captu.re of a brig or schooner $ 3,000
For the capture of a large boat i 300
For the capture of a small boat $ 100
For her destruction i of $ 100
For the capture of a naval commander I 5,000
For the death .. " -j of $ 5,000
For the capture of a soldier $ 100
For the death „ u \r $ 40
On 9th May the "water-braves' led by one or two petty officers in
each fire-raft launched a fire attack on the British ships at Kap-sing-
moon. Similar attacks on the British ships had been made in June.
Lin in reporting the result of the attacks, exaggerated the achievement
of the"water-braves" in burning the British vessels and killing the
31British and treacherous Chinese.
The "water-force"was excluded from those naval attacks. The
officers who led"water-braves'in fire-craft were selected from the
combat troops. Again money for operating these attacks and other
x?
expenditures were charged to the Hong merchants, not the local treasury.'
What was Lin's motive in using the Tanka people and fishex-men?
As a matter of fact, Lin had an ill-feeling towards those people.
When Charles Elliot refused to give up the murderers of Lin Wei-hsi in
August, 1839, Lin stopped the suppljr of food and water to the floating
31. IWSH, TK 10.6b-7a. But according to the record of CR: "little
or no danage (on British side) was sustained.
3?. E.J. Eitel, Eurone in China. The History of Hong Kong from the
Beginning to the Year 1883 (London, 1895), p.114-115.
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British community, hoping that depriving the British of their
provisions might bring Elliot to his knees. However, the Tanlca
people and fishermen used their boats to convey provisions and other
33
materials to the British ships in the outer ocean in exchange for opium.
Lin at once sent out orders to all fishing boats that they were not to
carry more than one day's provisions for their distant fishing, fearing
that their superfluous food would aid the British. On the other hand,
the Tanka people formed the largest part of the pirates along the coast
of Kuangtung, and were nicknamed "robber people." Their piratical
action started in the early period of the King dynasty (1368-1644).
When the Japanese pirates invaded the coast of China in 1387, a great
number of Tanlca people joined their action to loot the coastal
34
provinces. In peace time, they always captured Chinese merchant
boats and ravaged the coastal district. During the Opium War, many of
them worked on British ships and helped the British to spy on the
Chinese camps. In every fire attack on British ships ordered by Lin
and Admiral Kuan in Kay 1840, the Chinese force killed and captured a
lot of the fishermen and Tanka people.
Lin himself had a special hatred for the Tanka people. He once
reported to the Emperor that the Tanka people were "fond of money and
made light of their lives." Their supplies to the British had impeded
the national anti-opium campaign against the British.
To recruit fishermen and Tanka people as"water-braves" became Lin's
33. CIt, 8:442.
34. Kuan Lu-yin, "Kuang-tung, min-tsu ti kou-ch'eng ho chi sheng-ke"
(The nationality and identity of the people of Kuang-tung) in
Kin-sllib hui-k'an (The collected tnaterinls of literature and history),
v.l, p.81,
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policy in order to prevent these people fro** working A the British.
After recruiting these people as "water-braves" to fight the British,
he reported to the Emperor that his tactic was "to control traitors
35
with traitors; to attack poison with poison." Obviously, the first
traitor and poison refers to .the fishermen and Tanka people, and the
second to the British. YuKien, during the Opium War offered us a
clear picture of Lin's tactic. He told the Emperor: "The'water-
braves'are no better than rascals. If we employ them to attack the
English invaders, it is a matter of fusing poison to attack poison.®
Even if we lose many water-braves in the attacks on the English, the
strength of the empire will not be weakened. On the contrary, when
36
these'water-braves'disappear, the local district will bo at peace."
35. IWSH. TK 10.6a.
36. IWSH. TK 24.36a-b.
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CHAPTER 5
DISGRACE AND PUBLIC SYMPATHY
The British expeditionary force headed hy Admiral George Elliot
arrived at Kuang-tung water by the middle of June 1840. .Having
established'a blockade at the Pearl River estuary, the force followed
the instruction of the government and sailed northwards to take
military action.* On 5th July, the British reached T'ing-hai in
Chekiang Province and occupied the city. Prom T'ing-hai, the
British expedition sailed up to Pei-ho ( & ) near Tientsin. On
9th August George Elliot, the plenipotentary, transmitted a letter
from Lord Palmerston to Chi-shan, the governor-general of Chihli
demanding, among other things, satisfaction for the illegal detention
of the British Superintendent of Trade and of British subjects at
Canton; compensation for the surrendered opium; the payment of an
2
indemnity and the cession of one or more islands.
In Canton Lin knew that the Emperor would be very angry with him
about the British occupation of T'ing-hai, He had been offering
mistaken idea3 to the Emperor. At first he told the Emperor that the
British government would not stand behind the British opium traders in
China saying that the British opium vessels at Nan-ao (Nan-oa )
of eastern Kuangtung did not hold licences from their home country.
If discovered, Lin stressed, they would be punished by the British
1. CR, 9:419.
2. For detailsf*IWSM. TK 12.50a-39b.
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government. Later, Lin told the Emperor the British would hardly
3
send their fleet to attack China from 70 thousand li
After the fall of T'inghai in July 1840 Lin wasted no time in
persuading the Emperor to manoeuvre the popuiace. in the adjacent area
of T'inghai to destroy the invaders. Ke argued that although the
British were strong in " > naval battles, once they left their ships
they would lose their military vigour. In land battles,the
4Chinese people could easily defeat them. Lin also suggested
disguising garrison troops as villagers to fight against the British
soldiers. With the help of armed populace., he stressed that they
5
would kill their enemies like chickens and dogs.
The first reason behind using populace to defeat the British
was because Lin shared the wrong idea of his contemporaries
concerning the inability of the British in land battles. He
memorialized the Emperor: "the British soldiers did not know how to
use fists or swords. Also their legs were firmly hound with cloth,
IWSH. TK 7a~b. Before 1840, the traditional Chinese frontier
crisis always occurred in the northern part of the empire by
the "land barbarians "► After the Ch'in Shih-IIuang-Ti 7
(the First Emperor) unified China in 221 B.C., he ordered "the building
ef the famous Great Wall for the purpose of protecting Chinese
territory from the potential invasion of the Hsiur.K No f a strong
n mad tribe from the Worth. The frontier crisis caused by "sea
barbarians" had never been serious until the attacks of the
Japanese pirates along the eastern and southern coast of China
in 1387. However, the^Chinese emperor treated the disturbance
of Japanese pirates as^short-term emergency. Hot until the arrival
of the British expeditionary forces in June, 1840 did the Peking






and consequently it is extremely inconvenient for them to stretch.
Should they come on land, it is apparent that they can do still less.'
Therefore, what is called their power can he controlled without
g
difficulty." Lin adhered to this wrong idea after his official visit
to Macao on 3rd September 1839. He described the Portuguese: "The
bodies of the men are tightly encased from head to toe-... they look
7
like actors playing the part of foxes..."
The second reason was that Lin realised the propitiatory actions
of the British at T'inghai. The British commander, Colonel Burnell,
did not want to upset the people after the occupation of T'inghai.
He prohibited his troops from staying in the civil houses, temples and
8
public buildings. The troops were put under canvas amid paddy fields.
Elliot and Gutzlaff appointed a mainland Chinese as Civil Magistrate of
T'inghai. Each catty (ly lb) of opium was sold at the price of one
q
foreign dollar. The British authorities posted placards in public
inviting Chinese traders to come from outside the district of T'inghai,
They guaranteed them handsome profits in the foreign trade,
Lin told the Emperor that the people of T'inghai so far had
refused to have any dealings with the British. But he feared that if
the Chinese government was not able to take back T'inghai as soon as
6. IWSM, TK 6b.
7. Beeching, Opium Mars, p.90.
8. Beeching, Opium Mars, p.117.
9. Waley, Opium War , p.110. . • , ,
possible, the honest Chinese traders would not trade with the British.
But the temptation of the huge profit from trading with the British
would drive the lawless Chinese traders to engage in secret deals with
the British.'*'0
After the fall of T'ing-hai, the Hanchu dignitaries in Peking began
to heap recriminations on Lin, saying that he had invited trouble by
being too harsh in his handling of the opium affair. Thus, it became
necessary for Lin to achieve victories at Canton in order to cover the
Chinese military failure at T'ing-hai as well as to keep those Manchu
%
mouths closed. At that time five British warships were anchored-in
Kwangtung waters; 44-gun Druid. 20-gun Larne; 20-gun Hyacinth , 18-gun
ttie ] 1
Columbire an&4steamer Enterprise. On 17 August Lin inspected his
newly recruited "water-braves" with their war vessels at Szu-tsu Yang
(about twenty-eight miles downstream from Canton) and carried out a
rehearsal. Two days later, Lin ordered all "water-braves" and vessels to
12
launch an attack on those British warships in the ocean. In
September Lin again sent five large war-junks, each with six hundred
"water-braves" to attack the British warships at the Mo-tao Yang, (near
the Pearl River). In both of the naval attacks, the "water-braves"
suffered heavy casualties from the British, but Lin did not make real
reports to the Emperor.
Lin's attacks were emotional. Early on 24th September, Lin had
already reported to the Emperor that; -"The English ships are
10. IHSK, TK 14. 45b-44b. passim.
11. CR» 9:419.
12. YPCC. 2:220-221, 225.
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successful on the high seas; it is their forte to break waves and
sail under great winds. But if we refrained from fighting with them
on the seas, they would find no opportunity to take advantage of their
skills." When the Emporor knew of his hazardous attacks on the ocean
he angrily reprimanded Lin: "You have mentioned before that it is not
worthwhile to fight with the barbarian's ships in high seas. Why you
13
ordered naval attacks this time?"
In this respect, Teng was much more realistic. When he was
14
ordered by the Emperor to recover T'ing-hai in July, 1840,' ' he plainly
told the Emperor that the Chinese force was powerless to drive the
English barbarians off T'ing-hai. He even added that he found it
difficult to defend Chinese territory from another English attack, let
alone to attack the invaders. As for the idea of using Chinese v?ar-
junks to attack English warships, Teng stressed that the Chinese war-
junks were primarily designed for apprehending smugglers and privateers
along the coast, they were absolutely not strong enough to cope with
English battle ships. He remarked that the largest war-junks were
only a bit more than 20 ch'ih ( .1 ch'ih ' approximately equal to
14.1 inches; but the English warships were,with guns in tens. To
attack the English with Chinese junks was impossible. As for the
defence in Chekiang, Teng reminded his cc'CtaguQ that the Chinese force
could only be strengthened by imposing strict discipline on the garrison
troops at the same time; efforts should be made to boost the morale of
15
Chinese soldiers, in order to stir their combatant spirit.
13. YPCC, 4:69.
14. IW5T-I. TK U,38a-b.
15. YPCC. 2:585-590.
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On 14th September, 1840 Lin learned from the messengers from
Peking that the Emperor had instructed. Chi-shan to receive Palmerston*s
letter from the British Plenipotentiary and he became vrorried. In his
letter to I-liang, the then governor of Kuangtung on the next day, he
said that he could not sleep upon, hearing the news, adding that an
imprudent decision of the court in this issue would bring the
prohibition of opium into complete failure.
Palmerston's letter mainly complaining against Lin's inexpedient
proceedings at Canton, contained a phrase: "to demand from the
Emperor 'satisfaction and redress" which was translated as "ch'iu-t'ao huang—ti
Chao'-hsueh shen-yuan; (po- beg the. emperor to settle..and redress
a grievance). The Emperor thus thought that the opium prohibition had
been the very cause of the coming of the British force,, and that Lin
had privately disposed of communication from the British side. The
situation at that time was that the British fleet had already demon¬
strated its power at /^ei-ho (, near Tientsin, and was causing
extreme uneasiness to the Peking government. The Emperor thus dispatched
Chi-shan to open negotiations with the British Plenipotentary.
Ch'i-shan later reported to the Emperor that Chinese guns were
obsolescent, while British ones were powerful. With such inequality in
weaponry, it was senseless to fight. Ch'i-shan concluded: "Even if
they could be thrown back this year they might come the next, so war,
17
once started, would indeed be endless." On 28th September, the







■ - " -
to effect any substantial improvement in the situation (of strained
relations between China and Britain'), and further gave rise to many
complications. There can be no higher misdemeanor to the nation
and the people than this I It is for this reason that special
18
punishments are now being visited upon them."' He removed them from
office pending investigation in Canton. At the same time Chi-shan
was made Imperial Commissioner to Canton to continue negotiations with
19
the British Plenipotentary.
On 25th October the Emperor set another edict to order Lin to
remain in Canton to offer assistance to Ch'i-sh.an. I-liang was made
Acting (jovernor-general of Liang-kuang'before the arrival of Chi-shan.
The new Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-shan arrived at Canton on 29th
20
November. His awareness of Britain's "sturdy warships and powerful
cannons," made him realise that it was essential to appease the
British. In order to show his earnestness for negotiation, he
adopted a humble manner toward Elliot, which was in direct contrast to
Lin's. Later, Ch'i-shan received an imperial edict ordering the
21
Chinese force to be cut d.own.
r
On the other hand, one of the obligations of Ch'i-shan's mission
was to investigate the litigation between Elliot and Lin. He wanted
to find out whether or not Lin did not communicate to the Emperor a
22
letter from the Xing of England as well as to correct Lin's action.
Ch'i-shan tried to collect materials to prove that the armed conflict
18. IWSM, TIC 15. llb-12a.
19. Tuna-hue hsu~lu. TK 42:4.
20. CR, 11:528.
21. IWSM. TK 15.15b.
22. IV/SM, TK 13.40b-41a.
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at Canton was initiated by Lin's refusal to communicate with the
British. The British under such an occasion could only request
redress of grievance by sailing up to Pei-ho, Tientsin. I-liang
got angry with Ch'i-shan's fault-finding measures with Lin. Although
I-liang had not agreed that capital punishment should be imposed on
the opium addicts during the great d.ebate in 1838, he did see eye to
eye with Lin in the matter of the eradication of the opium. I-liang
supported Lin's strong policy that the British opium in the receiving
/stand
ships at Ling-ting^should be completely surrendered. HeAhelped Lin to
draft the edict to the British merchants, ordering them to surrender
their stocks of opium. In April, 1839 I-liang took an active role in
23the destruction of the surrendered opium in the harbour of Bogue.
As we have mentioned above, when the imperial edict announcing the
dismissal of Lin first arrived from Canton, I-liang honoured him with a
farewell reception in his office. According to Lin's diary, I-liang
visited Lin seven times after the latter's disgrace. I-liang picked
Lin's brains on foreign affairo and defence works. When I-liang
received an imperial injunction to cut down the "water-force" he
invited Lin's opinion as to the number.^
I-liang and Ch'i-shan were never on good terms. The latter did
not consult with the former, except when he asked him to provide
evidence that Lin had refused to accept the letter from the King of
23
England at Canton. It is understandable that the more harassment
23. IWSM, TK 6.13a, 7.6a.
24. Chen Sheng-lin, "Lin Tse-h.su ti i-sheng" in Chung-kuo ch'in-tal .ien-wu
lun-ts'ung, p.19.
25. YPCC. 6:113-114; 4:209.
Ch'i-shan placed on Lin, the more sympathy I-liang felt for Lin.
Negotiations between Ch'i-shan and Captain Elliot began early
in December 1840. Elliot demanded the cession of Hong Kong; an
indemnity and redress of past grievances. Ch'i-shan accepted all
the terms except the cession. As Ch'i-shan was not willing to yield
the cession of Hong Kong, Elliot attacked the forts at Chuen-pi on
7th January 1841, and threatened to occupy the Bogue. In the
conflict, the Chinese suffered 500 killed and 300 wounded, but the
26
British only had a fewT casualties.
Ch'i-shan became frightened of the British military achievement
at Chuen-pi, and he signed the "Chuen-pi Convention" with Captain
27
Elliot on 20th January. The terms of the Convention were:
1. The cession of the island and hax-bour of Hong Kong to
the British crown. All just charges and duties to the
empire upon the commerce carried on there to be paid as
if the trade were conducted at Whampoa.
2. An indemnity to the British government of six millions
of dollars, one million payable at once, and the
remainder in equal annual instalments ending in 1846.
3. Direct official intercourse between the countries upon
equal footing.
4. The trade of the port of Canton to be opened within ten
days after the Chinese new-year, and to be carried on
at Whampoa till further arrangements are practicable at
the new settlement.
During the negotiations with Elliot, Ch'i-shan mercilessly
26. OR, 10:37-43.




criticized Lin's defence works at Canton. In his report dated 12th
January 184 Ch'i-shan complained to the Emperor that the forts in
the district from Bogue to Canton were poorly built. The iron-
chains constructed to block the river on the orders of Teng and Lin
were of no use in defence: the advance of the British ships easily
broke through the iron-chains. Ch'i-shan remarked that the literary
officials (Lin and Teng), were distinguished in literary accomplish¬
ment but did not have much knowledge of defence work.
Ch'i-shan also attacked Lin's tactic of cutting off the supply
of water and food to the British community on their ships. He pointed
out that the British could easily obtain a supply of water from the
islands along the coast of Kuangtung. As for the supply of food,
Ch'i-shan said that the British would find no problem in getting
food from the greedy boat-people (Tanka), as there were more than 10
thousand "family boats" anchored close to the British ships. Ch'i-
shan went further, disclosing the fact that Lin had been deceiving
the government with his fake reports of victory in the armed
conflicts with the British during Lin's imperial commission.
The"water-force" of Kuangtung did not escape from the criticism
of Ch'i-shan. The new imperial commissioner told the Emperor that
not only were the vessels and cannons of the force inferior to those
of the British, but the sailors were lacking in battle experience and
their fighting strength was weak. The members of the "water-force"
were keen to attack a tiny fleet of British ships so as to make their
grade and seek promotion. But when the barbarian ships appeared in
great numbers they had turned out to be chicken-hearted and took no
P0
action." Ch'i-shan even said that Kuan T'ien-p'ei, the admiral of
the "water-force" v?as so genial to his undisciplined inferiors that he
29
could hardly "be termed as an audacious military leader,
Every dog has its day. The signing of the Chuen-pi Convention
provided Lin with a good chance to take vengeance on Ch'i-shan, In
Lin's opinion, Ch'i-shan had usurped the power to cede Hong Kong to
Britain and to allow the resumption of trade to the British. Lin
urged I-liang to disclose Ch'i-shan's misdeeds to the Emperor as Lin
himself was already a disgraced person, without the status which
allowed him to report to the Emperor. I-liang at first showed hesit¬
ation to act, because substantial proof of Ch'i-shan's agreement of
ceding Hong Kong was lacking.
On 1st February 1841, George Elliot and General Brenier issued a'
joint proclamation in Hong Kong, stating: "The island of Hong Kong
having been ceded to the British crown under the seal of the Imperial
minister and high commissioner Keshen, all native person residing there
in understand, that they are now subjects of the Queen of England to
30
whom and to whose officers they must pay duty and obedience...'"'
In early February Lin and I-liang received from Colonal Lai Un-
chio (^44?$/) in Hong Kong a communication concerning the British
ordering the Chinese troops to be withdrawn from Hong Kong.
I-liang lost no time in submitting to the Emperor a copy of
28. TOSH. TIC 19.12b.
29. IWSH. TK 19.13a.
30. CR, 10:64.
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Elliot's proclamation sent by Colonel Lai from Hong Kong. The
Emperor was infuriated on hearing that Chinese residents in Hong
Kong had become British subjects. He on 26th February ordered the
dismissal of Ch'i-shan's Imperial Commissionership and instructed
I-liang to conduct him to Peking in chains. All his family
31
properties were confiscated.
The Cbuen-pi Convention was only te/ytx>rajy igreeHtetit. It was repudiated
by both the Chinese and British governments. • This situation ushered
- in a new stage of conflict between the two countries. The Emperor's
nephew I-shan (if ) was appointed as "Ching—ni Ghiang-chtin
(Rebel-Quelling General ) and Imperial Commissioner with Lungwen
(Z3$" k ) and Yang Fang (^4 | ) as his assistants. The three,
were to command a large force from various provinces to fight the
British at Canton, with the imperial injunction to "quell the rebels
without faltering."*^
The hostilities at Canton were resumed. The British, fleet
headed by the powerful flat-bottomed, shallow-draft steamship
Hemes is stormed the forts m Ife.caoCn.ear Canton) in the latter
33
half of February. On 25th February the fleet shelled the fort
of the Bogue. The garrison under the command of Admiral Kuan put
up a stiff resistance. Stories spread that the soldiers in the
fort had refused to apply the fuses to the guns. They were bribed
31. IKSl-l. TK 23.2b-4b.
32. rWSK, TK 20.32b.
33. CR, 11:579.
by the British not to open fire cm the British ships. The angry
Admiral killed some of the disobedient soldiers and tried himself
to fire a gun, but he found that the fuse hole was soaked in water.
Admiral Kuan later got multiple bayonet wounds from the British
landing soldiers. However, he still fought gallantly and died with
34
his boots on.
Early on 13th February 1841 when the imperial edict of dismissal
of I-shan's appointment to Canton reached Kuangtung, Lin urged I-liang
to issue a proclamation offering rewards for the capture of the
British and their ships. I-liang was hesitant to do so. The death
of Kuan brought the issue "tc head. On 25th February an official
proclamation of rewards was issued by the Canton authority. The
35
rewards were on the following scale:
For the capture of a ship of the line 100,000
For the destruction 30,000
For a frigate or sloop, in proportion
For the capture of a large steamer 50,000
For the capture of a small steamer 25,000
For the capiture alive of Captain Elliot,Mr. Morrison
or Commodore Bremer, each 50,000
For their heads, each 30,000
For the capture of an English officer 10,000
For his head » " " " 5,000
For the capture of an English soldier or sailor 500
For his head >• >. •< 300
For the capture of a sepoy or lascar . 100
For his head •. >. « — 50
For those who lost their lives in efecting seizures,
a gratuity to their families of 300
34. IWSM. TK 24, 19a-b; CR, 11:580.
35» See Morse, International Relations» p.263-264. One incident,
involving the disappearance and apparent death of three British
in March, 1841 may be treated as the result of Lin's proclamation
of offering rewards. See CR, 10:182-183. KCFC. 81:43b.
The offer of rewards not only had excited the Cantonese to kill
the British, hut also aroused the anger of the British so that they
made a hasty military attack. On 27th February the British forces
ascended the city river. They destroyed another fort just below
Whampoa. Immediately the British forces cleared a passage from
Humsn to Whampoa intending to make an attack on the city.
Lin heard that the British fleet had succeeded in forcing its way
to the fort at Lieh-te seven miles east of Canton on 2nd March.
He knew that the next step of the British was to attack the city. On
3rd March Lin suddenly appeared at the Foochow-Ch'ao-Cho«Club to
recruit volunteers to defend the city. Eventually he got 560 men,
he paraded them in two files, one to the east, one to the west at one
36
of the city gates.
However, Lin's recruited volunteers did not have a chance to fight
with the British. Yang Fang arrived at Canton before I~shan and Lungwen
on 5th March and took over the responsibility of the warfare with the
British. On 10 February the British started attacking again. Yang
Fang finding himself unable to stop the advance of the British forces
towards Canton, pulled his soldiers into the city. The British fleet
pushed on up the city river on 16th March and succeeded in taking
several forts and destroying many Chinese war junks. Two days later,
the British troops took possession of the Factories and the city was at
37
their mercy.
Yang Fang this time submitted a report to the Emperor, pointing out
36. Waley, Opinn War, p,142j YPCC, 2:63.
37. .CR, 10:181.
the difficulties of the Chinese force in defending Canton: the
Chinese "water-force" had been completely destroyed and China did not
have the naval forces to bar the advance of the invading British fleet;
the local troops were unreliable as their morale was undermined by the
infiltration of traitors in their ranks; the imported troops from
other provinces were not familiar with the terrain and the commandership
of these troops was divided so that the troops were not able to take
38
united action against the British. In order to buy off the immediate
British attack on Canton, Yang Pang agreed to reopen the Canton trade
with the British. However, he did not dare tell the Emperor about
this.
Nov? Yang Fang was in a melancholy position: the Emperor was bound
to become aware of the reoccupation of the foreign factories by the
British and his crime of usurping power in allowing the resumption of
trade, a similar crime to that of Ch'i-shan in ceding Hong Kong to the
British. Yang Pang became a frequent visitor to Lin's lodging hoping
that the latter would offer him advice and. assistance in defending the
city with Lin's recruited volunteers. However, on the 19th March
Yang Pang even lived with Lin in order to get frequent advice. All
Lin could do in preparation for the possible British attack was to
39
strengthen the number of the recruited volunteers."
On 1st May an imperial decree reached Canton ordering Lin to
proceed to Hang-chow Chekiang to wait for further instructions.
This time Lin was given an official post of fourth grade (in a scale of
nine). Two days later, he made his journey to the new appointment.
38. Shi.h-liao hsun-kan. 35, ti, 304-305.
'39. Haley, Oniu.n bar, p.146.
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He was seen off "by the governor-general governor and other high-
rankling officials.
Modern Chinese historians show sympathy for Lin's disgrace. Hsin-
pao Chang says that Lin served the volatile and vacillating Emperor
who pushed Lin into the course of rash actions hut soon withdrew his
support.^ Pan. Wen-Ian^a communist historian even remarks that Lin
was not defeated by the British in military affairs, but was politically
defeated by the absurdity of the Emperor and the vandalism of the
capitalationists.^
Lin's contemporaries had the same feeling as Fan. The only
difference was that those perrons did not daye to condemn the Emperor.for
his punishment of him. In June 1040, the British expeditionary forces
obeyed government instructions not to attack Canton, but occupied T'ing-
hai as their naval base. The British action was construed by the
Chinese as meaning that the British feared the "LUiccnyuertLin and
his strong defence works at Canton. Wei-yuan highly praised Lin that
the latter was able to defend Kuan^-tung without recruiting a single
soldier from other provinces or asking for a single tael of silver
from the central government, adding that if other coastal provinces
had the same defence as that in Kuang-tung and Pukien, the British
barbarians would not be able to invade China.^ After Lin's disgrace
provincial administrators, such as Lin Yun-k'o (■*£'/') succeeded in
persuading the Emperor to reinstate Lin and send him to Chekiang to
40. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.216.
41. Pan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih, v.l, p.30.
42. YPCC. 6:151 .
assist in defence works. Lin arrived at Chen-hai (^^7 ) in June
1842. When the British troops were about to meet in the field the
"unconquerable" Lin, the Emperor suddenly ordered Lin to go to Ili for
his exile. Once again Lin had no opportunity to show what he could
do.
The Cantonese.on the other hand felt deeper sympathy for Lin than
his colleagues did. When the news of Lin's disgrace arrived at
Canton in October 1840, the popular feeling was one of melancholy.
The Cantonese showered Lin with souvenirs and eulogies. A board,
inscribed : "To one whose favour drenched the people; whose might
barbarians feared" was presented to' Lin. The people even planned to
practise the passionate traditional method of "P1an-yuan
(Literally, trying to stop the departure of a popular official by
grasping the shafts of his carriage and lying down in the wheel ruts),
43
to keep Lin at Canton.1" It is not difficult to realize why the
Cantonese thought that they were drenched with Lin's favour. Shortljr
after his arrival at Canton in March, Lin published an edict to convinc
the Cantonese that even a man addicted to opium for many years was not
a hopeless case, but might be helped to a cure, Lin had brought with
him two Chinese prescriptions to cure opium addicts. Later, he
approached the Medical Missionary Society asking if Western medical
science could help in finding another prescription to cure the
Cantonese. On the other hand, before the arrival of Lin, foreign
murderers of Chinese people at Canton had been able to escape due
punishment by sending money to victims' relatives to keep their mouths'
43. Lin Tse-hsu .jih-chi (Diaries of Lin Tse-hsu). (Peking, 1964),
p. 372-373.
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shut, and. by bribing local magistrates. In the murder of Lin Wei-hsi,
Lin's insiatance on the surrender of the British culprits, although it
was to assert Chinese jurisdiction over foreign offenders on Chinese
soil, might have seemed to the Cantonese to be a sign of his love for
the people. No doubt the Cantonese were glad to hear that the
expulsion of the British community from Macao was the result of the
British refusal. When Lin and Teng paid a visit to Macao after the
expulsion, the local people, young and old, greeted their esteemed
44
officials with all their hearts.
What did the foreigners fear from Lin? In the minds of the
Cantonese, the foreigners feared the surrender of opium; the submissive
retreat of all of the British to Macao after their confinement in the
factories; the obedience of the Portuguese governor expelling the
British merchants and their families from Macao; besides, the wooden-
rolls and iron-chains which Lin ordered to be placed in the shallow
water of Hong-tang the narrowest point of the Pearl River
estuary and the establishment of new forts at Chien-sha-tsui and Kuan-
yang, dreadful constructions to the foreigners. Exaggerated reports
of victories of Lin's recruited "water-braves"were also encouraging.
In one sense Lin and the Cantonese were in the same boat. Lin
was seriously criticized by Ch'i-shan for his strong policy, while the
Cantonese were also reprimanded by the same person as Han-chien tiwfers).I#
early 1841, Ch'i-shan reported to the Emperor that the Cantonese are
'Ungrateful and avaricious" and "dwell indiscriminately with foreigners
whom they are accustomed to see... day by day and after living many
44. YPCC, 2:183.
years together, the utmost intimacy has grown up between them... These
plain evidences of the want of firmness on the part of the people here,
45
give us still more cause for anxiety."
Lin became a hero and patriot among the people of Kuang-tung. Eis
.influence in- increasing their anti-foreign feeling was deep and lasting.
Only twenty-six days after Lin's departure from Canton on 3rd May 1841,^'°
several thousand village braves outside Canton launched an attack on
the British troops at San-yuan-li, and continuous anti-British movements





I-shan and. his assistant, Lung-wen arrived at Canton on 14th April
1841. Their duty was to fulfil the imperial injunction to
annihilate the British troops in Chinese territory. At about the
same time, regular troops gradual^' arrived at Canton from various
provinces. As the Chinese troops far outnumbered the British soldiers
I-shan was full of groundless confidence about the warfare. However,
Yang Pang, his deput3r who arrived at Canton in March had already
received several defeats in battles with the British. He eventually
was forced to negotiate with Captain Elliot for suspension of
hostilities and to allow resumption of trade with the British merchants.
From his experience, Yang Fang did not agree with I-shan's strategy of
launching sudden attacks on the British; instead he insisted that they
should send all the troops from various provinces under a single
command before taking any military action.
However, I-shan was eager to defeat the British in order to win
praise from the Emperor. On 21st April, I-shan secretly ordered a
night attack on the British ships lying off the factory area with
2
about 200 fire-rafts. Ho serious damage was inflicted upon the
British vessels, but a large mimber of fire-rafts were destroyed during
the course of attack. The next day, I-shan gave orders for another
attack on the factory and this time the Chinese troops this time did
1. JCR, 10:182.
2. CR. 10:294; E.H, Parker, Chinese Account of the oniun War
(Shanghai, 1888), p.31-32.
not receive strong resistance, and within a few hours, they destroyed
the factory area completely.
The British took military retaliation. A "body of troops under
the command of Major Pratt struck at the factory area where I-shan
expected to meet. But the main force of the British troops, numbering
about two thousand, was to attack Canton City from its northern heights
under the command of Sir Hugh Cough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse. On
24th May, the British sailed their flotilla northward from Macao Passage
to Tsingpu ;i%), from there they went ashore and occupied the nearby
strategic point called Ni-ch'eng The next day the British
X'A if)
troops captured the Ssu-fang Port, on the heights just outside the north
gate of Canton City. Sir Hugh Gougli then ordered his troops to
instal guns in the fort that put the city under the shadow of British
3
bombardment.
On 26th the British shelled the city from the Ssufang Fort. The
imperial examination hall in the south eastern corner of the city where
4
I-shan and his colleagues resided was heavily stormed. On the other
hand, I-liang, Governor of Kuang—tung was astonished when thousands of
Cantonese, old and young, cried at his office, begging him to sue for
peace with the British. Frederic Wakeman quotes from Liang T'ing-nan
saying; "Since the army crouched in one corner, conducting
3. Details for the British military action may be found in CR. 10:296;
John Ouchterlony, Chinese 'Jar: An Account of Ail the Operations of
the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty oi" Marking.
2nd ed, (London, 1844), p.136-139. For the Chinese description,
see KCPC, 81:38; IWSM. TK 29.1a-3a.
4. YPCC. 4:333.
only halfway measures and not marshalling to meet the enemy, the
people clamoured like rushing water, saying that the soldiers were
not to he depended on. . The city would certainly be destroyed, and
5
the barbarians would enter to burn and loot ..."
Thrown into a great panic by the British fire and the popular
apprehension, I-shan sent Yu Pao-chun ( 7 ^the prefect of Canton
and Wu Shao-j/ung (j3> Pfc) a Hong merchant, as emissaries to sue for
peace with Captain Elliot. The latter eventually accepted six
million dollars as the ransom of the city on 27th. The Peace
Convention with five terms was as follows:
1. The three Imperial Commissioners and their troops to quit
the city of Canton and proceed to a distance of upwards of
60 miles.
2. A ransom for Canton of 6 million silver dollars to be paid
within one week; 1 million before sunset of the 27th.
3. When all was paid, the British troops to stay in their
present positions for the time being, neither side to be
reinforced. If the ransom was^'paid in full within seven
days, the total to be raised to 7 million silver dollars;
if not cleared within 14 days, to 8 million; if 20 days,
then 9 million. The British forces to withdraw to outside
Bogue when the ransom was paid in full.
4. A sum of 300,000 silver dollars to be paid as the compen¬
sation for destruction of factories.
5. Kwangchow-fu (the negotiator) to produce full powers with
seals of three Imperial Commissioners, Governor-general,
Governor, and Tartar-general of the province. 6
The whole empire was shocked by the ransom of the city. What
had been the point of sending distant troops to Canton? When Ch'i-
5.
6.
See Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate (Berkeley, 1366), p.53.
Cf. Morse, TnternationaJ Peletions. p.283.
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shan reported to the Emperor that the garrison troops in Kuangtung
were not reliable, the Emperor ordered troops from provinces of
Szechuan, Kueichow, Hunan and Kiangsi fight the British troops at
Canton, hoping that they would be able to "cut off the rear of the
barbarian soldiers, (the outnumbered Chinese troops) then close in
n
from all directions and recover Hong Kong,"' When I-shan and Lungwen
impressed the Emperor that they were confident of victory, the latter
remarked: "I am awaiting the good news of victory with the greatest
impatience."
In 1976 a huge number of the regular troops of South Vietnam
retreated 3peedily as if they were running from a plague when a
comparatively small number of North Vietnamese soldiers staged an
assault on the heights of the South Vietnamese territory. The
situation of the Chinese troops in May, 1841 was similar to the timid
South Vietnamese troops when facing the British attack upon Canton.
The distant troops, numbering more than 17,000 retreated from outposts
around Canton to the cit3r when about two thousand British troops
threatened to attack. After the ransom of the city, Ts'ao Lu-i'ai
, censor of the Hu-kuang Circuit, remarked that when the
British troops marched east from Ni-ch'eng to Ssu-fang Fort, the
garrison troops along that district escaped from their post without
firing a single shot."^ Wang T'ing-lan ( ), the provincial
judicial of Kuangtung also commented that the battle attrected 17,000
7. IWSM, TK 25.43a.
8. IWSM, TK 26.42b.
9. Fan Wen-Ian, Ohung-lcuo chin-tai shih. v.I, p.68.
troops from other provinces and consumed several' million silver dollars
from various local treasuries. The timber for military constructions
was purchased from Kuangsi and cartridges and other military equipments
were brought from Kiangsi and Anhui. Even with such good preparation,
the result of the battle was such a miserable defeat. He remarked
that the defeat was because both principle and discipline were both
lacking in the army.
Instead of protecting the Cantonese, the distant troops, the Hunan
soldiers especially, annoyed them. Censor Lo Ping-chang (•
reported that the Hunan troops looted and plundered common people on
their way from Hunan to Canton. The district magistrates and
townspeople complained of the disturbance they caused when passing by.'*'
On 26th May when I~shan and the others were in the city, and it came
under heavy bombardment, the troops spread a rumour that the British
artillery had an intelligence report of the location of the imperial
commissioners from Cantonese traitors. They immediately launched a
traitor-hunt and plundered the Cantonese, accusing them of being
12
traitors. A Chinese witness recalled: "Several thousand of our
soldiers after loading themselves with robbed goods, ran away out of
13
the city pretending to trace the enemy." In addition to plundering
10. Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih (A record of Sino-Western affairs
(Taipei, 1962")) 6:15-20; Hsiao I-sban, Ch'lng-tal t'ung-shih.
Vol.2, p.950.
11. IWSM. TK 28.24b.
12. IPCC, 4:22.
13. J.P. Davis, China. During the Mar and Since the Peace (London
1852), I, 125.
and looting, some Hunanese troops stole out from their camps to molest
village men. The gentry of the neighbouring villages outside Canton
warned the authorities to discipline the Hunanese soldiers, and not to
let them leave the city. When the village braves discovered that the
Hunanese stayed with their women, they butchered them in cold blood.
It was crystal clear that the distant troops did not help to
bolster defence in Canton, but created local unrest. Was not-
Commissioner Lin great enough? He was able to defend Canton without
asking for troops or funds from any authorities. "Why can't we take
up the example of Commissioner Lin?" the village braves might have
asked.
A local prefec-tural gazetteer records that the "righteous braves"
had formed militia in the districts of Pu-shan ) and Nan-hai (/fyity)
shortly after the departure of Lin in early Kay, 1841. At that time,
there were about 36,000 "righteous braves" drilling day and night in
14those districts. On the other hand, of the 103 villages in the
north-west and north-east outside the city, each gathered 15 to 100
"righteous braves", prepared to draw their swords against the British
troops
14. JfCFC, 81:40b-41a.
15. Hsia Hsieh, Chor,g--hsi ch 1-shiIt. 6:3.1-12; CR. 10:350. In early
1841 Lin adopted another plan for the defence. Although he was
disgraced at that time, still he suggested I-liang, the then
governor of Kuangtung, 'Ho gather gentry for discussion as to
vitalize their conscience with 'righteousness', and encourage them
to defend themselves and families with mutual operation", Lin
continued, "only if a close relationship exists 'among those
people can we calm the people and preserve the country." See
Ch'en .Sheng-lin,. "Lin Tse-hsu ti 1-sheng" Chung-lruo chin-tat ,1on-
wu lun-ts'ung, p.16.
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Several thousand British troops roaming through the countryside
from Tsingpu to Ssu-fang Fort from 24th May caused trouble to the
villagers.In a "Condemnation of the devils by the San-^'uan-fi
villagers", the villagers reprimanded the British troops'violent
■behaviour: "disturbing our villages; looting our cows; destroying
our paddy fields; lewdly plundering the graves and molesting our
17
women." But it was the last two items that brought the anger of
18
the San Yuan Li villagers to fever pitch.
Frederick Wakeman has described it thus: "If hsiao (filial piety)
was offended bjr tomb-robbing, jL (righteousness) was most certainly
19
aroused by having one's own, or one's neighbour's wife molested."
In order to understand the cause of San-yuan-li incident, it is
worthwhile to mention that there are two concepts that discipline social
norms in Chinese society. They are: "Pai-shan hsiao wei hsien
(Literally filial piety is the most important of all virtues), and "Wan-o
yin wei shon M? & % " (Literally, lewdness is the worst of all sins)
These two concepts were very much emphasised in Kuang-tung. The act
20
of "opening graves and scattering the bones about" by the British
16.- KCFC, 81:39.
17. YPCC. 4:22.
18. See KGFC, 81:39a. The British troops were curious to know how the
Chinese embalmed the corpses by opening the coffins. A British
officer named MacPherson writes: "The features presented as dried
and shrivelled appearance, and there was strong pungent aromatic
smell perceptible on rising the lid." See CR. 10:336. As for the
molestation of the Chinese women, Sir John Davis remarked that the
permanent feeling of hostility of the Cantonese had "commenced with
the violence suffered by their women from Sepoy troops in 1841.
See FO 17/140, Davis to Palmerston, 8 February 1848.
19. Wakeman, Strangers, -p. 17.
20. KCFC, 81:39a. Yu-kien also reported to the Emperor that British
troops had commtted the same crime of "opening graves and
scattering the bones about." after their occupation of T'ing-hai
in July, ia+0, see IYSM. TK 24.38b.
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troops was an unforgivable crime to the.ancestor-worshipping Cantonese.
After Hung Hsiu-ch'uan (and Yang Hsiu-ch'ing {7$?^$j), the two
Taiping leaders, had broken out in their rebellion in early 1850, the
then Hsien-feng Emperor was in thundering wrath. He secretly ordered
the Governor-general of Liang-kuang to dig out the ancestral tombs of
21
those rebellious leaders in order to insult them. On 22nd August,
1849, Governor Amaral of Macao, was murdered by two Cantonese. His
head and his • left hand (the Governor did not,have a right hand)
22
were cut off and carried away. Hsu Kuang-chin {4^/k^j) the then
Governor-general of Liang-Kuang was responsible for the investigation
of the murder. Hsu later disclosed the reason of the murder as being
a retaliation, because the Portuguese Governor had ordered that the
• ancestral graves of the Cantonese in Macao should be removed in order
23to evacuate the place to build roads.
On the other hand, in several districts of Kuangtung, sxich as
Shun-te, P'an-yu there existed the custom, of "Pu-lo-chia
(Literally, (the women) not to take abode in husbands' home). Some, of the women
f'n tAfisC
4 districts, when reaching their marriage age were match-made to men.
But they refused, to have intimate relations with their so-called
husbands: they simply wanted to keep their virginity. After the
superficial wedding ceremony, the sworn sisters of the woman helped her to
Sew up every corner of her clothes with thread in order to avoid the
man's sexual impulse in the night. Three days after the wedding,
21. See Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-shih .ilh-chih (A Calendar
of historical events of modern China)(Taipei, 1963)? I, 157.
22. Details of the murder may be found in Morse, International
relations, p.340.
23. FO 682/1555, Seu (Hsu) to Bonbain, date TK 29/7/10 (27 August 1849):
■ Chinese Text.
the woman back to her mother's hon\e Her sworn sisters then examined
the thread of her clothes. If broken, the woman was supposed to have
had intercourse with her man, and that was regarded as a shameful
matter.2"'
Liang T'ing-nan, author of T-fen wen-chl (An account of
the barbarian invasion) recorded a case that a Chinese (most likely, a
Cantonese) was employed as janitor to a foreign house in Maca.o a.fter
the Opium War. One night he heard the screams of several Chinese
women who were being molested by the English barbarians. He was so
indignant that he felt an impulse to kill those English by burning down
the house. His action was thwarted when he considered the result that
2^
his fellow countrywomen would die with the English if he did so.
Even in Hong Kong nowadays, sexual attackers are listed as most
notorious criminals. They are bound to receive cruel torments by
prison officers and other prisoners.
On 25th May, the gentry of various villages held a meeting in Kiu~
lang-kang ( t' fffij ), a hilly region about 6 kilometres to the north of
Canton. They selected Ho Yu-cheng (/^ j5 /tfy) , a chu-.ienof P'an-yu
hsien) and ' Kao; Liang—ts' ai^£r#(a gentry of P'an-hu hsien) as their
24. Kuan Lu-yin, "Kuang-tung min-tsu ti kou ch'eng ho chi sheng-ke"
(The nationality and identity of the people of Kuang-tung) in
Mn-shlh hui-k'an. Vol.1, p.80 (June 1959)»
25. YPCC. 6:82.
26. A successful candidate in the provincial examination in Ch'ing
dynasty.
fl ll
leaders to superintend righteous braves from various villages. Wei
Shao-kuang villager of San yuan-li was appointed to run along
27
other villages to arouse other villagers against the British violence.
They agreed to use a three-star black flag as their standard. An oath-
taking ceremony "took place among the gentry, pledging to advance
when it advanced and to retreat when it retreated, with no fear of
casualties.
On the morning of 27th Kay when Sir H. Gough was about to give
orders to storm the city of Canton from the Ssufang Port, he received
a despatch from Captain Elliot dated 26th instant ordering the
cancellation of the bombardment of the city. The angry Gough complained
"You have placed us in a most critical situation. My men of all arms
are dreadfully harrassed, my communications with the rear continually
threatened and escorts attacked. My men must suffer dreadfully from
28
the necessity of continued watchfulness..." Gough's complaint was
not groundless. During their manoeuvre from Tsingpu to Ssufang Fort
their disturbance had aroused the indignation of the villagers. They
would meet trouble on their return journey.
On 29th a group of British patrols passed Tung-hua-li (f!),
near San Yuan Li {l x~if). They dropped into the house of Wei
Shao—kttang ( an active member at the Niu-lang-kang meeting on 25th)
2°
and attacked the women of the household. The countrymen with their
27. Lieh Tao, Ya-p'len chan-cheng shih lun-wen ch'uan-chi (Special
collection of historical articles on Opium WarJIPeking, 1958),p. 279.
28. R.Se Rait, The Life and Campaigns of Hugh, First Viscount Gough,
Field Marshal (Westminster. 1905), I, 195•
29. Hsia Ilsieh comments that the attack of the British troops to the
women was the outbreak of the San-yuan-li incident, see Chung-hsi
chi-shih. 6:18.
cudgels and hoes in hand went to help the females. Fighting thus
30
started and eventually the patrols were driven out. The next day,
a group of"righteous braves"numbering 5000 marched on a hill where the
i
British troops were encamped, Gough records: "I perceived numbers of
men, apparently irregulars, and armed for the most part with long
spears, shields and swords, collecting upon the heights three or four
31miles to my rear." ' He immediately divided his troops into several
groups, under command of Captain Duff and Pratt, etc. and he himself
kept the main force on the hill. When Gough ordered a charge to the
braves, the latter retreated rapidly to a distance beyond the range of
the musket. Within a brief period, more villagers joined the braves
and the number of the Chinese reached 7,000. Suddenly, a gun roared
out and banners.hoisted, the braves formed themselves into battle array
and made an advance on their British opponents. The British this time
retreated and stayed on the heights. However, the braves surrounded
thorn without launching an attack. In the afternoon, Gough ordered
another charge. Captain Duff's men were put in the centre with
Captain Pratt's on his left and the Bengal volunteers on the right.
The braves again gave ground. Not long after, fortune was with the
braves. A heavy storm had started, that drenched all the gunpowder
and rendered their muskets useless. The heavy rainfall had obliterated
the paths, and the British troops were submerged in a vast expanse of
water. A Chinese witness recorded: "The English soldiers in leather
30. Lieh Tao, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng. p.281, Frederic Wakeman also uses
the same description of the incident of Lieh Tao, he misspells
Wei Shao-kuang as Chang Chao-kuang, see Wakeman, Strangers, p.17;
cf. Lieh Tao, op.cit., p.281.
31. _CR, 10:540-542.
boots were not able to move an inch forward on the slippery, muddy
32
paths." The braves now approached their enemies, setting ambushes
to pick off a man here and a man there.They, knowing th'at the
British muskets were not working because of the rainfall, engaged in
eft<?/n>Ps.
hand-to-hand combat with their ^ This time the braves had the upper
hand as far as weapons were concerned. As J. Ouchterlony remarked
that the fixed bayonets of the British soldiers were a poor defence
34
against the long spears of the Chinese.'
During the storm one company of sixty sepoys and three British
officers from Captain Duff's camp were sent to contact other camps.
Those sixty-three men were surrounded by the braves and one of the
sepoys was snatched from the ranks by a kind of Chinese hooked spear.
A young officer named Berkeley and six other men tried to save him but
were surrounded by the braves, who greatly outnumbered them. In the
fight the braves wounded Berkeley with knives and spears; one of them
picked up Berkeley's fallen musket and made his way to the woods. He
dried the rain-water off the barrel and trigger of the musket and
lodged a ball in Berkeley's arm. The British main force, two
companies of:marines with new percussion muskets were sent to rescue
their surrounded soldiers. They brought them out by firing volleys.
Eventually, they were able to return to camp by late evening. In the
turmoil one sepoy had been killed, one officer and a dozen soldiers
were seriously wounded. , •
32. See Lieh Tao, op.c-it., p.233.
33. Cheng I-Ieng-yu, ed. Hsu-hsiu N/an-hai hsien-chih (Revised Gazetteer
of ilan-hai district) (1872), 26:6-7,11, hereafter cited as HHi-JHHC.
34. Ouchterlony, Chinese War, p.228.
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The news of the victory in San-yuan-li spread rapidly to other
villages around Canton, People from more remote villages went to
join the braves in the late evening of 30th. The next day Gough
discovered the number of braves massing on the hillside was around ten
to twelve thousands. Gough was angry with the; braves. He. sent a mess age "to
Yu Pao-chun (, Prefect of Canton warning that if he did not
stop the hostilities of the braves, he would denounce the Peace
Convention of 27th and advance to attack the city.
Having read Gough's message, the Prefect hastened to the place of
confrontation, convincing Gough that the Canton authorities had not
known of the braves' activities and that there were certainly no
Canton officers among them. Yu together with Liang Ilsing-yuan
and Chang Hsi-yu ) the magistrates of Nan-hai and P'an-yu hsien.
and one British officer named Moore went to talk to the braves. When
they reached the braves, the latter did not allow the British officer
to get through their ranks. Only the three officials went on. They
told the gentry leaders to disband their braves, threatening that if
they failed to do so, they would be held responsible for everything.
The gentry bowed to the intimidation of Yu Pao-chun. Some slipped
away, and others persuaded the braves to disperse. Leaderless, the
immense crowd of braves gradually disappeared.
It is important to emphasise that the San~yuan--li incident was a
spontaneous action of the gentry and the village braves; I-shan and
other Canton officials had neither sponsored nor assisted them during
the whole course of the incident.
However, Frederic Wakeman holds different ideas. He says:
But by March, 1841, the simple problem of defending
Canton overrode any objection's he might still have had.
Virtually on the eve of the San-yuan-li incident, he (l~
shan) found himself officially ordering "the two hsien
of P'an-yu and Nan-hai to secretly defend themselves
immediately." Prefect She Pao-shan had lied to General
Gough that morning on the heights. The officials were __
indeed sponsoring the militia of the ninety«siz villages."''''
Unfortunately, the statement is mistaken. The Chinese characters
"fang t/i" and "fang t't " have confused Wakeman. "g#" means "to •
inquire about" and nFt " means "to defend." On 28th May there was a
fight between the Hunanesetroops and the braves of Nan-hai and P'an-yu
hsien that resulted in casualties of more than ten members in each
36
party. I-shan thus instructed the district magistrates of the two
37
hsien "to inquire about" the cause of the fight.' The fight did not
have a connection with' the British troops, but Wakeman assumes that I-
shan had ordered the braves of the two hsien to defend themselves.
In fact, I-shan had an unusual hatred for and distrust of the'
Cantonese. He treated them as traitors. In his early arrival to
Canton, he memorialized, the Emperor: "The danger lies within, not
without", and he went on to say, "it is more important to defend ourself
38
against the Cantonese than the enemy." Disloyal Cantonese once
39
detected were executed without trial. When I-shan made preparations
for the warfare with the British, in early May 1841, he did not consider
the use of the Cantonese. He brought "water-forces" all the way from
35. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.28.
36. YPCC. 3:391; Of. IWSM. TK 30.8b, 9b.
37. IWSM. TK 30.9a.
38. YPCC, 4:102,
3-9. Wakeman himself also says that when the city was threatening to
fall apart in late May, 1841, I-shan, who was proceeding in retinue
near the Great Buddha Temple, was stopped by coolies demanding to
know how he would save the city. He became infuriated and ordered
some of them to be decapitated on the spot. See Wakeman, Strangers
p. 52.
Fu-k'ien even though they needed heavy expenses. '
When Sir H. Gough ordered that the city should he stormed from •
Ssu-fang Fort on the 26th, the Canton authorities had decided to
negotiate with the British. On the same day, Lin Fu-hsiang ()
sent a message-to Ch'i-kung ( ), the then governor-general of
Liang-Kuang, that the village braves and his "water-braves'7 outside the
city were eager to attack the British troops. Ch'i-kung bluntly
rejected his offer, saying that the Peace Convention was being
negotiated between both the Chinese and British authorities. The
next day the Convention was signed, and on the following day (28th Kaj)
I-shan, Lungwen and Yang Fang immediately issued a joint proclamation,
stating: "... Since the peace is now resumed, the people must not
create trouble. At the same time, han-cb ion (traitorous Chinese)
must he apprehended. The capture of any landing foreign parties is
strictly prohibited. Any violation of the order will be punishable
by martial law.1'^"'"
As we have mentioned before, the Peace Convention was signed on
27th May. At that time I-shan agreed to pay 6 million silver dollars
as a ransom to the city. He ordered 4 million dollars to be collected
from provincial revenue-collection offices: the treasury, department
of transport and maritime custom.' The Hong merchants were forced to
contribute 2 million dollars. Hsiao I-shan records that the money
for the ransom "was collected day and night (27th to 28th) in hot
40. Fan Wen-Ian, Chung-kuo ehin-tai shih, p.43.
41. YPCC, 3:539.
42 43haste." On 29th the ransom had been paid, and the British
troops withdrew from Ssu-fang Fort. If I-shan had intended to
resume hostilities with the British, he would not have paid the
ransom in such a quick time.
To the Chinese, the San-yuan-li incident was a great popular
victory. Contemporary records exaggerate that over 200 British
soldiers and two officers were killed, including a general whose head
44
was as large as a bucket. ' The village braves were full of ground¬
less confidence after the incident. As one of the San~Yuan-Lfc leaders
claimed after the battle* "How can we look on the barbarian soldiers
45with fear? How can we think them ferocious now?" Mowqua, the
famous Hong merchant told Edward King of Russell and Company: "That
if the mandarin had not interfered, the twenty thousand villagers who
46
rose against the British troops would have made an end of them."
It is important to note that Commissioner Lin was praised by the
San-Yuan-li "righteous braves". The British after the incident issued
a proclamation in Chinese, saying that they would forget and forgive
the attack of the villagers, but they would not tolerate further
42. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, 2:948.
43. Morse, International Relations, p.284. The third item of the
"Peace Convention" stipulates that before all the money of the
ransom were paid, the British troops would stay in their position
(Ssu-fang Fort). The British troops withdrew from the Fort on
condition that the Canton authorities had paid all the ransom.
44. The people of Kuangtung believed that the righteous braves had
killed Admiral J'.J. Gordon Bremer and Major Becher during the
incident, see, IWSM, TK 31.19b.
45. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.58. This is a translation of YJakeman.
46. Coolidge to Matheson, 4 June 1841, unbound miscellaneous
correspondence, Jardine Matheson Papers.
assaults. The angry villagers of San-yuan-li immediately retorted to
the British: "You said that your ships and guns were irresistable,
why did you not dare to take the affeMreat Canton while your respectful
Commissioner Lin was in office in Kuangtung instead of shifting your
attack to Chekiang to harass people :in T'ing-hai... The covetous
minister, Ch'i-shan was deceived by your machinery of trickery. He
withdrew soldiers from Shakok and Heng-tang and prohibited soldiers
47
from -adrfeacking yo<tt«.,,,^' .
During the incident the guns and muskets of the British troops
were drenched because of the heavy storm. In such a situation
cudgels, hoes, spears and long knives of the village braves were
superior fighting weapons. On 26th May, the citizens of Canton and
high-ranking officials had suffered much from the bombardment of the
British artillery from Ssu-fang Fort. Unfortunately, the village
braves at that time were busy with their preparation for the imminent
warfare without the city and they did not have the chance to perceive
the powerfulness of the British guns. In the same placard, the braves
expressed their total denial of the might of the armament; "Although
you (British troops) were able to occupy the Fort in the previous
days* your rockets and other weapons were not useful." They even
challenged the British to fight with them in land, positional, horse
or common warfares. The braves also did not fear the British ships,
they told their British counter-part: "As for naval battles you first
withdrew your ships from the Eogue for a hundred days so that we were
47. IWSI'I, TK 31.17a.
able to build our ships within that period. After that, we can
compete with your* . ships in the outer ocean. If you can beat us,
£ 8(we admit that) your ships are tough (li-hai fj '#) '
Commissioner Lin no doubt appreciated the resistance of the
village braves in the San-yuan-li incident, but he would not share in
their contempt for the powerful Eritish weapons. In September, 1840
Lin still kept his prejudice against the British ships which he did
admit tAeir- y&ower/w/wisin the ocean. He memorialised the Emperor on
24th September 1039? "Because the British ships are sturdy and guns
fierce, the people call them powerful... Yet they do not realise
that the British battleships are very heavy, taking water to the depth
of tens of feet. These vessels are successful only on the outer
oceanj it is their speciality to break the waves and sail under great
"49 1winds. " Hot long after his memorial, the"water-force" engaged in a
naval battle with a small fleet of British battleships at Ch'uan-pi
on 3rd November of the same year and Suffered, a miserable defeat.
Although Lin exaggerated the damage done to the British, he himself
had experienced the might of the British ships. After his disgrace in
October 1840, he sent a secret memorial to the Emperor, pointing out
that ships and guns were absolutely indispensable to the naval warfare
with the British. Although China was not able to develop them at
the time, still the country had to plan how to acquire them. Lin
suggested using one-tenth of the custom duties at Kuang-tung to
develop Chinese guns and ships for the national defence. Again in






wrote a confidential letter to one of his close friends in which he
sadly admitted that the British 'rapid-fire" guns and speed;/ ships were
greatly superior to any the Chinese possessed, adding that "even though
the rebellious English had fliedand returned beyond the seas, these thing- (guns
and ships) would still have to be quickly planned for... Moreover, unless
we have weapons, what other help can we get now to. drive
-ft 50
away the crocodile and get rid of the whales?...
The situation had been uneasy for the practice of conciliatory
policy at Canton in 1840's. Commissioner Lin was not given a chance
to fight vis-a-vis the British and to be defeated at Canton. Linfe
supportersthe village braves were able to cause some minor casualties
to the British troops due to the heavy thunderstorm, and believed that
the British armaments were not to be feared. With such notions, the.
people of Kuangtung dared to challenge the arrogant British young
merchants in the post-war period.
The village braves had a strong anti-urban feeling among them,
they simply did not like the way Canton had been behaving: the
citizensbegged their Governor to take measures of expediency to save
them from the British bombardment; the Canton authorities, headed by
I-shan sent Yu Pao-ehun and Wu Shao-yung to arrange the. Peace
Convention with their enemies by paying six million dollars as .^ransom".
Beyond such spineless begging for suing for peace with the
British, the villages had another reason to condemn the citizens.
T.F. Tsiang has given us a clear picture of the activities of the
people and officials within the city:
50. See Teng, China's Response, I, 28.
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Even before the Opium War, facts of actual life in
Canton in special did not always fit tributary system.
No matter what the literati might think and emperors
might decree, the craftsmen and merchants at the marts
were eager for the profit they could make from trade
with foreigners. Local officials were glad at the
increase of customs revenue which trade with foreigners
promoted and at the private fortune which they derived
from concealed participation in the trade and from
illegal exactions. On the other hand cessation of trade
brought economic difficulties to the local population
and loss to the local officials both in their public
and private capacities, furthermore, it might drive
the barbarians to war. It was therefore to the interest
of the local officials and population to wink at
irregularities of the foreigner so long as the emperor
did not get wind of them, 51
On the other hand, the citizens of Canton and the Hong merchants
had taken part .in the opium traffic. When the Opium War began in 1859
the term "traitor" was used to indiscriminately that it came to include
the opium smugglers and the entire commercial establishment of Canton.
The Hong merchants got the nickname from Commissioner Lin of "chien-shan^
1% " (Treacherous merchant) Hsia Hsueh remarked that the
traitorous Chinese who engaged in the opium trade, hated the strong
policy of Commissioner Lin of extirpating the opium traffic. They
feared that once the opium trade was captured, their livelihood
(from the opium trade) would then be threatened. They even helped
the British fight against their own government in the hope that the
52
former could win the warfare and maintain the opium trade. When
Lin declared a boycott against the British commercial community in
December, 1839 their Chinese servants and han-chien smuggled food and
other provisions to them. Later, traitorous Cantonese helped guide
51. T.F. Tsiang, "China and European Expansion" in Immanuel C.Y. Hsu,
ed. Readings in Modern Chinese History (Oxford,1971), p.131.




British ships along the Pearl River, and pulled away the impediments
that Lin had ordered to block the river.
The traitorous merchants on the other hand even petitioned Lin,
begging him not to disturb the province's trade by declaring war with
Britain. Lin was genuinely convinced that the Hong merchants had
54
betrayed their country for the sake of commerce.
After the San-yuan-li incident, the "righteous villagers" distinguished
themselves from those "traitorous"Chinese. In the "Placard of the
righteous people of Kuangtung denouncing the English barbarians", the
villagers blamed them as "fellow who renounce their fathers and ruler",
but they, themselves were completely different, loyal to the existing
government and not compromising with English invaders. On the same
placard, the villagers said: "... we righteous people have received
the favour of the Celestial Dynasty in nourishing us for two centuries.
Today, if we do not exterminate you English barbarians, we will not be
55human beings..."
The distrust of the British had made the villagers become
xenophobes. In the final part of the placard, they stated:
"Our hatred is already at white heat. If we do not
completely exterminate you pigs and dogs, we will
not be manly Chinese able to support the sky on our
heads and stand firmly on the earth. Once we have
said this, we will never go back on it, even if
frustrated ten thousand times. We are definitely
53. W.E. Hall and W.D. Bernard, The Hemesls in China. Con-prising a
History of the Late War in That Country with an Account of the
Colony of Hong Xon." (London 1855J, P«133> 139.
54. 1WSI-I. TK 23.14a.
55. Teng, China's Response. Vol.1, p.36»
going to kill you, cut your heads off' and burn you
to death! Even though you ask people to admonish
us, we will not obey. We must strip off your skins
and eat your flesh, and then you will know how
tough (li-hai) we are..." 56
In retrospect, was the movement of San-yuan-li organized by the
village braves themselves, or by the gentry? The facts indicate the
latter. There first took place the gathering of gentry at Iliu-lan-
kang on 25"th May, then came the attack of the British troops on 29th
May. On the other hand, it is clear that when the gentry leaders of
the village braves agreed to stop hostilities against the British
troops on 31st Kay, the braves, being leaderless, dispersed. As for
the "Placard", written in such vigorous and vulgar terms, it is under¬
standable that it must have been inspired or at least drafted by the
gentry, as the illiterate villagers were not able to do the writing.
During the Opium War, the villages not only had to bear war costs,
but they also suffered from disturbance b3»' the British troops. Thanks
to Lin's patriotic influence among them, they were willing to follow
their gentry leaders to fight the British. The gentry, who appeared
to be the mainstay of the social order, also assumed responsibility
for the safety and security of the rural area in this way.
56. Teng, China's Resnonse, I, p.36.
CHAPTER 5
MILITIA (T'UAH-.LIEF) AFTER SAN~YITA!'I~LI
The signing of the Peace Convention of Canton on 27th May 1841,
was merely a local issue between Captain Elliot and Canton leaders.
In London Lord Palmerston was not satisfied with the benefit acquired
by Captain Elliot in the Ch'uen-pi Convention on 1st January 1841.
He therefore recalled Elliot and appointed Sir Henry Pottinger as his
successor. The arrival of Pottinger at Macao and the departure of
Elliot for England in August 1841 marked the beginning of a new stage
in the war. Pcttinger had been instructed to bypass Canton and go
north to occupy T'ing-hao and seise the strategic points on the
Yangtze River. He was invested with full powers to negotiate a
treaty with the representatives of the Emperor of China.
After leaving a few ships to guard Hong Kong, Pottinger launched
an expedition to the north with thirteen men-of-war, a surveying
vessel and a force of 3,519 men. On 26th August, Amoy in Puch'ien
was captured,''' On 1st October T'ing-hai, was taken, now for the
second time. . A British provisional government was established.
At this stage, leaders of coastal provinces grew frightened
of the British military success. They realized that.the garrison
troops were not able to cope with the invading troops. The
achievement of the "righteous braves" in the San-yuan-li had offered
them an idea for improving their defence. Were the braves not
stronger than the garrison troops for defeating the British; In




to form militia for defence, they highly praised the victory of the
San-yuan-li. Liang Chang-chu (-vi ^), former Governor of Kuang-si,
recently appointed Governor of Kiangsu, impressed the Emperor: "the
real factor that saved Canton from (British) destruction was a group
2
of braves from the neighbouring villages of the city." He
suggested that the Emperor should, order Ch'i-kung, the then Governor
general of Liang-kuang, to train the village braves to form a
military force to defend Huangtung. Pao Shih-chen , a famous
scholar and censor of Nan-king, also suggested that the Emperor should
recruit the "righteous braves" to replace the demoralised garrison
troops. Yen Po-tao (, the Governor-general of Eukien and
Chekiang, on the other hand told the Emperor that the braves when on
the point of destroying the surrounded weary British troops in San-
yuan-li were ordered to disperse by the Canton prefect, Yu Pao-shun.
In a memorial to the Emperor, he enclosed hand-written copies of the
placards written by the San-yuan-li braves and the righteous people
of Kuangtung, stressing that the braves and the people were both
3
soldierly and loyal to the government. He implored the Emperor
to use the"ardour of the people"to form militia'as at San-yuan-li
4
to establish a coastal defence force.
On the other hand, the Canton authorities headed by Hanchu and
Chinese leaders found it necessary to strengthen the militia to cope
with the local unrest caused by natural calamities and. the scourge of
war.
2. INS!!, TK 31.15a.
3. Hsiao I-shan, Ch1 ri rw-ta 1 t'nng-shih, II, 954.
4. IPSE, TK 30.15a-l6a.
A decade before the outbreak of the Opium'War, Kuangtung had
been suffering from unkind tricks of nature. In 1829 high tides to
"a degree unprecedented in the memory of the oldest inhabitant"
flooded the provincial city and swept away villages. Hundreds
5
were drowned, and the rice crop was largely destroyed. During
the summer of 1833 and 1834, torrential rains raised the level of
the rivers as much as ten feet above normal, and "boats navigated the
streets of Canton." In July 1833, 10,000 lives were reported lost,
1,000 in the town of Fu-shan alone. Host of the rice crop was lost
in 1833 and the destruction of the dykes in the southern part of Han-
hai hsten resulted in the loss of most of the silk crop/' Even the
temperature had been unkind to the people, for local histories record
a number of cold spells and snowfalls during these years, People
found their lives difficult each day. Water supply for irrigation
and other benefits caused fighting between villages. At the same
time, vagabonds multified and banditry flourished in the districts.
In .1829, it was reported that 1,000 men were involved in a village
feud in Hsun-teh hsien, and in 1834, 400 people were reported killed
in a similar affair in Tung-kuan {'P'tf ) hsi en. The district
magistrate of Han-hai hsien in 1830 was forced to issue a
proclamation in which he condemned the bandits who extorted money
7
from the peasants. There are records in the English language
published in Canton, that: "vagabonds and banditti" abounding in the
countryside; and "instances of kidnapping by ex-pirates... were so
5* The Canton Register. 18 June 1829.
6. For details, see pertinent issue of OR; the Canton Register. Also
KGTO. 81:306.
7. The Canton Register. 6 September 1830.
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frequent that no man could feel himself safe alone in the streets of
Canton after 9 o'clock at night.
On the other hand, the warfare had despoiled the people of Kuang-
tung. Lu Hsien-chi , censor of the Hu-kuang Circuit,
memorialized the Emperor that the people in the coastal area had been
suffering from various sorts of extortion, such as forced labour and
9
the requisition of materials and draught animals. Although the Kuang—
txtng- authorities got subsidies from other provincial treasuries for the
warfare;,' localo officials Still squeezed money from the people in
order to cover the military expenditure. Additional taxation and
other extortion thus simultaneously were inflicted upon the people.
Many peasants left their jobs to escape the intolerable extortion and
became raacals.
Worst of all, the suspension of trade since the War had created ax
hugh number of unemployed in the province. Vung Hung ('&&}) the
first Chinese graduate from Yale university (also the first Chinese
graduate in America); estimated that the people of Kuang-tung who were
directly engaged in the foreign trade were more than 100 thousand.
If the number of people who indirectly earned a living from it were
also taken into consideration the amount would be more than one
10
million. When jobs ran out, these people spread over the city and
8. CR, V.3, passim.
9. res::, tk 45.i7a.
10. See Lieh Tao, Ya~p'ien chen-cheng? p. /jw.
its suburbs and became trouble-makers. The situation deteriorated
uhen Ch'i-shan disbanded the'water-braves"recruited by Lin in late
1840.^ The disbanded"water-braves" together with rascals roaming
the border of the provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-si, joined the
local bandits and devastated the area. Since the local authorities
Un
v/ereAable to apprehend them, they soon developed into 'a strong
force.
When the British took forces up the Canton River, succeeded in
occupying forts and threatened to attack Canton in early March, 1841,
the officials in the city immediately settled their families to
other safe places from the city. Their action had aroused the fear
of the common people. Eight or nine out of every ten shops and
families within the city followed suit and left the city. The
rascals in the rural districts rose in hundreds or thousands, robbing
and plundering. Some of them kidnapped women of the families for
ransom; others killed people for their belongings. Lo Ping-chang
commented that the unrest was because the garrison troops were fully-
engaged in the defence of the city and were not able to spare
12
strength to protect the people. British bombardment from Ssu-
fang Port in Kay 1841 revealed the deterioration of the unrest.
One Chinese official reported: "Innumerable bodies strewed the
streets. All discipline was lost; a confused clamour filled the
13
ways, and everywhere I observed plunder and murder..."
11. IWSH. TIC 28.23a.
12. IWSK. TIC 28.23b-24a.
13. See John. P. Davis, China, During the War- and Since the Peace
(Londod, 1852), I, 125-127.
To decide whether- or- not officially to strengthen the existing
militia in Kuang-tung was a difficult, problem for the Emperor, It
was natural' that the: 'conservative Manchu Emperor- was unwilling to
mobilise the militia-men to fight against the British, We can find
some analogies in. the European wars of liberation against. Napoleon,
Metternich in Austria was always hesitant ta use the common people
ton defeat Napoleon. He. wanted to defeat Napoleon with, regular
troops, whose obedience he could rely on,
Besides, the ancestors of the Emperor had had too much trouble
in Kuang-tung in the past. In the early years of the Manchu
government, Cheng Ch1 eng—kung -$/- A (1 62:4—1 662), occupied Taiwan
(Formosa) as a base to launch a bitter campaign against the govern¬
ment, At that time, innumerable people in Kuang-tung gathered under
Cheng's flag. The Manchu government at that time had to adopt
the' proposal of Huang Wu ( ~f( f<o ), a. surrendered general from Cheng
Ch'eng-kung, and put into effect a scheme of forced evacuation
of - all who-' lived within fifty li_ (Chinese mile) of the sea coast.
In 1674* the"Revolt of the Three Feudatories" (San—fan chih luan
JL 2 rfjL ) led by Wu San~kuei(vt ■?$£), Keng Ching—chung (-.)
and. Shang Chih—hsin (/^/i./= ) was takingplace, Kuang-tung at that
time was one of the strongest bases for this anti—Hanchu warfare.
When the Revolt failed, the. "Anti-Ch'ing, Restore-King" ("Fan-ch* ing
fu-nxing sk idea was covertly preserved and nurtured in the
secret society of the "Heaven end Earth Society" ( T'ien-t.i hu.i X )
in Southern China., especially in Kuang—tung. As we know, Hung Hsui—
ch'uan, the leader- of the Taiping Rebellion v;as a native of Hua-hsien
in Kuang-tung,
However, the situation in Kuang—■tung after the San-yuan~li
incident was obvious; the. regular troops were proven neither able
to> defend.-
. the province from the English attack, nor to protect;
the people. Another force was urgently demanded . to replace them.
The; Emperor' believed' the memorials of his governors-general
and censors that the. San-yuan-li braves had killed two high—ranking
English officers and soldiers in hugh numbersj^ What impressed
the' Emperor most was that the "reighteous braves" in the San—yuan-1i
battle were different from the rebellious people of Kuang—bung in
the past. The braves called themselves the "righteous1 people" in
their "Placard" that denounced the English barbarians, and stressed
that they were all. gratified with the favour of the existing dynasty
in nourishing them for two hundred years.
Besides, the Kuang-tung leaders had proclaimed the loyalty of
the braves, adding that, if the Emperor approved, the form of militia
in. Ifwnng-tung, it would be supervised and commanded by the. loyal
and upright local gentry.
When the: Emperor w.^s still considering whether or not to use
the. militia, the leaders of Kuang—tung in. early September, 1841
boldly told him that they had already selected certain members of
the prestigeous gentry to go out into the villages near Canton
1 5
to summon the villagers and train militia. Under such
circumstances, the Emperor agreed to form the militia in
the province.
14. IV/SM. TK 29.26b.
15. IV/SM. TK 52.15b.
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After all, what drove the Emperor in Peking to support the
Kuang-tung leaders' initial action of usino.the traditional rebellious
d
people of ICuang-tung to form militia after the San-yuan-li incident?
Frederic Wakeman holds the view that it was due to the financial
reasonslocally financed militia would reduce Peking's expenses for
i 6
upkeeping regular troops.
To certain extent, I agree with Vakeman's view. We have mentioned
A
the frugality of the Emperor in the previous chapter. In the early
stage of the Opium War, after the British "had taken T'ing-hai on 5th
July, 1840 for-the.first time, the Emperor did order the locally
financed militia be used to defend the maritime provinces in order
to save military expenses for maintaining regular soldiers in those
1 7
places. However, facts indicate that the imperial approval of
using the militia after the San-yuan-li incident was not chiefly
devised to reduce military expenses.
As a matter of fact, the military expenses after the San-yuan-li
i S
incident in Kuang-tung were much more than the period before that.
Military expenses below the red line were those after the San-yuan-li
incident
^ , , Total Military _ TaelsPeriods Expenses (tael) (per day)
TIC 2l/l/2p (l4 February 1341 )
to- 1,074,000 121 8,876.0551
TIC 21/4/24 (15 June 1 841 )
TIC 21/4/24 (15 June 1841 )
to 1,671,000 168 9,946.4286
TIC 21/10/15 (27 November 1841)
TK 21/10/15 (27 November 1841)
to 1,157,879 114 10,156.855
TK 22/2/8 (19 March 1842)
16. Wakeman, Strangers» p.65.
17. Charles Gutzlaff, The Life of Taon—lcwangy Late Emperor of China
with. Memoirs of the Court ox Peking (London, 1352), p. 67.
18. Of. IWSM. TK 40.52a-b=
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In my opinion, the motive of the Emperor in using the militia
was due to the urge of recovering lost territories. Early Kanchu
emperors were meritorious in enlarging the extent of the empire.
The Cliien-lung Emperor, the grandfather of the Tao-kuang Emperor
had made. the. empire the second largest one in Chinese history, jiist
next in size, to the Mongol Empire. Although the Chia-ching Emperor,
his father, suffered from social, economic and political decline
after the Chfien-lung period, still he was able to put down, the
White Lotus Revolt at the turn of the 18th~l9th centuries. Beside,
he had succeeded in dismissing the British envoy, Lord Amherst, who
demanded, apart from trading benefits, a port to pr-ospeir British
trade in China in 1816.
The fall of T'ing-hai on. 1st October, 1841 for the second time
was a great insult to the Emperor. The Painful feeling of the Emperor
towards the British occupation of T'ijag-hai is recalled in the dieis^r
of Weng T 'ung-ho % imperial tutor to the Kuang-hsu Emperor (l 875-
1908} ) dated 29th May, 1366. The diary describes that the Tao-kuang
Emperor during the Opium War period was very frustrated on reading
the depressing military reports from his defeated generals. After
the second fall of T'ing-hai, the Emperor once paid his routine
visit to his mother. The latter shouted to him: "Tour founding
ancestors won every inch of territory and every subject of the empire
with utmost difficulties, how can you lose them so easily?" The
1 9
kneeling Emperor did .not dare to stand up for a long while.
The Emperor had decided to use the newly established militia in
Kuang-tung to recover territories. On 20th October, 1841 he urged the
Kuang-tung officials to use the militia-men to take back Hong Kong which
20
was then eccupied by the British troops.
19. Ch'en Yiin-lung, comp., uChung-ho yueh-k'an shih-liao hsuan-chi
(Selected articles of the "Chung-ho monthly"}" ^Taipei, 1970)> 1,278.
20. IWSH, TK 32.l7a-b.
What was militia ? Were those in Kuang-tung able to come up
to the expectation of the Emperor: repulsing the British troops
from Chinese jterritories?
The foundation of militia was based on t'uan-lien (Lit.
"grouping and drilling"). T'uan-lien was principally designed for
local defence and based on a system of registration and conscrip-
tion. It^closely tied to the civil mutual security system known
as pao-chia ( f )„ The pao-chia system was a Tithing system
devised by Prime Minister Wang An-shih i V& (1021~1086) of the
Sung dynasty to maintain civil mutual security. Pao-chia regis¬
tered every rural household. It stipulated ten households forming
one p' ai (/f:'47), ten p'ai forming one chla (lf )9 ten c-bia forming one
pao . Tie chang - fy (chief) of the pao vras responsible to^ Local
magistrate. The pao-chia posts were ordinarily assigned to commoners,
21
the gentry not usually taking 'part in it. The system was an offi¬
cial effort to ensure that villagers formed no links with unorthodox
groups. Once pao-chia was in force, one could "divide the good
22
from the bad". When Commissioner Lin arrived at Canton in 1859,
he enforced the existing pao-chia system and made it a useful vehicle
of his authority. The opium dealers and smokers were easily distin¬
guished among common people after the enforcement. In a short period
Lin v/as able to imprison opium dealers in hundreds and smokers in
thousands. The enforcement of pao-chia also offered him a good
base upon which he was able to select law-abiding people as "righteou
braves".
21. Hsiao Kung-chuan points out that this feature of pao-chia was
in fact designed partly as a counterweight to the gentry's
local influence. See Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial
Control in the nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960J, p.68.
22. Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China
(Harvard University Press, 1970)? p.60.
The ,P3-Q-chia system, however, was not necessarily capable
of defending itself, as local defence required the power of unity
and a firm popular* will. The functions were left to the t'u.an-
lien as it emphasized unity.
The t'uan-lien system originated during the late seventh
century in reference to a state militia system, designed for
border defence. The system was helpful, considering the inade¬
quacy of government military power, in that it provided security
for its own people and cut of their contact with the rebels. The
modern meaning of t'uan-1ien can be traced back to late Ming period
In 1636, lu Ksiang—sheng/it Ik i] (1 600-1639)., a krl((tantghwrjjyixev.
up a plan to fight the rebels who had escaped the suppression of
government troops by mixing with the village people. In response,
Lu built strong and thick walls in selected villages, within which
would be gathered the grain supplies of the surrounding countryside
The people of these villages were to be organized into groups
(t'uan /?) ). Each group would bo supervised by a group head (t'uan-
ehang ip/^ ), under each group-head was appointed a drilling-head
(lien-chang -/< ). ^~J
fin
The village-basis systemAwhich Lu Hsiang-sheng based
, , ite
his defence programme was cyaecf by .Kanehu government in it's
t'uan-lien system. "Local community schools" (she-hsueh t-t fS- )
served as depots "fa- recruiting members into t'uan-lien, According
to the recruitment system, each household (hu ) provided one
conscript for every three adult males (ting J' ), and these were
then grouped into larger units to form t'uan. and drilled, (lien)
23. ICuhn, Rebellion, p.41.
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by the appointed trainers. There were strict rules against recrui-
ting t'uan-lien members from outside area in order to guarantee
members in every t'uan-llen were recognized by their leaders.
The official model of fr* uan-lien stressed bureaucratic lines
of authority. In theory, the district Magistrate was the head of
t 'nan-lien. ■ He had power to examine the t 'nan-lien leaders and
to confirm or dismiss them. Top t'nan-lien posts were generally
reserved for members of the upper gentry. The gentry's place in
t'nan-lien was rationalized by the formula? "official supervision
and gentry management." The gentry's power in locally financed
t'uan-1ien was much emphasized as the principal source of it's
funds came from their contribution.
In the Ch'ing period, t'uan-lien found application in large-
scale battle during the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1Q04)» Manchu
rulers before the Chia-ching Emperor (1796-1820) were able to
maintain order throughout the empire. At least rebellions were
not obvious in the majoi" cities; minor disturbances there could
be halted by the empire's regular troops? the Eight Banners
tAe
and the Army ofAGreen Standard. The Eight Banners encamped in
Manchuria and in and around Peking and important cities of
tAt
Chihlij the Army ofAGreen StandardAstationed in provincial a,nd
'' k
prefectual cities outside Manchuria and Chihli. Neither force
could penetrate China's village substructure where rebellions
rose and flourished. They were adequate in times of relative
stability but not in times of major social disruption. The
Eight Banners, established at the beginning of the seventeenth
century and instrumental in the Manchu takeover of China (l644),
declined rapidly after the coniquest# However, the force enjoyed
special privileges from the Manchu government. Housed in isolated
city quarters (in a generally unsuccessful attempt to keep thera
separate from the Chinese population at large), Bannermen received
grants, of land for farming and raising livestock. In addition,
they received amounts of rice, cloth, and cotton, as well as a
small pension. Soon after the establishment of the Manchu•regime,
the Eight Banners became an expensive, cumbersome and almost use¬
less haven of vested interest. The Army of the Green Standard,
an exclusively Chinese army, comprising of Ming military remnants
and additional levies. Unlike the Banner army, which the Manchus.
originally intended solely as a fighting machine, the Green Stan¬
dard army was designed to perform* a variety of diverse and often
non-military functions. In addition to acting as both a national
defense army and internal security force, the Green Standard
provided an escort service for funds, provisions and prisoners,
guarded graneries, tombs and city gates, assumed police duties
such as surveillance and crime prevention, carried out postal
functions, and stood ready to undertake other designated tasks,
including providing labor for public works. However, the force
provided a useful, indeed essential, complement to the declined
"Eight Banners following the Manchu conquest. Unfortunately, the
Army retained its vitality for only about a, hundred 3'ears, and then
24it too declined.
During the White Lotus Rebellion, both the Banner and the
Green Standard forces were proven strengthless to cope with the
rebel. Li Chien-nung (3N^/4f.) quotes a contemporary account
2.4. See Stanley, Spec tor, Li Hung-chnag and the Huai Army; A
Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle, 1964)*
p.xxxii~xxxv»
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stating that in many bitter fights with the rebels in various
provinces, both forces timidly stood behind the militia-men. and
25
took no direct fight with the rebels. After the Rebellion,
militia became the backbone of the combating forces.
Militia organization in Kuang-tung was srniliar to those in
other provinces. "Local community schools" were the foundation of
militia. She-hsueh in Kuang-tung also called as shu-yuan college)
or i~hsueh-^"^(charity school). Its main function was to provide
"place where scholars present classes and students 1 earn.41"
Occasionally, she-hsueh functioned as meeting places for gentry to
26
mediate clan disputes and. feuds. In the Ch'ing period, there
were 258 she-hs'ueh in Kuang-tung, sponsored by local government:
27
155 by private funds. %;
During the Opium War, she-hsueh near Canton were actually
founded specifically as t'uan-lien headquarters. They, each of
which was already coordinating the gentry activities of many
villages, were natural spots for the location of ta—t'uan (XIJ?)
headquarters. An office (kung-so <£-£/}) was established by the
28
gentry leaders to supervise the headquarters.
The militia in the Pearl River delta where the prefecture of
Canton located were stronger than others all over the province, and
25. See Li, Political History of China, p.8.
26. HHHC. I5:l8b-19a; T'ien Ming-yueh, ed. Hsiang-shan hslen-chlh
(Gazetteer of Hsiang-shan district) (18797» I5*36a.
27. Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China; Aspects
of Social Mobility, 1 560-191 1 (How" York, 1962}, p.199-205.
28. Ta-Ch'ing l.i.-ch'ao shih-lu (The veritable records of the
successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty) (1937)? 394*15.
the role of gentry in those militia was very much emphasized.
There are a number of reasons to account for this. The Pearl
River delta is criss-crossed by an amazing number of creeks and
tr ibutaries, which rendered the enforcement of law and order-
difficult under any circumstances. The circumstances were defin¬
itely not favourable. The officials had neither the will nor the
power to enforce the law. The vacuum left by the instituted
authorities was filled to some extent by the local gentry. On the
other hand, the region was the richest and most thickly settled part
of Kuang-tung due to the foreign trade in Canton. For more than a
century, Canton had been the only Chinese port open to foreign trada.
The order in Canton and the Pearl River delta deteriorated after the
flourishing or. growth of the illegitimate trade in opium as the
Chinese opium trafficants were well-armed and did not shun battles
with government patrols.
The disorder inAPearl River delta stimulated the co-operation
of the villages for mutual defence under the leadership of the gentry.
K'ang Yu-wei M the protagonist of the ill-fated Hundred Day's
Reform, has left a succinct description of these entities:
"With the outbreak of troubles of the Tao-kuang (-j 821-1350)
and. Hsien-feng(l851-1861) periods, the gentry took
the initiative in organizing militia to protect their
villages. In case the strength of one village was
insufficient, several neighbouring villages, in
conformity with the dictates of topographical features,
would band together to form regional alliances. Cr
one large village might function as the unit of defence
and a corps was organized. These corps were called chu /£/
(Literally, "bureau."), which'regularly levied taxes and
were run by a permanent staff of functionaries. Take,
for example, the case of T'ung ,jen chu (/z]A/£i)o£ Nan-hai
hsien . Its jurisdiction extended over thirty-six
villages with a combined population of fifty or sixty
thousand people. There were two c-hu-chang (A -&). heads of
the bureau to be recruited from those holding the chin-
shih or chu-ien degrees,,. Thereupon, the villagers
had the local gentry and the clan leaders to arbitrate
their disputes ana the militia, specially selected and
trained to defend their properties... The organizational
framework of the chu might vary in its complexity, but
in the main, it was as has been set forth above. It was
to be found over the greater part of the province of
Kuang-tung. The managing gentry of the chu were selected
by all the ranking gentry of the locality and approved by
the district magistrate. There were also cases in which
'
appointments in the chu had not been approved by the
magistrate. For all major decisions, all the gentry ^
members were entitled to participate in the deliberations."
Before the Emperor's approval of' using the militia in October
1841, local gentry had asked their officials reconstruct militia
due to the 2!opal unrest# In the summer of 1841, Li Fang
(-^<5 )> a chu-jen of P'an-yu hsien, petitioned the Crovernor-general
of Liang-kuang to be permitted to reconstruct the Sheng-p'ing she-hideh
^(School of prosperous peace) which formed in Shih-ching ( '£ 1/ ),)
30
a market town about four miles northwest of San-yuan-li in 1764.
After the official approval of the Peking government to strengthen
the militia at the end of October 1841, the Sheng-p1ing she-hsueh
experienced rapid growth. Ho Yu-cheng and Wang Shao-kuang, the
active leaders of San-yuan-li, were very happy to sponsor the Sheng-
p'ing she-Hsiieh. Thanks to their prestige, eleven she —-hs'ueh in
f7an-hai and P'an-yu hsien were gathered under the banner of the
31
Sheng-p'ing she-hsueh. There were:
Names Location
1. ''Hsun-feng (ky /H.) £he-fas'ueh" Nan-hai hsien
2. "Liu-shun (zT/'/jO She-hsueh" Nan-hai hsien
3. "En-chou ('a?! >!'/) ghe-hs'iieh" Pan-yu hsien
29. K'ang Yu-wei, K'ang Nan-hai kuan-chih i (A discussion of the
official system by K'ang Nan-hai), 2nd ed. (Shanghai, 1905),8:15.
30. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.71.
31. Cf. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.74.
Haines Location
4. "iJuai-ch' ing (1% iff ) She-Jisueh'
5. "Chung-yung She-hsueh"
6. "Ch'eng-feng ( />\ &\L ) .she-bsueh"
7. "Ch'un-feng (>*7 /^L) She-bsueh"
8. "Ho-feng ( -%afcLi) she-.teueh"
9. "Hsi-hu {ttyfif)) She-hsueh"
10. "Lien-hu ) .She-bsUeh"


















Later, Ho Yu-Shu (f°T$il) a chin-sh.ih of P'an-yu hsion
established the Sheng-p'ing kung-go 'f 3?h'f in Chiang-ts'un (4 :l )
l( * t , ^ ^ i
to recruit more members for the Sheng-p'ing ghe-hsueh. The Kung-So
was located in a relatively poor but densely populated area near the
boundary of neighbouring Hua-hsien (the home town of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan),,
that brought certain influences to the Rebellion in 1850. The gentry
of the various she-hsueh asked the rich people where the she-bsueh was
located to donate money. As for the poor, their direct contribution
« " U ,,
was to join the she-hsueh. The Sheng-p.'ihsr she-hsuen and Kung~So
were able to raise 20,000 taels in subscriptions, of which 11,000
were actually received. More than 10,000 braves were actually
32
recruited.
The Emperor had taken the risk of using the rebellious people of
Kuang-tung to form militia to recover Chinese territory. But was his
risk worth it? I-shan, who remained Imperial Commissioner in Canton
after the San-yuan-li incident, was responsible for the military action
of taking back Hong Kong with the help of the newly-recruited militia-
32. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.73.
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men. Unfortunately, he did not have confidence in the militia. In
a report to the Emperor, he painfully told the Emperor that the some
thirty-six thousand militia-men could manage to defend the strategic
points of the City River, but they were not strong enough to attack
33
the English barbarians in Hong Kong.
Other provincial leaders who praised the success of San-yuan-li
incident had kept a large number of militia-men in their jurisdiction.
Yen Po-tao, the Governor-general of Fulcien and Chekiang impressed on
the Emperor that the militia in the villages were well-organized,
saying that once the recruitment of mercenaries (yung) was completed,
3 Ahe would order those forces to destroy the invading barbarians. '
However, Tuan Hua (), the vice-president of the Board of Revenue,
reported from Fu-kien during his appointment there that there were
some 58,000 militia-men in that province who only protected themselves
but did not help the garrison troops to fight the English. Besides,
35
they accepted neither official order nor military grant.
In October 1841, the British troops gained several victories
in Chekiang. The Emperor thus gave Associate Grand Secretary I-ching
(■% £1. )f his nephew, the title of "Hajesty-Bearing General", to
superintend warfare in Chekiang. After his arrival, he reported to
the Emperor that there were some ninety thousand militia-men in-the
province. However, they were not well selected. I-ching commented
33. B'JSN, TIC 41.17a-b.
34. T.fSM, TK 32.19b~20b.
35. IWSM, TK 41.31a.
that they could not even defend themselves, let alone attack the
36
powerful enemy.' In another report, he told the Emperor that the
militia-men had. declared that in case of British attack, they would
attend the "battle field to increase the ranks of the Chinese camp, but
they would not actually engage in fighting,, I-ching thus concluded
that although the number of militia-men were impressive, their combat-
37
ant strength was doubtful.
What depressed the Emperor most was the traitorous action cf the
people of Kuang-tung and Pukien in helping the British troops to attack
the Chinese garrison. In one of the battles in Chekiang in October,
1841, Yukien the then Imperial commissioner and Governor-general of
Liang-Kiang reported that the British placed ten thousand rascals whom
they recruited from Kuang-tung and Pu-k'ien in front of their troops
Men
while they cenvnanded* from behind. Those rascals were equipped with
advanced British weapons. They scaled the city walls to attack and
eventually succeed in occupying the city. Yukien seriously criticized
the idea of using'the militia-men to defend Chinese territory, saying
38
that such characters were no different from traitors."
However, the continuation of the British attacks on Chinese
territories had caused the Emperor to snatch at the use of militia.
Despite the serious criticism of the militia, the Emperor did not
consider disbanding this force. On 5th June 1842, he sent an edict
to the Grand Secretariat to emphasize the importance of the militia:
36. IWSM, TK 41.38b.
37. r.'.'SII, TK 42.7a-b.
38. IWST-I, TK 33.34a-36b.
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"As to the officers and soldiers in the army, there
is a current belief among them that the sturdy
ships and fierce cannons of the barbarians are
irresistible. Hence, they gave up fighting the
moment they saw the enemies on the battle-fields.
But they should know that the ca\ise of the invasion
of the enemies was our concession at the beginning.
Should every one. go forth bravely and with the
co-operation of the village braves, it must be
obvious that not only is I there great difference
between us the hosts and them the strangers, but
also there is no comparison between the numerical
strength of the two parties." 39
On the other hand, the development of militia since the establish¬
ment of Sheng-p'ing kung-so developed in an unorthodox way. Many
complicated members from the poor families in Chiang-ts'un where the
Kung-So was located, had joined the t'uan-lien. Trouble thus occurred-.
The prestigious gentry were not willing to lead such groups of "black
sheep"; the leadership was left to the less prestigious and "righteous"
gentry and other minor degree-holders, such as chien-sheng <££ 4 (hahdezr of a
degree obtained by purchase). The situation worsened when the War was
over in August 1842. Former leaders of the Sheng-p'ing she-hsueh,
such as Ho Yu-cheng had withdrawn from their roles in the t'uan-lien.
More fop posts were replaced by the less prestigious gentry. The Huang—
iung authorities had less influencaon the less prestigious gentry,
and the t'uan-lien ran out of provincial, contrail. Horse yet, such
kind of gentry and minor degree-holders had never before experienced
the power of leading t'uan-lien. Once they landed such positions
they tried to hold on to them. Some of them even made use of their
position to build up their own power. To arouse popular sentiment to
39• See B.C. Kuo, A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War
(Shanghai, 1935), p.290. This is a translation of Kuo.
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fight against the British invaders was a good means to this end.
At the same time, they had to condemn the provincial leaders and the
garrison troop3 who were not able to protect the people so as to draw
the popular support to their side. Ch'ien chiang (^r.-'x), a chien-
sheng from Chekiang was a good example. He went to Canton to try
his luck when the Opium War began. At that time, the rural gentry
near Canton recruited braves to protect their villages. Ch'ien
managed to register as a local ting ( 7~ ) and entered the t'uan-lien.
As he was a chien-sheng he was entitled to become a leader of a small
ie
t'uan-lien unit. DuringA San-yuan-li incident, he led a t'uan-lien
unit to fight the British troops and was much in the public eye.
After the Opium War, he got the opportunity to lead a large group of
t'uan-lien with financial support from a local notable named Su Lang-jao
In November, 1842, he posted a proclamation in the Confucian
temple (l-Iing-lun-t'ang *) ferociously condemning the British
invaders who brought opium to China, sapping the country of her riches
and her people of their health. At the sane time, he humiliated the
provincial leaders for "valuing their lives being as heavy as
mountains; the civil and military officers feared the barbarians as
if they were tigers. They ignored the peril of the country and the
lamentation of the people, doing everything according to their own
will as well as to cede (Chinese) territories and pay huge indemnities
t ■ \ 41
ito the English invaders)." He stimulated the people to defend
themselves by their own strength and curb the further invasion of
40. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.69.
41. YPCC, 3:354.
the English. The immediate result of Ch'ien Chiang's militant
proclamation wa3 the anti-foreign disturbance. On 7th December, a
group of some 170 lascars appeared in the factory area vithout
officers. They started a quarrel with some Chinese fruit-sellers.
The quarrel soon turned into a street riot. During the affray, one
•
Chinese was stabbed and several lascars were injured. Due to the
increasing number of Chinese during the affray, the lascars sought
refuge in the British factory, which became the focus of attack from
the angry Chinese. By midnight the British factory was ablaze.
Within a short period, the fire spread to other factories (Greek and
Dutch factories). By that time plunder and looting had started.
42
The riot did not disperse until the arrival of 200 Chinese troops.
42. FP, Correspondence respecting insults in China (London, 1357),
p.1-10, hereafter cited as Insults; CR. 11:687-688; IWSH. TK
64.20a-22b.
PART TV/0
CH'I-YING'S CONCILIATORY POLICY AND ITS FAILURE
CHAPTER fi.
CH'MING AM) THE TREATY OF NANKING
»
The second British occupation of T'ing-hai on 1st October, 1841
had frightened the Emperor. Sir Henry Pottinger made an announcement
after the occupation: "... Under no circumstance will T'ing-hai and
its dependencies be restored to the Chinese government, until the
whole of the demands of England are not only complied with but carried
into full effect."^
After the occupation of T'ing-hai, what shocked the Emperor most
was the fall of Chen-hai (/£|r^) on 10th October. Chen-hai lay on a
narrow peninsula, between the mouth of the Yung River and the sea.
At the tip of this peninsula, commanding both the town and the mouth,
was a great cliff over two hundred feet high, with very steep sides
and a citadel on top. Chen-hai had formidable defences and was under
the strict command of the Mongol Imperial Commissioner, Yukien.
During the battle, Yukien placed himself at the front of the fighting
2
to encourage the spirits of the garrison troops. However, although
the Chinese soldiers, had the geographical advantage of height, they
were not able to obstruct the advance of the scaling British. Yukien
committed suicide by throwing himself into- the river when the British
broke into the city.
The fall of Chen-hai proved that the British were not only well-
versed in sea battle, but also in land combat. In a joint memorial,
Ch'i-ming-pao (the then Tartar-general of Hangchow
1. This is a uotation from Beeching, Chinese Opium War, p. 137*
2. See IWSM, TK 34.22a.
(Chekiang) and Liu Tun-ke, the governor of Chekiang, told the Emperor
that the British troops were able to scale the cliff and climb the
city walls to occupy Chen-hai, adding that the rumour that once the
British went ashore they would lose their vigour, was completely
groundless
Three days after the occupation of Chen-hai, the British captured
Ningpo ($ ))t ). The irrational Emperor ignored the bare fact that
the Chinese forces were no match to their British opponents. On l8th
October he gave Associate Grand Secretary I-ching ), his nephew,
the title of "Majesty-Bearing General", with Wen-wei and d'e-i-
shun ( 44 (R ) as his deputies. They were given troops transferred
from the interior, and sent to Chekiang to recover the cities of
4
T'ing-hai, Chen-hai and Ningpo.
The appointment of I-ching was similar to that of I-shan in
January of the same year. These two appointments throw significant
light on the conduct of the war whenever the British occupied Chinese
territory, the furious Emperor would immediately order his own
relatives to gather troops from various provinces to recover the lost
territory. The loss of territory was considered a great offence to
"the prestige of the Celestial Empire."
The reasons why the Emperor preferred appointing the Manchus
rather than Chinese to superintend important actions of the war with
the British are understandable. On the one hand, the Emperor, being





superintend large forces. On the other hand, the Chinese were less
belligerent than the "Manchus. While the former studied the classics,
the latter were more inclined to practise archery and horsemanship.
The Emperor practically overlooked the fact that I-shan, his
nephew and the troops from the various provinces had received a
humiliating defeat from the British at Canton in May 1841. This time
the Emperor pinned his hopes on I-ching, another of his nephews, to
lead the troops from the various provinces to drive away the British.
When I-ching showed confidence that he would no doubt recover the
three -lost cities, the Emperor praised him adding that he was waiting
5
for his future victory.
By the end of 1841* the Emperor with groundless confidence
decided to launch counter-attacks against the British not only in
Chekiang, but also in Canton. At the beginning of I842, the Emperor
reproached I-shan for not holding firm either by attacking the British
troops at Hong Kong or strengthening the defence of Canton, but
instead wasting more than 300 thousand taels per month to maintain the
military forces.^ Ch'i-ying, the military governor of Sheng-ching
the home base of the Manchus, was appointed as "Tartar General
of Canton" on 24th February 1842 to take charge of military affairs u\
Canton in the hope that he would recover Hong Kong. In early March,
Ch'i-ying was ordered to hasten to his new post. On the other hand,
I-ching, Wen-wei and Te-i-shun started their counter-attack on the
cities of T'ing-hai, Chen-hai and Ning-po on 10th October. However,
5. IWSM, TK 44.8a.
6. IWSM, TK 43.l6b-17a.
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they were not able to drive the British from the cities. A large
number of Chinese soldiers were killed in these attacks. The warfare
in Chekiang at that time was much more serious than that of Canton.
Ch'i-ying on his way to Canton was detained at Hangchow in Chekiang.
He was ordered to stay at that city to act as Tartar General instead
7
of ^oing to Canton.
Ch'i-ying was a member of the Manchu Plain Blue Banner and an
8
imperial clansman. His forefathers were not particularly renowned.
The existing Chinese documents concerning his family background start
with his father, Lu K'ang who had a good record in dealing
with academic affairs, but was bad at military administration. He
first served as secretary in the Imperial Clan Court and was
later promoted to the post of Grand Secretary in 1804. After Lu-
K'ang became the commandant of the Peking Gendarmerie in 1809, his
inability to discipline his inferiors was noticed. In l8ll he was
accused of failing to prohibit gambling by the officials under his
jurisdiction. Two years later, while he was serving as lieutenant-
general of the Plain Yellow Banner, several of Ms soldiers joined
the rebels who attacked the palaces in Peking. As a result he was
9
exiled to Hi, Sin-kiang and died there.
Ch'i-ying landed the post of supernumerary secretary in the
Imperial Clan Court in l80o by virtue of his status as a yin-sheng
7. XWSM, TK 44.35b.
8. Clansmen were direct male descendants of Nurhachi (1533-1615),
the founder of the Ch'ing dynasty. Clansmen were entitled
to wear the "yellow girdle" (in order to show their
nobility.
9. See Hummel, Eminent Chinese. I, 150.
He became the administrator to the Imperial Clan Court in
1813• Two years later he served as the superintendent of customs
at Shanhaikuan (and held the post until 1819. In 1820 he
served as sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat.
EtHptrtir-
When the Tao-KuangAascended to the throne in 1820, Ch'i-ying
enjoyed more influential and lucrative posts. He was promoted
chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, with concurrent titles of vice-
president of the Board of Rites, and superintendent of the Summer
Palace (Yuan-ming-yuan IjU afll]f)) in 1820. In the later years, Ch'i-
ying became the president of the Board of Ceremonies in 1834, and
shifted to take charge of the Board of Revenue in the same year.
In 1836 he chaired the Board of Civil Appointments. From 1824 onwards,
Ch'i-ying was also given top posts in military affairs: lieutenant-
general of the Plain Yellow Banner (1824); commandant of the Peking
Gendarmerie (1827-37)• In June 1838 he became military governor of
Sheng-ching which entailed residence at Mukden. He kept the
post until he was appointed Tartar-general of Hang chow in 1842.
Ch'-ying did not have a meritorious record in the civil service.
In1fact before his appointment as military governor of Sheng-ching, he
was accused three times of malpractices which included corruption.
1 12
In 1827, when the people of Yuan-p'ing hsien made a request
10. Yin-sheng was the son of a distinguished official holding a rank
conferred in recognition of the latter's contribution to the
Manchu government.
11. Shan-hai-kuan (,Mountain and Sea Pass) was a key pass in the Great
Wall in Northern China.
12. Yuan-ping hsien of Hopei is famous for its Marco Polo Bridge
i located in the southern part of Peking). On 7th July,
1937, the Japanese warlords started their invasion in China with




to start mining silver in their district, the idea was rejected by
the imperial court.^ Ch'i-ying made use of his administrative
influence in the Board of Revenue eventually to approve the proposal.
He was demoted by 2 grades when someone exposed this matter to the
court. In 1830 Ch'i-ying was involved with the issue of a false
document from the same Beard, demanding donation. Again, Ch'i-ying
was degraded by 2 grades. In November 1836, he was charged with
/
illegally releasing a eunuch, Chang Tao-chung who had been
gambling in the imperial court. This time he was accused by the
Emperor himself of "practising favoritism" and was degraded to the
rank of vice-president of a Board.^
Despite his malpractice in office, Ch'i-ying was able to regain
high offices after short periods of demotion. He was after all an
imperial clansman. Besides, he had an intimate relationship with
the imperial house and the Tao-kuang Emperor. His sister was married
15
to a member of the imperial house; and his niece was married to the
Tao-kuang Emperor.^ Ch'i-ying himself was a childhood playmate of
the Emperor. Through the reign of Tao-kuang (1820-1850), Ch'i-ying
enjoyed special preferment from the Emperor and escaped serious
punishment under imperial mercy.
13. In order to safeguard its silver resources, the Manchu government
set up strict regulations for the mining of silver. In 1833 Lin
Tse-hsu and then governor-general of Liang-Kiang proposed to theEmperorr
that- the govt, should coin cilver dollars. However, the
Emperor was not willing to use the silver reserves. He turned
down Lin'sproposal, adding that it was wholly incompatible with
long-established usages (ta-pien ch'eng-fa, pu-ch'eng shih-t.'i
see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p. 124.
14. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 130-131.
15. See Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 32.
- 16. Davis, China during the War, I, 251.
Unlike a provincial leader whose success in the bureaucracy was
based on the merit of his record within his own sphere, the political
success of an imperial clansman, apart from earning trust from the
emperor, depended on support from influential figures in the imperial
court. Ch'i-ying in his long service in different Boards and in the
imperial Household had built up a close relationship with Mu-chang-a,
another clansman and the chief grand councillor who had a good deal
of power because he had the ear of the Emperor. The British also
observed the intimate relationship between the two clansmen. The
British diplomatic correspondence with China in the post-war period
17
were always addressed to Ch'i-ying and Mu-ch'ang-a.
The Ch'ing officials who dealt with foriegn affairs before the
Opium War actually executed the instruction of Peking. Even though
they realized that the government policy was not suitable, they still
had to implement it. But Ch'i-ying made an exception after the war.
Due to his intimate relationship with the Emperor and Mu-cnang-a, he
was able to hold his own views in foreign policy, which made him a
colourful diplomat.
When the Opium War broke out, Ch'i-ying, who was in the post of
military governor of Sheng-ching, was ordered to prepare the coastal
defence of the Liao-tung Peninsula . In a report to the
Emperor in January, l839» be listed twelve items in his defence
programme, including the practice of the pao-chla system among the
bannermen; constant drilling of the garrison troops: the use of
17. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 133.
militia; the improvement of fire-arms; the speeding up of military-
dispatches between Peking and Mukden and the evacuation of the
1 ft
coastal people and their cattle and other military materials. In
his comment on Ch'i-ying's defence programme, the Emperor acclaimed
19it as an exemplary stratagem.
After the capture of T'ing-hai by the British troops on 5th July,
1840, the British were proven well-versed in naval warfare. Ch'i-
ying at that time voiced his opinion that he disagreed with the
Chinese forces engaging in naval battle with the British any more.
However he shared the same idea of other provincial leaders that
Chinese troops were able to defeat the British in land battles. He
suggested that once the British troops had left their ships to go
ashore, the Chinese soldiers should first lure them to move inland and
then block their return journey. The Chinese troops should then
encircle the British troops and attack them with a shower of musket
20
shots and arrows. If the British ships occupied Chinese strategic
harbours, Ch'i-ying deemed that the Chinese soldiers could disguise
themselves as fishermen to approach the British ships on the pretext
of selling fish to them. In this case, the Chinese soldiers could
know the actuality of the British ships. In the middle of the night,
21
they could attack their ships with fire.
18. IW'SM, TK 19.22b-25b.
19. IWSM, TK 19.25b.
20. IWSM, TK 39.45b-46a.
21. IWSM, TK 39.48a.
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The development of Ch'i-yingSstrategy was influenced by the
current rumour. Ch'i-ying shared the mistaken idea of his contem¬
poraries that the British, although good at using firearms, did not
know how to use swords. Besides, their waists were stiff and their
legs were bound with cloths. Once they had fallen down, they could
not stand up again. Under such circumstances, the British troops
would not be able to cope with the Chinese soldiers. Besides, Ch'i-
ying believed that the British had poor eye sight, and that they could
only see things at a short distance. In the middle of the night,
22
they would lose their eye sight completely.
As far as the defence in Sheng-ching was concerned, Ch'i-ying
revealed his idea in a report to the Emperor that the local troops,
although not able to launch attacks on the invading British, could
defend themselves by using topographical protection. As for
principle of the military action, Ch'i-ying insisted that the Chinese
troopsshould first show the might of their military power to the
British troops and then conciliate them afterwards in order to
23
manifest the dignity and the grace of the empire. Fortunately,
Sheng-ching at that time was not engaged with actual fighting with
the British troops, otherwise, Ch'i-ying would face the same fate of
other defeated generals in various provinces and receive severe
punishment.
22. 17,'SM, TK 39.48a.
23. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35 > ti, 288b.
Ch'i-ying, while strengthening the defence in Hangchow, paid
special attention to the manoeuvres of the British fleet. He
reported to the Emperor that more than twenty British battleships
had gathered near Cha-pu (f j'0i), intending to occupy that city.
Under these circumstances, he had assigned. I-li-pu together with
Hsien-ling ) to Cha-pu to try to "chi-mi"^./^ 7halter)the British
p j
in order to save the city from attack. The Emperor at that time
received a report from a censor, Su T'ing-k'uei ( if), saying
that a rumour was spreading that Britain had been attacked by her
feuding enemies. The battle ships engaged in warfare in Chinese
25
water had been ordered back. With this good opportunity, the
Emperor decided to gather all the available military forces to make a
counter-attack on the British invaders. In this case, Ch'i-ying's
effort of "halterin^'the British in Cha-pu would affect the fighting
spirit of the troops. The Emperor thus ordered Ch'i-ying to leave
Hangchow for Canton, telling him to report on the progress of the
defence in Bogue. He was also ordered to recover Eong Kong, a
rescript which I-shan could not fulfill. Having the wrong
idea that the British were having trouble themselves in their
own country, the Emperor proclaimed: "Why should the rebellious
barbarians be allowed to keep it (Hong Kong) permanentlyJ*^
During his appointment as the Tartar General of Hangchow in
May 1842, Ch'i-ying was able to escape from actual fighting with the
British troops. Being the commander-in-chief in Hangchow, he was
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not attack Hangchow, but shifted their attack to Cha-pu where I-ching
suffered a serious defeat on 18th May. After the fall of Cha-pu,
Ch'i-ying was ordered to take charge of the defence of the whole of
Chekiang province. If the British launched attacks and defeated
Chinese troops in that province at that time, he was bound to suffer
defeat and be punished by the Emperor. However, the British after
the capture of Cha-pu, moved their offensive to Kiangsu.
On 16th June the British attacked the fort of Woosung ), "the
port of Shanghai, which was protected by heavy lines of defence works
superintended by Niu Chien the Governor-general of Liang-kiang.
The Chinese soldiers resisted the British boldly. But within a short
period the British took the port by storm. Over three hundred guns
27
were captured by the British troops. With the fall of Woosung the
city of Shanghai was at the mercy of the British. It eventually
fell on the 19th of June 1842. The Emperor at that time still
insisted upon war. Probably the extension of the warfare by the
British had caused hi>n consternation. After the loss of Woosung
and Shanghai, Niu Chien requested that he be allowed to break off
28
hostilities with the British through negotiations. The angry
29
Emperor warned him: "Your request aggravates my anxiety and anger."
It is important to note that Ch'i-ying after a short span of
time (from May to July 1842) in the combatant province.of Chekiang
had perceived the backwardness of the Chinese armaments and the
superiority of that of the British. He felt sure that China at that
27. IWSM, TK 48.1a-b. For details of the battle, see CR, 11:398;
IWSM, TK 50.14b-24b.
28. IWSM, TK 53.24b-27b.
29. IWSM, TK 53.28a.
time should end the war with the British as the continuation of the
war could only result in causing more casualties to the Chinese
soldiers and increasing local unrest. Without much hesitation Ch'i-
ying exerted himself in the matter of conciliating the British in
order to be able to start peace negotiations with them. In a
report to the throne in the post war period, Ch*i-ying recalled that
his peace-making motivation arose from his observation of the
destruction on the battle fields in Chekiang and Kiang-su after the
British attacks from May to July 1842. The serious destruction of
the defence works by the British armament had frightened him. After
his investigation of the ruins of the combatant provinces and the
description of the natives about the British damage in those places,
Ch'i-ying concluded that the superiority of the British armament was
the sole reason for the British military victory in China. He
ascertained that the Chinese troops in the battle fields were brave
to meet their enemies. However, no matter how gallantly they
fought, they still lost the battle. Ch'i-ying pointed out that the
British cannons were able to reach the Chinese front from ten to twenty
li away, while the Chinese guns failed to reach the British because of
their limited range of a few _H. Besides, the British cannons were
swift and movable while the Chinese guns were heavy and immovable.^
The above statement, of the power of British armament had been
proven in the battles for the defence of Woosung on 16th June 1842.
On the eve of the battle, Chen Hua-ch'eng Admiral of Kiangnan,
assured Niu Chien that he saw no difficulty in checking the British
30. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35? ti, 288b-289a.
attack as he himself had spent half a century in naval service and
had won innumerable naval victories. Niu Chien, impressed by the
confidence of Admiral Ch'en, bravely reported to the Emporor that he
had no doubt about being able to check the British attack."^
When the British attacked Woosung, Niu Chien, like other brave
generals, appeared on the battle front in order to strengthen the
morale of the Chinese troops. But the British cannons were fierce,
Niu Chien reported: "... innumerable (British) cannon balls flying
in awful confusion through the expanse of Heaven, fell before, behind,
and on either side of him, while in the distance he saw the ships of
the barbarians, standing erect, lofty as the mountains. The fierce
daring of the barbarians was inconceivable. Officers and soldiers
fell at their posts. Every effort to resist and check the coast
32
was in vain, and a retreat became inevitable." After his
experience in the battlefield and his witnessing of the course of the
war, Niu Chien assured the Emperor that the Chinese troops were not
able to withstand the attack of the barbarians. It was not that
33
they were timid, but in fact that their enemies were too powerful.
After making the Emperor realize that the Chinese armaments were
inferior to those of the British, Ch'i-ying took steps to persuade
the Emperor to reach peace with the British. As an imperial clansman,
Ch'i-ying knew the real fear of the Manchu court: the unrest from
within was more much more dangerous than the crisis from without to
31. IWSM. TK 50.26b.
32. _CR, 11:455-456; IWSM, 51.l6a-l8a.
33. IWSM, T!C 51-30b-31a.
an alien regime. The Vvhr had already stirred up local disturbance.
Not only the British invaders looted and plundered the common people;
the local rascals, making use of the warfare, committed the same
crime. (People leaving the combatant cities to the suburbs to avoid
British plunder were looted by the local rascals). It was under¬
standable that the destitute people driven by hunger and insecurity
would accept British rewards to fight against their government troops.
The situation became worse in the spring of 1842. Before the fall
of Cha-pu on 18th May 1842, Ch'i-ying warned the Emperor that if the
city of Cha-pu were captured by the British, the popular fear in the
34
provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang would increase. Ch'i-ying in
late June went further to warn the Emperor that the British tried to
draw the Chinese people on to their side to use them to fight against
the Chinese troops. The British, he continued, after occupying
Shanghai, distributed imperial grain to the local people and claimed
that they were not in hostility with the common people. They were
eager to build up a close relationship with them. The British
invited the Chinese traders and people in the vicinity of Shanghai
38
city to trade with them in the city. In early July, Ch'i-ying
plainly opined that the disastrous factor of the empire at that time
was not the invading British but the small group of Chinese traitors
who secretly schemed to make use of the local unrest to fish in
troubled waters. He suggested that it was wise for the government
34. IWSM, TK 47.44b.
35. IWSM, TK 53.9b-10a.
not to dissipate too much of its military power in fighting with the
British troops, otherwise, when the traitor-led revolts broke out,
the government would not have enough power to suppress thera."^
The Tao-kuang Emperor and his officials during the Opium War
were imbued with an idea that "the greed of the British barbarians
knows no bounds", and that "the empire was being conquered". Ch'i-
ying in this respect was able to relieve the fear of the Emperor.
By the end of May 1842, he told the Emperor that when I-li-pu sent an
emissary, Ch'en Chih-kAng &$:)),^ to see the British in one of
their battleships, a British chieftain named Kuo (the interpreter
Gutzlaff) told Ch'en that the British expeditionary force sought not
38
war but trade. Later, he made this point clear to the Emperor:
"Although the demands of the barbarians are indeed rapacious, yet
they are little more than a desire for ports and for the privilege
of trade. There are no dark schemes in them. Compared with war
which inevitably entails great disasters, we would rather see assent
be given to their demands and thus save the whole country south of
the Yangtze.""^
Clii-ying was finally made chief negotiator. However, he
understood that the Emperor had suffered loss of dignity by appointing
him to the negotiation table. Certain national QsSets would have
36. IWSM, TK 54.36b-37a.
37- Ch'en had been serving as an officer in Canton garrison in 1843,
see Earl Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbarians:
A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents
(New Haven, 1951)» P«33.
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to be paid in order to buy off the British. How to keep the
Emperor always frugal and yet conscious of appearances, to agree to
his idea of conciliating the barbarians during the negotiation became
the tough job for Ch'i-ying.
After the capture of Chen-hai and Ning-po by the British in
October 1841, Liu Yun-k'e (J&jj&'Jif) insisted on the necessity of
conciliating the British barbarians. Liu told the Emperor that the
British troops were able to "break through the ranks of the Chinese
troops whenever they liked." The British "being ten thousand men of
one mind" made forward march and never retreated" on the battle¬
fields. On the contrary, Liu pointed out: "The failing morale of our
soldiers is caused by repeated defeats." The Chinese soldiers
with "timorous hearts", on hearing that they were to be sent to fight
with the barbarians became "shuddering and terrified "» He concluded
that it was difficult for China either to. attack or defend It
was also hard to conciliate the barbarians.^
However, the Emperor did not appreciate this bare-fact statement
of Liu. Liu's memorial indeed fitted a Chinese proverb: "Chang £' a-
jen ch'i-yen', *vueh £zu-chi wei-feng ( lit. raising the
arrogance of others by lessening the grandeur of oneself). Even
after the fall of Cha-pu, the Emperor still insisted: "Should
everyone (officers and soldiers) go forth bravely and fight with
the advantage of knowing our own geography, there is no difficulty
for us in achieving (military) success." He was also confident that
if commanders and governors aroused "their conscience" to fight the
40. IWSM, TK 35.5a-6b.
English barbarians, China would surely defeat her enemies. He
added J "I see no reason why any attack launched by us cannot
achieve success, nor why any defence made by us is not impregnable."^
Ch'i-ying knew the character of the Emperor that he could not
I
bear too much hurt on his grandeur. During the negotiations with the
British in the middle of August, Ch'i-ying tried his best to make
the Emperor feel at ease about conciliating the British. Although
he knew that only the appeasement policy could save the country from
further British encroachments, he still assumed a bellicose attitude
to suit the Emperor's character. In his report dated 17th August
1842, he opined: "We will presently negotiate with them (barbarians)
according to the conditions they proposed, and in the meantime we will
petition the favour of your Majesty to give assent thereto. But
should the animal temper of the barbarians still refuse to obey these
commands, we have no alternative other than to stir up our soldiers
and officers to make a last defence of the city regardless of what
A P
might be the consequences, victory or defeat." With these words
Ch'i-ying was able to make the Emperor accept the peace terms with a
certain dignity. What would happen if the negotiation broke down?
Ch'i-ying later mentioned in his report: "Should we fail to take
advantage of the occasion (negotiation), and fail to ease the situation
by soothing the barbarians, they will run over our country like









CHI-YIUG' S CONOILIATIOHPOLICY AND HIS APPOINT!,iENT AS IMPERIAL
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
After tedious negotiations headed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry
Pottinger, the Treaty of Nanking was signed on 29th August 1842.
A supplementary Treaty ofABogue with eight regulations (shan-hou
chang-ch'eng regarding the Treaty of Nanking was drawn up by
Ch'i-ying and the British interpreters and completed on 8th October
1843. It was agreed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger that they
should meet in Kuangtung in November of the same year to settle the
new tariff system for the post-war period. Ch'i-ying was ready for
that mission. Early in October 1842, he reminded the Emporer that he
should proceed to Canton from Nanking to settle the tariff system
with the British first and afterwards he would arrange the same tariff
system in the other four treaty ports."'" To his surprise, the
Emperor in his edict of 17th October, appointed Ch'i-ying as the
Governor-general of Liang-Kiang; I-li-pu his deputy in managing the
Treaty of Nanking, now handicapped by infirmities, was made imperial
commissioner and Tartar General of Canton to settle the tariff system
2
with Huang En-t'ung and Hsien-ling as his deputies.
J/n/nznael C. y. h/ci\ holds ~fhe, Vieuj ~£Aa. f Chfc-y}/Tg,
indication of the need for a man of his experience take change of the '
Huang subordinates of
1. IWSM, TK 61.23b.
2. IWSM, TK 61.25b.
opening of ports, the development of trade regulations, and the
general superintendence of Sino-Western relations in Kiangsu,
Chekiang, and Fukien.""^ Probably the immediate diplomatic issue
awaiting solution was the tariff system in Canton. The tariff
I ■
system of the foreign trade was not negotiated by Chinese and British
authorities until 17th November 1843, Ningpo in December 1843;
o 4
Foochow and Amoy in June 1844. The appointment of Ch'i-ying and
I-li-pu on 17th October was in fact a demonstration that the latter
had entrusted a more influential task in foreign diplomacy than the
former. Other facts also illustrated the loss of imperial favor of
Ch'i-ying. Immediately after the Treaty of Nanking, Ch'i-ying
emphasized in a memorial that Huang En-t'ung and Hsien-ling, who had
5devoted themselves to the Treaty of Nanking, should be raised in rank.
But the Emperor only agreed to consider their promotion after the
conclusion of work in Canton.^ Also, the Emperor made it clear that
Ch'i-ying's management of the tariff negotiations in Kiangsu, Chekiang
and Fukien should be discussed with I-li-pu and the local authorities
7
in those provinces.
The fact that the former chief negotiator of the Treaty of Nanking
immediately after the Treaty of Nanking was only given authority to
3. Hsu, Rise, p.243.
4. See Morse, International Relations, p.346, 359, 361, 362.
5. IWSM, TK 6l.l8b-20a.
6. IWSM, TK 6l.25b-26b.
7. IWSM, TK 6l.28b-29a. For example, when Ch'i-ying proposed the
idea that "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment''should be granted to the
United States and France on 18th January 1843, the Emperor instructed
I-li-pu to make a comment on Ch'i-ying's idea, see IWSM, TK 64.46a.
have general superintendence of barbarian affairs, but had no direct
say in the po3t-war negotiation needs explanation. Luring the
negotation of the Treaty, Ch'i-ying arrived at Ranking on 11th August
1842. He immediately sent Chang-hsi (#-§")» the retinue of I-li-pu
Q
to have preliminary discussions with J.R. Morrison.0 At the same time,
Ch'i-ying implored the Emperor that when the negotiation reached a
certain stage, he should go to meet the barbarian chieftain in order
9
to conclude the Treaty. But the Emperor instructed him not to do so.
An imperial edict of 17th August addressed to Ch'i-ying reads: "(since)
the barbarians are extremely tricky, the Imperial Commissioner should
not present himself to meet the barbarians ... Only after the
.complete retreat of the barbarian ships (fltwChinese water), could the
said Commissioner choose a suitable place and summon the barbarian
chieftains to the meeting. The said Commissioner must not recklessly
board the barbarian ship since it might result in an accident.""^
The Emperor treated the Imperial Commissioner's boarding on a
barbarian ship as a symbol of loss of imperial dignity. However,
before the edict reached Ch'i—ying,^ he, on 20th August had
accepted the invitation of Sir Henry Pottinger and led his colleagues
to visit the British battleship, Cornwalli£. Although Ch'i-ying was
given full power as Imperial Commissioner to negotiate with the
8. Son of the first Protestant missionary to China.
9. IWSM, TK 58.32b-33a.
10. IWSM, TK 58.33b-34a.
11. The maximum speed of correspondence normally obtainable was five
days from Peking to Nanking.
British, all the important decisions on the Chinese side had to have
the permission of the Emperor before any action could be taken.
Ch'i-ying later explained to the Emperor that his boarding the British
ship was to dispel suspicion and show earnestness to the British,
12
so that he could achieve the peace settlement. However, the
Emperor would be angry with him because he took the initiative to
approach the barbarians without imperial permission.
Ch'i-ying's awkward behaviour in trying to please the British
would also arouse the consternation of the Emperor. At one banquet
at Nanking after the signing of the Treaty, Ch'i-ying kept on asking
Sir Henry Pottinger to open his mouth while he swiftly popped into it
several immense sugar-plums."^ At another banquet Ch'i-ying misbehaved,
whi l^t a drinking with J.R. Morrison. After the banquet, I-li-pu
angrily told Chang-hsi: "the behaviour of General Ch'i in greeting
the barbarians is extremely unseemly.It is not surprising that
I-li-pu himself or other members of his suite who attended the banquet
had reported the unseeming behaviour of Ch'i-ying to the Emperor.
Ch'i-ying's action and behaviour could not be pardoned by his
contemporaries. Before the Treaty of Nanking, Ch'i-ying's boarding
of the barbarian ship could be explained as being for the purpose of
achieving peace. But his behaviour in amusing the British chieftain
after the signing of the Treaty would receive criticism. The Emperor
12. IWSM, TK 67.4b-5a.
13. G.G. Loch, The Closing Events of the Campaign in China (London,
1842), p.170.
14. See Chang Hsi, Eu-i jih-chi (Diary during the course of conciliat¬
ing barbarians) in Shen Yun-lung, ed. Chin-t.ai chung-kuo shih-
liao ts'ung-k'an (Collected materials on modern Chinese
history) (Taipei, 1970), series 39, v.387,p.85.
who abhorred the invasion of the British barbarians might deem that
his behaviour was a matter of trying to build up a relationship with
the arch-enemies.
It is important to note that on the eve of the signing of the
Treaty of Nanking, the Emperor had a different idea from Ch'i-ying on
dealing with the British. The Emperor mentioned in his imperial
edict: "the encroachment of the barbarians has seriously affected the
lives of the people and the foundation of the empire. Although I
cannot relieve the anguish in this respect, I cannot but agree to
what they request, hoping that the efforts (intbe establishment of the
Treaty) which have been exerted are able once and for all to save
15
future trouble." After the War, Ch'i-ying held the idea that
although China had ceased hostilities with the British, it was
necessary for him to maintain a friendly relationship with the
British chieftains with both sincerity and a certain condescension.
Ch'i-ying's personal background (his intimate relationships with
the Emperor and Mu-Ch'avtg-a which was able to save him from punishment
•forofficial malpractice) might make him believe that discrepancy
between the two parties could be solved by personal relationships.
He could as well build up this sort of relationship with Sir Henry
Pottinger by boarding the British ship and popping sugar-plums into
his mouth. On the other hand, the Emperor, after repeated Chinese
military failure in the middle of 1842, had eventually to agree with
Ch'i-ying's idea of conciliating the barbarians in order to end the
War. But his hatred towards the British invaders did not allow him
15. IWSM, TK 59.3b.
to tolerate the humiliating ways of Chi'i-ying. The stipulation of
equal terms between Chinese high-ranking officials and British
chieftains in the Treaty of Nanking had already lowered the majesty
of the Celestial Empire. How could he again appoint the humble
I
Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner? In this respect, I-li-pu,
"the elderly man of the old school""'^was able to maintain a certain
dignity in dealing with the British barbarians. It was not surprising
that the Emperor preferred I-li-pu to Ch'i-ying as the Imperial
Commissioner.
Ch'i-ying had never been satisfied with his appointment as
Governor-general of Liangkiang. The actual management of foreign
affairs after the war were handled by I-li-pu with Ch'i-kung the then
Governor-general of Liangkiang, as his deputy in Canton. Ch'i-ying,
like a fish out of water in his post in ^Nanking was not able to use . hi
talent to implement his conciliatory policy. Time and again he
expressed his eagerness for duties in Canton. In December 1842,
Ch'i-ying even expressed his confidence that there was no one able to
manage the foreign affairs but himself. But the Emperor did not
17
show much interest in his proposal.
In Canton I-li-pu met a lot of difficulties in negotiations
which began on 23rd January 1843 with his British counterparts about
the new tariff system. No agreement had beer, reached in a month.
At the end of February, I-li-pu confessed that the tariff question
16. This is the impression Sir Henry Pottinger obtained of I-li-pu
during the post-war tariff negotiations, see British Consular
Archives, Ningpo: Thorn's 33 to Davis, June 30 1845•
17. IWSM, TK 64-5b-7b.
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was still most bewildering in its complexity (t'ou-hsu fen-fan
18
ft On the British side, Pottinger did not feel pleased
in negotiating with I-li-pu and Ch'i-kung.
The death of I-li-pu on 4th March 1843, at first did not offer
Ch'i-ying a better chance of appointment to Canton. Both Ch'i-ying
and Sir Henry Pottinger were surprised when the Emperor on 22nd March
appointed Ch'i-kung to take up the post as the Imperial Commissioner
to continue negotiations with the British. (Ch'i-kung's experience
in foreign affairs was far less than that Ch'i-ying's). The
appointment of Ch'i-kung was merely an indication that the Emperor
had decided to keep Ch'i-ying out of foreign affairs. However, Sir
Henry Pottinger did not appreciate the new appointment of Ch'i-kung.
In the previous months, he had perceived that the tariff question
would not be solved "from I-li-pu and KeKung's utter ignorance and
19
impracticality." Ch'i-kung's presence at the negotiation table
still did not help to establish the tariff system. Pottinger was not
happy that Ch'i-ying was not made the new Imperial Commissioner. He
looked to Ch'i-ying personally to settle the Treaty of Nanking.
When Ch'i-ying was appointed Governor-general to Nanking and I-li-pu
was made Imperial Commissioner to Canton, Pottinger protested
vigorously against the imperial decision. In early November, I-li-pu
told the Emperor that the British chieftain had a special trust on
Ch'i-ying,' saying that when the said British chieftain heard of
Ch'i-ying's appointment to Nanking, he immediately contacted Liu Yun-
ke, the then Governor-general of Min-Che (Fukien and Chekiang),
18. IWSM, TK 65.26b.
19. .British Consular Archives, Ningpo: Thorn's 33 to Davis, 30 June
1845-
asking Liu to send a report on behalf of him for the imperial
20
explanation of Ch'i-ying's unusual appointment. Later Sir Henry
Pottinger was not satisfied with the imperial reply on l8th November
1842» that I-li-pu's appointment would really expedite the tariff
questions. The British plenipotentary only agreed to continue the
negotiation of tariff systems after Ch'i-ying had declared that he
21
himself still had general control over the negotiation. After
the death of I-li-pu, two actions on the British side help to bring
about the restoration of Ch'i-ying to Canton. Sir Henry Pottinger
withdrew the British representatives from the negotiation table to
Hong Kong in the middle of March on the pretext that the imperial
commissioner was absent. The cargo ships of Britain and other
nationalities made their shipments to Canton and other treaty ports
which had not yet opened without paying custom. Smuggling flourished
in those ports especially in Canton. Such events forced the
Emperor to realize that a speedy appointment of a new imperial
commissioner to Canton was inevitable. Sir Henry Pottinger favoured
Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner. He, after the death of
I-li-pu proposed to Ch'i-ying that he intended to go north to Shanghai
or Ningpo to continue negotiations with him in order to save the
trouble of his journey to Canton. This proposal of Sir Henry
Pottinger gave the Emperor nightmares in case this might be the signal
for another form of British encroachment in which it was designed to
proceed from south to north, as happened during the Opium War.
2°. IWSM, TK 62.50a-b.
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Ch'i-ying was able to react to this salutary situation.
Immediately, he presented Sir Henry Pottinger's correspondence to
the Emperor enclosing his observation in his memorial that the
presence of the British chieftain would arouse disquietude
amongst the people in Kiangsu and Chekiang and the local vagabonds
22
would make use of the situation to create trouble. The menace of
crisis from without and unrest from within seemed to rise again.
The Emperor after reading Ch'i-ying's memorial on 6th April 1843,
had no other alternative but to appoint Ch'i-ying as the Imperial
Commissioner to Canton. In his imperial edict to the grand councill¬
ors, the Emperor made an explanation of Ch'i-ying's appointment:
"(Ch'i-ying) being the original negotiator of the (Nanking) Treaty is
trusted and respected by the barbarians. His appointment as the
Imperial Commissioner (to succeed I-li-pu) is much more suitable than
that of Ch'i-kung. Imperial edict for his appointment has been made
to-day. He should make haste to Canton to manage the tariff and
general regulations of trade. Everything must be completed properly
in order to accord with the barbarians' requests and to avoid
23
complications
After the appointment of Ch'i-ying to Canton, the tariff
negotiation in Canton went on smoothly. Huang En-t'ung and Hsien-
ling were ordered to revive the negotiations with their British
counterparts. On 11th May, they went to Hong Kong for negotiations.
22. IWSM, TK 66.la-b.
23. IWSM, TK 66.2a-b; see also YPCC, 1:431.
The British welcomed these two members of Ch'i-ying's previous staff
with the best accommodation on the Island; they were given the use of
carriages for transportation and were taken round the Island in an
iron steamer. The British rapidly outlined their proposals for the
tariff "so that they (Huang and Hsien) will be ready to communicate
24
their opinions to Kiying as soon as he comes."
Modern Chinese patriots might condemn the unassuming attitude of
Ch'i-yung towards Sir Henry Pottinger after his appointment as imperial
commissioner to Canton. Pottinger recalled after meeting Ch'i-ying
twice in H.K. in June 1843 5 the latter "embraced me with all the
warmth and sincerity of an old friend and was even visibly affected by
28
the strength of his emotion at our meeting again." Pottinger
might not know why this dignified Manchu clansman behaved so
emotionally. If the appointment of Imperial Commissioner was the
favorite post which Ch'i-ying had been longing for, Pottinger should
2.S
deserve such an embrace from Ch'i-ying, his "intimate" friend.
After Ch'i-ying's arrival at Canton, the tariff system between
Britain and China, entitled "the tariff and general regulations of
trade" was signed by Pottinger and Ch'i-ying on 22nd July. At the
end of November 1843, negotiations in Canton had been completely
settled, including the signing of the Supplementary Treaty of Bogue
on 8th October. Shanghai had been opened for foreign trade on 15th
24. FO 17/67, Pottinger's 52 of 4 May 1843.
25. FO 17/68, Keying to Pottinger, encl: in Pottinger's 85 of 19
July 1843.
26. The term It" was the Chinese translation of the word
"intimate". This term was used by Ch'i-ying in his letters
to Pottinger.
November. The local authorities had to negotiate the tariff system
with the British consul there. In his memorial to the Emperor on
25th November, Ch'i-ying reported that tariff and regulations of
trade in Canton and Shanghai would be the model for foreign trade in
the post-war period. Once they were settled, those in Ningpo,Amoy
and Foochow would be adjusted to them. As no negotiations with the
British barbarians had ever taken place in Shanghai and barbarian
experts were lacking there, he had to go back to Shanghai as soon as
possible in order to prepare the tariff negotiations with the British
27
representative.
Ch'i-ying's return to Kiangsu simply illustrated his eagerness
for the management of foreign affairs. When he had been appointed as
Governor-general of Liang-kiang a year before he felt uneasy because
at that time there were no foreign affairs for him to deal with in his
jurisdiction. He then yearned for the appointment to Canton.
When all the treaty negotiations were settled in Canton, he hastened
back to Kiangsu where other negotiations were waiting for his expert
handling. We must admit that he had confidence in his management
of foreign affairs and believed that his ability and experience were
better than those of any of his contemporaries.
Ch'i-ying's achievement in the tariff negotiations in Canton had
convinced the Emperor of his ability in barbarian affairs. He
gradually regained trust from the Emperor. When Caleb Cushing, the
27. IWSM, TK 70.5a-b.
American plenipotentiary arrived at Macao in February 1844, be
insisted on proceeding northwards to Peking. In March, Ch'i-ying
was then appointed as (governor-general to Canton in order to curb
28
his forward journey. In April, Ch'i-ying was also titled as Imperial
Gommissioner to manage "post-war trade affairs in the various
9 O
provinces" (ko-sheng t 'ung-shang shan-hou shih-i
28. Ch'ing-shih kao (Draft history of the Ch'ing dynasty), (1927),
pen-chi, under Tao-kuang, 24th year.
29. IWSM, TK 71-l8b-19a.
150
CHAPTER 8
CH'I-YING'S REFUSAL OP THE POLICY OF
"USING BARBARIANS TO COHTROL BARBARIANS"
The policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians" was
a frequent practice in Chinese history. The term "control"
(chih #>] ) here means "defeat and subdue". The emperors of China
adopted this policy whenever the Chinese troops were not able to
cope with the invading non-Chinese forces. However, China always suffered,
from the result of it. We can find examples in T'ang and Sung dynasties.
An Lu-shan (^FT^/h), was a military governor during the
Hsuan Tsung Emperor's reign (713-755) of the T'ang dynasty. His
mother was a Turkish shamaness, his father, a non-Chinese of
unknown origin from the region of Jehol (Manchuria). An was
permitted a large army in the north-eastern part of China to
defend the country from the attacks of the Kitan, a league of
tribes under the leadership of an apparently Mongol tribe.
In 755 An broke out in revolt. He occupied the important city,
Loyang, and claimed himself emperor of Yen dynasty. T'ang
troops were sent against him but without effect. In the same
year, he marched his troops against Ch'ang-an (-fkcSr ), the T'ang
T/,e
#
capital. nHsuan Tsung Emperor fled betimes into Szechuan and
abdicated there. His son, Su Tsung Emperor also fled into Shen-
si. There the new emperor sought military aid from the Uighurs
to bring An Lu-shan and his followers down.
Rewards for the Uighurs included future payment from the
T'ang government rolls of silk in thousands, and a daughter of
:the emperor to the Uighur khan as his wife. However, the Uighurs
-15*1
always reminded, the T'ang government of their merit, and demanded
more benefits from it.
The Kui Tsung Emperor (1101-1125) of the Northern Sung dynasty
paid a price much more than the T'ang emperors in using barbarians
to fight barbarians. After long-continued fighting with the Kitan,
whose empire called "Liao", the Emperor invited Tungusic Juch&n,
who in the past had been more or less subject to the Kitan, to
fight against the Kitan. Eventually, the Juchen defeated and even
destroyed the Kitan empire. Knowing that China alone was entirely
defenceless, the Juchen suddenly attacked and occupied Kai-feng,
the Sung capital in 1126. The Hui Tsung Emperor, who had retired
a year before, was taken prisoner with his son, and the Northern
Sung dynasty was at an end.
Ignoring the devious result of the "policy", Chinese leaders
during and after the Opium War considered it as a possible means
to cope with the problem of the British aggression.
Commissioner Lin was the first person who advocated this policy.
In early he suggested: "Let barbarians fight barbarians."*' Later,
he gave details of this idea: "to use various barbarians to
check (the aggression) of the English barbarian is to make the
stag (British barbarians) stumble and fall; to segregate the various
2
barbarians in order to please the English barbarians is to beat fish."
1. Tung-hua hsu-lu. 14 s 235•
2. IWSM, TK 10.29b. In Chinese conception: stag was supposed to
be wild ; fish to be mild and docile. Lin deemed that other
foreign barbarians were mild, compared with the wild English
barbarians.
On the other hand, Yu^-ch'ien, when facing the attack of. the
British troops in Che-kiang . in 1841, proposed to invite other
barbarians to fight against the British. He mentioned in his
report on 24th March: "The strength of such countries as Europe(?),
America and France is separately equal to that of the (English)
rebels. It is not worthwhile for the Heavenly Court to issue an
edict ordering them to render aid, but there is no harm in making
a proclamation of the rewards that will be offered to the various
3
barbarians for killing the English rebels."
Although the Americans and the French men did not practically
help China to fight the British they did show some sign that they
were willing to help China in the warfare with Britain. In March,
1842 Commodore Lawrence Kearney, commander of the American East
India Squadron, arrived at Macao with two war ships, the frigate
Constellation and the sloop-of-war Boston, for the purpose of
protecting American trade. The American offices of the ships
notified the Chinese interpreters: "Our warships are strong and
large. If the officials of the Heavenly Court wish to come on
4
board and inspect them, they are entirely free to visit them."
However the Kuang-tung officials of high posts dared not board the
American ships as there was no precedent. Ch'i-ying was the first
high-ranking official who had boarded the British warship,
Cornwalli during the negotiation of the Nanking Treaty. I-shan,
Ch'i-kung and others went on board the Constellation at Canton in
October 1842. After that they memorialized to the Emperor that
3. IWSM, TK 24.36a-b.
4. CR, 11:183.
the said American ship was powerful: "The warship is divided into
two decks, top and bottom, set with forty-odd, cannons, all on
movable carriages. They fired trial shots and turned them around
5
and were extremely dextrous."
P'an Shih-cheng a prominent citizen of Canton had
used his own money to build warships and torpedoes for the defence
of Kuangtung waters under the superintendence of an American officer
named Jen-lei ® -± (Chinese pronunciation!) in 1842. When
P'an reported to I-shan that torpedoes built by Jen-lei-shili were
particularly ingenious and efficacious, I-shan sent men to him to
learn his skill.^
The French officers on the other hand showed more enthusiasm
than the American officers. In January 1842, Captain Cecille,
commander of the French man-of-war Erigore had come to Canton and taken
up residence there. Later, he approached the Canton authorities and
requested a personal interview with top-ranking Kuang-tung officials to
discuss military affairs. In the interview, Cecille told I-shan and
others that his country was profoundly grateful for the Heavenly
Court's generous favours, adding that the King of France on hearing
the English barbarians had taken up arms against China, feared that
the commercial ships of France would be implicated, and thereupon
sent his ships to provide protection, and in addition ordered him on
his arrival to China to act as intermediary in the settlement of the
5. IWSM, TK 61.39a.
6. IWSM, TK 63.16b.
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dispute. Cecille even mentioned that France and Britain once were
enemy states but had recently made peace. He was willing to
negotiate with the English barbarians in order to mediate in the
hostilities between China and Britain, adding that if the English
barbarians agreed, that would be the end of the hostilities; if they
did not agree, then they would have a pretext for taking up arms
against them.^
With the superficial kindness of the American and French officers
and the advocacy of provincial leaders during the War, the policy of
"using barbarians to control barbarians" began to gain ground in the post¬
war period. Since the policy was a traditional Chinese practice, it
was easily accepted at the time as the Chinese honour the old way.
Wei yuan iifO, an ardent supporter of Commissioner Lin was a
famous scholar noted for his interest in current affairs. His famed
book Hai-kuo i:'u-Chih ;%Sl5/^.(Ar~) illustrated gazetteer of the mari¬
time countries ) was first published in 50 chuan (tomes) in 1844, the
enlarged edition in 60 chuan came out in 1849, and the third edition in
100 chlian in 1852. In the preface of his book, Wei-yuan states that
his book was based on the work called the "Gazetteer of the Four
Continents", which had been written by western scholars and translated
f
by Commissioner Lin. Wei stressed that his book was written for the
purpose of "using barbarians to control barbarians; using barbarians
9 / \
"against" barbarians; imitating superior skills (or armament) of the
7. IWSM, TK 45.30b.
8. IWSM, TK 45.31a.
9. Wei Yuan suggests that by offering trading benefits to one group
of barbarians, these would be willing to help China "against"
another group of barbarians.
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barbarians and using them against the barbarians." In his
conception of "using the barbarians to control barbarians", Wei Yuan
said that there were three barbarian countries which the English
barbarians feared: Russia, France and America."*"'*" He went on further
to say that at the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the
Ch'ing Dynasty, war had taken place between France and England in the
north-east part of America for the sovereignty of that territory.
France was eventually defeated and lost rule of that territory to
England. Since then, the two countries became state enemies. The
English barbarians later levied numerous heavy taxes in the thirteen
states of America and so the people there started a righteous revolt
to drive the English barbarians away. The people recovered their
territories and built up their country, "United States." Since then
12
the English barbarians had not dared to invade that new country again.
Wei Yuan insinuated in his book that I-shan had inadvertently
13
turned down the offer of the American headman to act as mediator in
the hostilities between China and Britain in 1840. The Chinese
soldiers when attacking the factory area had mistakenly injured
several Americans. Thereupon, the American headman no longer made an
14
effort to mediate.
10. Wei Yuan, Hai-kuo t'u-chih (An illustrated gazetteer of the
maritime countries)(1844), preface, passim. Hereafter cited as HKTC.
11. ffiCTC, 1:36.
12. ffiCTC, 1:38.
13. Wei Yuan did not mention the name of the headman.
14. HKTC, 1 :36-54.
Wei Yuan emphasized that the best way to practise the policy of
"using the barbarians to control barbarians" was to "move the enemy
states of the rebellious barbarian country (England) to attack that
15
country." This idea through the publication of Hai-Ruo t'u-Ghih
had attracted the attention of the whole empire. Not only the members
of the War Party treated it as tactics to take revenge on the British
invaders, the Emperor although in principle agreeing to the concil¬
iation policy of Ch'i-ying in the post-war period, was willing to
allow that tactic to exist, as he could hardly swallow the insult of
being defeated by the British barbarians. He had been seeking every
means to defend his empire and if possible, to take revenge on the
rebellious barbarians.
Ch'i-ying who dealt with the Americans and French men in the post¬
war period found it difficult to use both nations to control the
British. The real attitude of the two nations was far from being
"respectful and obedient" as shown during the War. When Commissioner
Lin proclaimed the stoppage of trade with Britain on 26th November,
the American merchants were allowed to continue their trade. They
made use of this opportunity to make fortunes. Russell & Co., the
American firm managed to carry British goods from Hong Kong to Whampoa
by American ships at the rate of thirty to forty dollars a ton.
(Freight from London to Canton would at that time probably not have
exceeded £12, or $55, a ton) Chinese tea and silk were the return
cargoes of those American ships. They were later shipped to England."^'
15. This idea is repeatedly mentioned in four essays on "policies for
maritime defence." See HKTC, ch.l, passim.
16. Between 1st October 1839 and June 118th 1840, as much as 24,826,599
- pounds of tea were shipped to England with the help of American
merchants, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p°.206.
Captain Elliot, Superintendent of Trade later wrote a letter to
R.B. Forbes, the boss of Russell & Co., praising his assistance in
helping the British merchants to convey merchandise during the
stoppage of trade to the British merchants, adding that Her Majesty
17
should thank him greatly.
The fact of the American merchants' involvement in the opium
traffic came out later. An American opium clipper during the period
of Commissioner Lin's proclamation of prohibition of opium in 1839,
brought 20 chests of opium from Canton to Singapore. When the
clipper anchored at Singapore, coolies were ordered to carry out those
chests to the wharf. At the same time the American merchants spread
rumours that China had decided to stamp out the evil opium trade and
no more opium was able to enter China. The rumour caused the price of
the opium to fall suddenly. Within 24 hours, the Americans bought
700 chests of opium at the low price of $250 per chest. After the
bargain the Americans brought the 20 chests of opium back to the
clipper and sailed to Fukien water where they sold the opium at the
1 ft
high price of $2,500 per chest.
After the Treaty of Nanking, Commodore Lawrence Kearney went to
Canton again on 6th October 1842. He sent a letter to Ch'l-kung, the
then Governor-general of Liang-kuang, requesting the imperial favour
for the American merchants which the English merchants acquired
19
through the Nanking Treaty. Ch'i-kung agreed to his request.
17. As Elliot told R.B. Forbes: "the Queen owes you many thanks for
not taking my advice as to leaving Canton. We have got in all our
goods, and got out a full supply of teas and silk." See F.B.
Forbes. Personal Reminiscences (Boston, 1876), p.155.
18. W.C. Hunter, The "Fan Kwae" at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825-
44 (London,1882), p.78. Cf. Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, p.82-83.
19- IWSM, TK 63.17a.
At that time the American ships dropped anchor in the ports of Canton,
T'ing-hai, Ning-po and others and awaited the opening of those ports
to trade. This situation had aroused the anxiety of the Chinese
officials. At that time the "Tariff and 6-eneral Regulations of Trade"
between Britain and China was still in the course of negotiation, and
the British'merchants had not yet started their trade in those treaty
ports except Canton. There was no reason why the American merchants
should anchor their ships at those ports to await trade.
Ch'i-ying at that time was made Governor-general of Liang-kiang,
which entailed residence at Nanking. He was responsible for the
matter of the opening of ports and the trade regulations,in Kiangsu,
Chekiang and Fukien. The American ships in those ports had aroused
his suspicion. In his report to the Emperor on 18th January 1843»
he mentioned: "the English barbarians took the lead in causing
troubles (in the Opium War) which have reached the present extremity.
The rest of the barbarians, although outwardly respectful and obedient,
in reality sat by to see who won and who lost. Should we succeed in
overcoming the English barbarians (the other barbarians) would then
take over England's benefits for themselves, but should it prove
otherwise, they would then throw in their lot with the English
barbarians, adhere to and join with them and thus their profit -would
still be there.
Ch'i-ying feared that if the American merchants were not allowed
to trade, they might not dare openly to oppose Chinese authorities,
20. IWSM, TK 64.44a-b.
but by adhering to the English barbarians, they still could trade in
those posts. In this case, the English could in the end gain the
gratitude of those foreigners. If the latter lined up with the
English barbarians, Gh'i-ying feared that the closer relationship
between Britain and America would be increased while the estrangement
21
between China and America would become daily wider. In the reaction
to this situation, Ch'i-ying advocated that the "most-favoured-nation-
treatment" of the Nanking Treaty be granted to Americans so that they
22
could enjoy the same benefits in trade with China.
Ch'i-ying once again realized the craftiness of the Americans in
the mission of Caleb Cushing. Cushing arrived at Macao on 24th
February 1844. Soon after his arrival he received a letter from
Edward Everett, American Consul at Canton which informed him that the
Chinese government had agreed to grant the same privileges to all
other nations as had been granted to the British. To obtain trading
privilege was the main purpose of Cushing's mission. Another purpose
of his mission was to petition for access to the Emperor and his Court
23
in Peking. Since the main purpose had been reached before
negotiation with Chinese authorities, Cushing naturally forwarded the
request of his journey to Peking, as otherwise he would have achieved
nothing personally in the mission.
21. IWSM, TK 64.44b.
22. IWSM, TK 64.45b.
23. Cushing's instructions from his government, see United States
Senate, 28th Congress, Second Session, Document 138, p.1-7, passim.
Hereafter cited as Sen.Doc.
Ch'i-ying at that time had left Canton for Nanking. Ch'eng
Yu-ts'ai (^§(ipiO, "the acting governor-general of Liang-Kuang took
the responsibility of approaching Cushing. The latter told him that
he would make only a short stay at Macao for procuring provisions
24
and then he would proceed to Peking. The insistence of Cushing's
»
northward journey was so strong that Cheng had to report to the
Emperor on 1st April: "Although we are still stopping him (from going
\ 25
northward; yet we are afraid that he would not obey our orders."
After Ch'i-ying's reappointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton
on 22n'd April, he immediately started negotiations with Cushing.
At the negotiation table Cushing still insisted on the delivery of
26
his government's letter as the reason for his going to Pekingf
ne also requested that the American consuls at their treaty ports be
allowed to address communications directly to the Court of Censors in
Peking instead of to the local governor-general. Moreover, the
Chinese authorities should assume the responsibility of protecting
the American ships in the treaty ports and that in the case of injuries
caused to them by other foreign powers, the Chinese authorities should
take revenge for them, or in case the vessels of the United States
were seized in Chinese waters by other foreign countries while the
Americans were engaged in war, the Chinese government should help
27
Americans to attack their enemies.
24. Sen. Doc., 67, p.2.
25. IWSM, TK 71.16a.
26. IWSM, TK 72.1b-2a.
27. IWSM, TK 72.l6a-b.
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The demands of Cushing in the negotiation illustrated that
Cushing tried to acquire additional concessions for the United States
beyond the Anglo-Chinese treaties. Ch'i-ying commented in his report
to the Emperor that Cushing had "a very cunning mind", and "no amount
28
of caution in dealing with him would be superfluous."
Not only Ch'i-ying found the American plenipotentary to be
demanding, but Huang En-t'ung, his skilled aide in the management of
foreign affairs also had a bad impression of the secretary and others
of the American mission. When Huang held conference with Daniel
Fletcher Webster (usually called Fletcher Webster), who was the son of
the then American Secretary of States Webster, the latter proudly said
that the Emperor of China should delegate an official to come to Macao
29
to receive the American emissaries and credential. The opprobrious
language of Webster was an insult to Huang. Being the chief of staff
of the Imperial Commissioner, Huang was well-qualified to negotiate
30
with Fletcher Webster. During the negotiations for the Treaty of
Nanking and the Supplementary Treaty of Bogue, Huang received
respectful receptions from J.R. Morrison and Gutzlaff on the Cornwalli
and in Hong Kong. Webster's display of contempt towards Huang had
naturally made him feel that the Americans were more arrogant than
the British.
28. IWSM, TK 72.7a.
29. IWSM, TK 72.6b.
30. At that time Huang's official title was the financial commissioner
of Kuangtung. As far as status was concerned, Huang was well-
qualified to negotiate with Fletcher Webster.
In the course of the Sino-American negotiation, an affray-
between the Cantonese and Americans took place in the factory area on
16th June 1844. When the crowd watching the Americans playing a
game of skittles was driven out by some of the players, the crowd
began to throw brickbats at the players. The Americans took refuge
in their factory. The angry crowd broke into the garden of the
factory, but were driven out by the Americans armed with sticks and
canes. The crowd in return threw stones and pieces of tile. The
Americans in defence armed themselves with pistols and muskets. In
the course of the affray, one American killed a Cantonese named Hsu
A-man (also pronounced _ Hsu Ya-man). After the incident,
Ch'i-ying v/as under pressure from the Cantonese and the local gentry
32
to h&uioverthe murderous American. But Cushing refused to submit the
American to the Canton authority. He, in return demanded that the
Ch'i-ying take protective measures to prevent a recurrence of similar
violence. As a result a jury of six American residents of Canton,
33
agreed that "the killing was a justifiable act of self-defence.
Cushing later concluded the case in a note to Ch'i-ying: "the mob who
wantonly attacked the foreigners and the police who culpably neglected
their duty in the matter are the parties really to blame, and who
ought to be punished, not only for the assault committed on the
31. Sen. Doc. 67, passim; CR, 13:333-335.
32. CR, 14:490.
33. CR, 14:526.
foreigners, but for the death of Hs'u A-man. For that death, the mob
and the police deserve to be held responsible in the eyes of God and
34
of man."
The proposal to use American barbarians to control British barbar¬
ians based on the idea that the former were of affable nature:
"respectful and obedient." But what happened during the Cushing
mission proved that the exigencyof the Americans was much more than
that of the British: the insistance of Cushing's northern journey to
Peking; the arrogant attitude of Fletcher Webster to Huan En-t'ung,
and the demand of protective measures to guarantee the safety of
Americans after the killing of a Chinese. As far as Cushing's
request to go to Peking for imperial audience was concerned, Ch'i-ying
at that time could not understand why the American credentials should
be presented by Cushing to the Emperor at Peking. Ch'i-ying remarked
in his report to the Emperor: "His request for audience (in Peking)
was actually to show off his achievement before the English barbarians.
Since both Ch'i-ying and Huang had worse impressions of the Americans
than of the English barbarians how could they consider using the
former to control the latter?
In the post-war period, the Chinese government did not consider
much the idea of psing French barbarians to control English barbarians.
Traditionally, the Chinese thought that the French barbarians, like
34. CR, 14:531.
't .«
35. IWSM, TK 72.2b. Ching Yu-ts'ai also had such ideas when he first
held negotiations with Cushing in March 1844, see IWSM, TK 71.16a.
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the English barbarians, were noted for their defiance and were less
amicable than the American and Russian barbarians. When Captain
/
Cecille offered to act as intermediary to cease hostilities between
Britain and China at Canton in January 1842, I-shan rejected his
proposal by saying that no-one at that time dared to take the
initiative for the peace negotiation with the English barbarians as
the Emperor had selected I-ching, the "Majesty-Bearing General" to
lead government troops of various provinces to bring about the
complete defeat of the English barbarians. In his memorial, I-shan
gave his impression of the French barbarians to the Emperor that they
desired to share in the gains and territory in the conflict between
China and Britain by means of assuming the role of mediation. I-shan
stressed: "although the said military officers are apparently
'respectful and obedient', how do we know they will not avail themselves
of this opportunity (the mediation) in order to spy out conditions in
the interior or otherwise cause troubleL" The Emperor also doubted
the Sincerity of French mediation. In his edict to the Grand
Councillors he commented: "How can the said barbarian military officer
be able to disperse the English barbarians (to stop hostilities with
China)? In his report he was even unwilling to make clear the means
37
by which he could disperse them."
After his rejection in Canton, Captain Cecille went to Shanghai
in August 1842 with two battle-ships. . When he anchored his ships at
, "7Q
Wu-sung (port of Shanghai), he told the tao-fai (iit^ ) there that
36. IWSM, TK 45.31b-32a.
37. IWSM, TK 45.36b.
38. Tao-t' ai or'lntendant of Circuit after the Opium War became an
important role in dealing with the.foreign consuls in Shang¬




he wished to proceed to the Yangtze river to meet Sir Henry Pottinger
and Niu Chien, the then Governor-general of Liang-kiang. Again, he
mentioned that his purpose was to induce the English barbarians to
39 / /
cease hostilities. Captain Cecille and his attache were intent on
forcing their way to Nanking. Niu Chien reported to the Emperor:
"Cecille together with twenty other fellow countrymen boarded a 'sand'
boat and drove out all the Chinese sailors off that boat except one
(for guiding navigation), and sailed up to the north. He left word
that he wanted to hire it to go to Nanking to arrange the peace
40
negotiation." Niu Chien commented on his northward journey: "Now
they come to the Yangtze in ships, nominally to urge the English to
cease hostilities, but actually, we fear, to take advantage of the time
before the fighting ceases. As to the said barbarian leader's going
out and mediating, it is hard to be sure that it is not simply because
he plans to appears friendly to the Heavenly Court, in the hope of
41
getting a pretext for making demands."
The Treaty of Nanking had already taken form in late August, 1842.
China did not need French assistance to establish the Treaty. The
presence of Captain Cecille at the negotiation table would only
complicate matters. Niu Chien suggested: "We certainly should
instruct Pottinger to wait until such time as Cecille arrives at
Nanking and give him specific instructions to return to a point out¬







country, without allowing him to tarry or cause additional trouble.
Pottinger will thus reciprocate our Emperor's supreme purpose of
42
restoring peace on the frontier." The Emperor did not appreciate
the action of Captain Cecille; he suspected that the French military
officer planned a secret scheme. In his edict to Ch'i-ying who was
then in charge of the negotiation for Nanking Treaty, the Emperor
ordered him to persuade Captain Cecille to return to Kuang-tung as
England had already made peace with China and would never resume
43hostilities. It is important to note that the Emperor at that time
got the idea of using the British barbarian chieftain to control the
French barbarian chieftain. In the same edict, the Emperor ordered
Ch'i-ying to instruct Pottinger to take the following attitude towards
Cecille: "If (his motive) is sincere, then explain to him that now
England is already at peace with China and will not trouble the
barbarian leader to state your case for you... if Cecille's coming was
nothing but a desire to get profit out of this. Pottinger should
devise a means to admonish him and to destroy his illusions, so as not
44
to cause him to interfere and disrupt matters."
On the other hand, Ch'i-ying's attitude toward the French differed
from that of the Emperor. Ch'i-ying possessed a superficial knowledge
of France. He knew that France had a historical feud with Britain.
In Ch'i-ying's opinion the French barbarians might be willing to help
China to fight against the British as they had helped the American
42. IWSM, TK 59.21a.
43- IWSM, TK 59.22a.
44. IWSM, TK 59.22b.
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barbarians before. In his report on 28th July 1844, he mentioned: "the
United States used to be a dependency of the English barbarians. Because
the people there were oppressed by the English barbarians, one of their
countrymen, Washington, led the people,in the war of resistance, the
French barbarians sent troops to help them, whereupon the English
barbarians made peace and the American barbarians were able to set up
45 ■
a nation."
Ch'i-ying was able to realize the strong independent and egocentric
character of the French barbarians. He stated in his report to the
Emperor on 23rd September 1843: "of the various countries now engaging
in trade, France has traded at Canton for the longest time and up to
the present time has never been willing to accomplish things through
46
others." Ch'i-ying suspected that barbarians other than French
barbarians had helped the British invade China in the Opium War. His
argument was based on the fact that: "When the English barbarians
first defied (Chinese) authority, their battle-ships were not numerous.
Later on they increased day by day until finally numbering a hundred
and several tens of vessels. The barbarians are separated by successive
oceans, several tens of thousands of li wide... how can it be said to
be easy to mobilize and distribute (forces). If anyone says that they
are not in collusion with other barbarians and secretly helping each
47
other, your slave certainly dared not put much confidence in it."
But Ch'i-ying assured the Emperor that the French barbarians even helped
45. IWSM, TK 72.18b-19a.
46. IWSM. TK 68.26b.
47. IWSM, TK 64.44a-b.
the American barbarians to set up their country from the English
exploitation, of course, did not take part in the defiance of Chinese
48
authorities by the English barbarians during the Opium War.
However, the good impression of Ch'i-ying towards the French
barbarians was shattered by the French mission to China in August 1844.
Ch'i-ying at first did not expect the French government would sent its
envoy to China to seek commercial benefit as the American plenipotentary
did. He told the Emperor: "France fundamentally does not regard trade
as important. Her merchant ships coming to Kuang-tung are not more
49
than one or two per year." Ch'i-ying was happy when Count de Ratti-
menton (the then French consul at Canton) told him that his country
50
would not send an envoy to come to Kuang-tung. But in the spring of
1844, after Ratti-Menton had gone back to France, he suddenly sent a
51
note to Ch'i-ying that a French envoy would arrive at Canton shortly.
On 14th August 1844, T.M.M.J, de Lagrene, the French envoy, arrived
52
at Macao with eight warships. Ch'i-ying immediately sent Chao
Ch'ang-ling and others to Macao to make inquiries about his
arrival. In the first interviews, the French envoy did not state
clearly the purpose of his coming. But Ch'i-ying had predicted that
the coming of the French envoy was for a treaty of alliance with China
to attack the English barbarians. In his report on 28th July, he had
48. IWSM, TK 72.19a.
49. IWSM. TK 72.18b.
50. CR, 12:503.
51. IWSM, TK 72.19b-20a.
52. CR, 13:477.
already impressed on the Emperor: "if the French barbarians have an
envoy coming, it must be, as before, on the pretext of making an
alliance with China to attack the English barbarians; they hope to see
53
the glories of our superior country and expect imperial favour."
But different rumours were spreading at that time: the French
envoy might wish to conclude a treaty of alliance; to proceed to
Tientsin to request an imperial audience. He might want to demand the
lifting of the ban on Catholicism in China or he might intend to imitate
what the English barbarians had done, to provoke hostilities and to
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capture the Bogue. After several negotiations, the French envoy
eventually revealed his intention of securing a treaty of alliance
between France and China as Ch'i-ying expected. He proposed the
exchange of embassies between the two countries and if the exchange of
embassies was not feasible, he hoped that China would accept French
experts in astronomy to take service in Peking. China on the other
hand would send officials to France to learn the technique of the west¬
ern armament manufacture and strategy specially in naval warfare in
55
order to defeat the English barbarians in the next battle.
Ch'i-ying rejected the proposal of Lagrene by saying that the
existing dynasty possessed plenty of experienced persons in astronomy
and there was no need to invite the French experts. As for the defence
of the empire, Ch'i-ying said: "We have never relaxed military
53. IWSM, TK 72.20a.
54. IWSM, TK 72.44a-b.
55. IWSM, TK 72.44a-b.
preparedness since the conclusion of the peace with England and the
building of ships and cannons, and the drilling of the fleet is going
56
on in various provinces in order to be ready for future necessities."
Despite the disagreement over the exchange programme, Ch'i-ying
and Legren^ continued their negotiations. Lagrene told Ch'i-ying
that his country would not gain as much benefit as the England and
United States get from the trade with China, because the trading
capacity of Prance was far less than that of the other two countries.
Lagrene demanded the lifting of ban on Catholicism in China as a
compensation (the ban was imposed in the preceding century by the
imperial court). Ch'i-ying accepted his demand on the grounds that
if he refused this item among all the other lustful demands, it was
likely that the angry envoy would stir up trouble. In his report to
the Emperor, he mentioned: "After careful consideration and weighing
the relative urgency of various points, I conclude that we should
consent to his demand (toleration of Catholicism) and try to put him
57
under our control."
The treaty between China and France, which was mainly based on
the pattern of the American treaty, was concluded as the Treaty of
Whampoa on 24th October 1844- Ch'i-ying had a bad impression towards
the French envoy. Lagren^ was not able to give a satisfactory
explanation to Ch'i-ying why he brought eight warships with him for
56. Chung-yang yen-chiu-yuan. Chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so, comp.,
Tao-kuang Hsien-feng liang-ch'ao ch'ou-p'an i-wu shih-mo nu-i
(A supplement to the "Complete account of the management, of
barbarian affairs in the periods of Tao-kuang and Hsien-fengf')
(Taipei, 1966), p.98.
57-. IWSM, TK 73.30b-31a.
the Sino -French negotiation and he refused to disclose the purpose
of his mission in the preliminary negotiations. Besides, Ch'i-ying
discovered that Lagrene had a greater ambition in China than the
American plenipotentary. Cushing's mission to China was to obtain
commercial privilege and his request to go to Peking was for imperial
audience, while the French envoy, beyond securing commercial privilege,
demanded toleration of Catholicism in China. As for the proposal of
exchange of embassies between the two countries, Ch'i-ying thought
that the French envoy "desired to obtain access to our Court by
pretending to pay us homage. And they desired to occupy some territory
on the frontier under the cloak of an ingenious scheme of contributing
58
to our defence."
The refusal of Ch'i-ying to accept Lagrene's proposal of a treaty
of alliance between China and France denoted that Ch'i-ying had given
up hope of the idea of using French barbarians to control English
barbarians. Although Ch'i-ying recognized France as a great power
in the West, he still doubted that China with military assistance from
France would be able to defeat the powerful England. He feared:
"If China lose the battle again to England, the frontier crisis (of
the empire) will arise; even though China is able to defeat the
English barbarians with the help of France, the French barbarians will
claim that they have done the empire good deeds and ask for imperial
59
favor as a reward."
The geographical separation between China and France also caused
58. IWSM, TK 73.4a.
59. IWSM, TK 75.39a.
the abondonment of Ch'i-ying's idea of using French barbarians to
control the English barbarians. Ch'i-ying told the Emperor that
France being separated from China by great oceans was beyond the
realm of our strength. Moreover, he did not believe that the French
barbarians would really help China to harm their English neighbour.
In one of his reports after the Treaty of Y/hampoa, he wrote: "Yet
the French and English barbarians although having historical emnities
are after all .neighbouring nations. I am afraid that the French
barbarians would not ignore an immediate neighbour to please a distant
country by harming their brethren." ^
In retrospect, the missions of Cushing and Lagrene, caused
Ch'i-ying to abandon the idea of using American and French barbarians
to control the English barbarians because both the plenipotentaries
appealed to Ch'i-ying to be greedy and cunning. Technically speaking
the Chinese authorities should not grant the Most Favoured-Nation
Treatment to the United States and France before the coming of both
plenipotentaries. It was I-li-pu who first advocated this practice:
"If we allow only England to establish additional trading ports and do
not also allow other countries to come to trade in the same way, it
is feared that as their ships and dress are not very different, it
61
will be hard to distinguish clearly." He also feared that if other
various barbarians were not given the same trading privilege, they
62
would depend on English assistance to trade. (The British merchants
60. IWSM, TK 72.44b.
61. IWSM, TK 64.37a-b.
62. IWSM, TK 64.37b.
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could convey the commodities of other foreign merchants with their
ships, just as the American helped the British to convey their goods
during the stoppage of trade to Britain in 1841.) Ch'i-ying
supported I-li-pu in this respect. He explained the situation to
the Emperor: "If other barbarians did not have the same privileges
as the English barbarians enjoyed, the latter would certainly be
willing to help them in the trade", Ch'i-ying went on further to
caution the Emperor." "(other barbarians) adhering to the English
barbarians secretly go to the various ports, how are we then going to
akeep watch over them? Thus the English barbarians can in the end
gain the gratitude of the other barbarians and secretly seize the
lever of our country's wealth. The various barbarians not being
able to expect favour from the Heavenly Court will be bound to the
English barbarians hand and foot."
Caleb Cushing arrived on Kuangtung waters from Washington after
a boring journey of 208 days. Before any negotiations with Chinese
authorities he was informed that the Chinese government had already
granted the Most Favoured-Nations Treatment to his country. In this
situation Cushing could hardly just accept the Chinese offer and go
back to America. So, the lesser purpose of his mission: the
petition for access to the Emperor and his court to present credentials.
64 .
became his insistance. When Cheng Yu-ts'ai first approached him
in March 1844, Cushing thus tactfully told him that his 9-nionth
journey to China was solely to ask permission to go to Peking for an
63. IWSM, TK 64.44b-45a.
64. The instruction of the U.S. government concerning the presen¬
tation of American credentials to the Chinese Emperor in Peking
reads only "so long as may be becoming and proper." See note 23
of this chapter.
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imperial audience. Cushing kept to the same tune in the negotiation
with Ch'i-ying in July 1844. He told the Imperial Commissioner that
he came under orders from his president and had credentials which
must be presented for imperial Scrutiny.
As for the French mission in October 1844, Lagren^ had been
seeking for something which he could achieve beyond the trading
privileges. After Ch'i-ying had rejected his proposal of a treaty
of alliance between the two countries, Lagrene eventually asked to
secure the tolerance of Catholicism. If the Most Favoured-Nations
Treatment had been the focus of argument in the negotiations with the
American and French plenipotentaries, and the Chinese negotiators
showed that they could not but grant it to both countries reluctantly,
Cushing would not have told Ch'i-ying that his sole purpose of his
mission was for the imperial audience in Peking; Ch'i-ying would not
have to report to the Emperor that if Lagrene did not secure the
tolerance of Catholicism, his mission to China would be a complete
failure.
CHAPTER 9
THE CANTON CITY QUESTION
The question of the British right to enter the city of Canton
became a knotty issue in the post-war period. The Cantonese did not
allow the British to enter their provincial city, but the people of
the other treaty ports: Shanghai, Ningpo and Amoy did not have
resistance to the British entry; except a tiny resistance in
Foochow (see the following discussion.)
The people in the other four treaty ports had not had any contact
with the foreigners before the Opium War. Their impression of the
British immediately after the war was that they were the winners.
The Cantonese on the other hand regarded themselves as victors in the
San-yuan-li battle. The feeling of the Cantonese towards the
British can be illustrated by a Chinese proverb: "Ch'ien-lu Ghi-
ch1 iung (Kweichow donkey at the end of its resourcefulness -
a person who has exposed his limited ability Cfrom the story of a
donkey brought to Kweichow which the tiger first feared but soon
overpowered after discovering that it could only bray and kick)).
The Cantonese thought that after more than two centuries of trading
with British barbarians in Canton, they had discovered the covetous
nature of the British."'" On the other hand their military strength
as shown in the San-yuan-li incident was weak and fragile.
The British merchants before the Opium War were not allowed to
1. When Lin was in Canton in 1840, he also addressed to the British
opium traders that having come from the sea coast of Fukien himself,
he was well aware of the barbarians' tricks and would not fall into
their traps.
enter the city. All the trading had been done in the factory area
outside the city. The city itself did not have any connection with
the foreign trade. When the British insisted on entering the city
after the War the Cantonese naturally thought that the British had
bad intentions to their city.
The British right of entry into Canton was based on article II
in the English text of the Treaty of Nangking. The article reads:
"His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees, that British subjects, with
their families and establishments shall be allowed -to reside, for the
purpose of carrying on their merchantile pursuits, without molestation
and restraint at the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo
2
and Shanghai." But the Chinese text differs considerably from the
English version, it reads: "the Emperor of China graciously allows
the subjects of Great Britain to bring their families to reside
temporarily at the ports of the five coastal cities of Canton, Amoy,
Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, there to carry on trade without the least
3
restraint." According to the English text of the treaty, the
British were allowed to the cities, but in the Chinese text, it
was mentioned" that the British were only allowed to the ports
(harbour area) of the cities.
The Chinese at that time did not have much idea of the spirit of
the western treaty system. They were accustomed to solving disputes
according to the circumstances of each particular case. In fact
2. Imperial Maritime Customs III (Miscellaneous series: no. 30)
Treaties, Conventions etc., between China and foreign states,
(Shanghai, 1908), I, 160, hereafter cited a,s Treaties.
3. Ibid.
the Cantonese did not pay much attention to the content of the treaty.
They deemed that the treaty was unreasonable and harmful to their
country. Both the British and the Chinese officials who signed the
treaty were to be condemned. In the post-war period the Cantonese
resisted the entry of the British to their city for the single reason
that they were not willing to accept the British. They did not
argue that'the British were only allowed to reside "at the ports of
the five coastal cities" as mentioned in the Chinese text of the
Treaty of Nanking.
Why did the Cantonese so strongly resist the British entry into
their city? A modern Chinese historian, Shen Wei-t'ai ()Xf/£-^..) says
that, apart from the hatred of the Cantonese towards the British, there
was no other explanation for it.
There is no doubt that the Cantonese would never forget the
British caused a disaster involving a huge loss of life and serious
damage to property during the war. Besides, the ransom of the city
by the Canton authorities in May 1841, was also an intolerable insult
to them. On the other hand the Cantonese could hardly forgive the
in.
immorality of the British troops which was committed^their city in
war-time. Like other Chinese all over the empire the Cantonese
4
despise the British from the cultural point of view. They did not
treat the British as human beings but as ch'in-shou (animals).
In a proclamation during the Opium War, the Cantonese humiliated the
British: "You (barbarians) should take a mirror to look at yourselves,
4. Cf. John Fairbank's remark: "the Chinese have been willing to
accept individuals from abroad on their merits as persons, to
judge them not by the standards of race or colour or origin, but
by the touchstone of Chinese culture." See John K. Fairbank,
The United States and China (Harvard University Press, 1948), p.7.
your appearance is not different from animals.. It is only that you
are animals that can speak. You do not know a bit about the content
of hsiao (% ) and _i (v<) (filial piety and righteousness)."^ During
the war, family wives and daughters were annoyed by the British troops
in the villages outside Canton city. Wherever the British troops
attacked the women in those rural districts the male villagers did
not hesitate to use their cudgels and knives to fight against the well-
equipped troops. The outbreak of the San-yuan-li battle was one of
the best examples. After the war the villagers faced the same threats
from the foreigners. A member of the gentry of a village on French
Island reported to the Canton authorities that all kinds of foreigners
disturbed his village: "they have entered our houses and frightened
our wives and daughters, so that the indignation of the multitude is
kindled against them and our people think of nothing else but making
an appeal at once to the sword. Ling Wen-lung (-"^OiL), a member
of the gentry of P'an-Yu ( ) also reported that the foreign seamen
entered his village in twos and threes, creating trouble and annoying
7
women. The situation outside the city had caused a phobia among
the Cantonese. How could the Cantonese accept the British barbarians
into their city? Moreover, if the British were allowed to enter the
city, they would bring their women with them. The conservative gentry
dared not imagine how their fellow countrymen and their wives would
feel when the barbarian women appeared in their city, taking sedans
5. IWSM, TK 31.16a.
6. F017/71, encl. I in N0.I63, Pottinger to Aberdeen, 14 December
1843.
7. F0682/1059, Keying and Ching (Yu-ts'ai) to Pottinger, date TK
23/11/5 (25 December 1843): Chinese text.
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carried by Chinese bearers while the barbarian men opened the door
for them, or simply walking side-by-side with their husbands. A
few days before the riot on 7th December 1842, the presence of two
foreign ladies in the factory area had caused alarm to the people of
Q
the city. Placards were posted to condemn the barbarian women
appearing in that area. New rumours had spread that the British were
planning to bring their wives to enter the city immediately. Those
rumours added fuel to the fire that speeded up the outbreak of the
riot.
The British treated their entry to the "cities and towns" of
the five treaty ports as a matter of upholding their treaty right.
Their first concern was to establish their residence and consulates.
The British at Canton treated the "city question" as very serious
because in the past 2 centuries they were not allowed into the
provincial capital. A few days after the signing of Treaty of
Nanking, the Chinese negotiators addressed a note to Sir Henry
Pottinger in which they intimated that since Hong Kong had been
ceded to Britain as a place of residence, there would be no need for
9
the British to reside at Canton. Sir Henry Pottinger rejected such
an idea on the grounds that "a quarter of each city in its suburbs
being allocated to them at each port, they should be allowed freely
to build or rent houses there so long as their business may render
necessary...."^ Three hundred foreigners in Canton were stuffed
8. In 1835, the Canton authorities had set up regulations that no
foreign women could be brought to the factories or trading
stations where commercial agents resided and transacted business.
9. F017/57, end.30, desp.38.
10. F017/57, encl.31.
into twenty-one acres of the old factory area, of which 17 acres were
covered hy buildings. The energetic foreign merchants there felt
that they did not have enough space to exercise and build additional
factories and accommodation. When they realized that their colleague
in other treaty ports had been accepted into the cities, they became
infuriated. The foreigners at Shanghai were less than a hundred in
number. After they had entered the city, they found that conditions
there were not hygienic enough to set up living quarters. In this
situation they voluntarily moved out from the city. Through the
arrangement of their consul, G. Butler and the Tao-tai of Shanghai,
they obtained an area of 180 acres in the vicinity of Shanghai city
for their residence. The foreigners at Amoy, Ningpo and Foochow met
the same hygienic problem in the cities. With the help pf their
consuls and the local officials, they moved out to the offshore
islands Ku-lang-hsii ( of Amoy; Yao-chiang (•#£>;m) of Ningpo
and Nan-t'ai (/% ) of Foochow.
The British at Canton were instigated by the achievements of
their fellow countrymen in those ports. Bitter insistance in Canton
was followed by bitter resistance, which was then followed by even
more bitter insistance, and so on in a vicious circle.
On 22 July 1843, the "tariff and general regulations" between
Britain and China were signed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger.
In order to honour the content of the "regulations", Ch'i-ying
announced that five ports would be opened for trade. He felt
confident enough to proclaim that Canton would soon be open to the
British. Unexpectedly, his procJamation aroused a storm of protests
from the Cantonese in the form of placards and meetings. Ch'i-ying
was forced to inform Sir Henry Pottinger that the Canton authorities
were not able to allow entry. At that time negotiations on the
supplementary treaty (to the Treaty of Nanking) were taking place.
Sir Henry Pottinger did not want the "entry question" to spoil the
Negotiations. Since Ch'i-ying had promised that once the public
sentiment of the Cantonese was less excited he would allow the British
to enter the city. Under this condition Pottinger agreed to put the
matter aside.
As the British were not able to enter the city at that time,
they tried another method of seeking a place for residence. On
8th October 1893, Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger signed the
Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue on 8th October 1843. The seventh
article of the supplementary treaty stated that when the British
intended to rent Chinese territory, the local district magistrates and
British consuls should pay due regard to the disposition of the people.
In the course, the Chinese people should not raise an unreasonable
rent on the land and the British merchants could not force the people
to rent their land to them."'""'' The British had long been covetous of
the Honan District (the southern territory of the provincial river),
because the place could be developed as residence and trading station.
Sir John Davis, the then British plenipotentiary to China and
governor of Hong Kong on 8th May 1844, officially requested the
renting of the Honan District. Ch'l-kung, the 'Governor-general of
Liang-Kuang accepted the British request as the government policy at
11. Treaties, I, 392.
that time was to soothe the British and the Canton authorities were
12
ordered to avoid any conflict between the two countries. But the
people of Honan District unanimously refused to rent even an inch of
13
their land to the British. On 23rd May more than three thousand
people from Honan District made a demonstration in front of the
British factory in the factory area. The people later gathered at
Shuang-chou shu-yuan to draft a letter to the British,
stating that even though the officials allowed the British to rent
land from the people, the people of Honan District were of one voice
that they were not willing to rent their land. The people threatened
that if the British forcibly rented their land in devious ways and
set up buildings there, the British residents there were bound to be
attacked and their goods would be set on fire. The latter concluded
that the people were of one mind. Even the gentry and the elders
were not able to coerce the people; the high ranking officials could
14
not suppress their unanimous sentiment.
The citizen of Canton immediately echoed the people of Honan
District in their resistance against renting their land to the British.
The Cantonese ferociously proclaimed that all the Chinese land had
been purchased by the people with their entire savings. Even the
15
officials could not take away their land to rent it to the British.




The Cantonese went on further to warn the British that if they
unscrupulously took the land away from the people, the Chinese people
would not hesitate to draw their swords.
While the people of Honan District and the Cantonese were carry¬
ing on their campaign to refuse the British request to rent, Ch'i-
ying was on his way. from Nanking to Canton to take up the post of
Imperial Commissioner and the Governor-general of liang-Kuang.
When he arrived at Canton on 30th May, the"anti-land-renting movement"
was over. Chi-ying of course did not appreciate the action of the
people. The anti-British sentiment of the people in Kuang-tung was
more fierce than that in the previous years: This was harmful to his
conciliation policy. Two years later (in 1846) Ch'i-ying expressed
his ill-feeling towards the people's action on the matter of renting
land in his report to the Emperor, saying that the people despised the
British too much and made frequent attacks on them. Occasionally,
the British made small requests, for example to rent land for building
residences, but the people gathered together to obstruct their
17
requests. Ch'i-ying himself might feel regretful about the British
failure to rent land in Honan District. The reason was simple: if
the British succeeded in renting land in that district to build
residences, they would lessen their pressure for entry into the Canton
city. Now that the people had refused to rent their land to the
British, the latter would feel that they had lost face. Their
insistance on their right to entering the city would then become inevit¬
able.
16. YPCC, 4:9.
17. IWSM, TK 77.37b.
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The "entry question" became a more serious matter in 1845.
From the Chinese side, the strength of the people, based on militia,
became strong force after the San-yuan-li incident. Because of the
increased local unrest and the conflicts between the British and the
local people in Kuangtung, the. local government decided to strength .
the militia. (it must be mentioned here that it was managed before
the arrival of Ch'.i-ying. at. Canton on 30. May 1844- )- early 1Q44
militia received arms from Canton authorities to form a defence force.
Ch'eng Yii-ts'ai (flilrtO the (governor of Kuangtung, personally
estimated that such kinds of irregular forces in some districts
18
numbered as many as ten thousand individuals. Hundreds of thousands
of volunteers and village braves, on the other hand, had been organised
into societies for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of fear, so
that the British dared not enter the city. Ts'ao Lu-t'ai (
remarked: "all one had to do was whistle and within a short time they
19
would be ready for action." This irregular force became a source
of China's resistance to the British entry in the "city question"
which deteriorated in March, 1845.
On the British side, Sir John Davis succeeded Sir Henry Pottinger
as British plenipotentary in May 1844. After a short period in
office, Davis made Ch'i-ying understand that personal friendship
technique which he had.applied to Pottinger could not affect his
policies as regards China. Davis believed that Britain's failure in
subjugating the militia-men in the San-yuan-li incident resulted in a
18. Davis, China, during the War. II, p.30, who cites the Peking Gazetteer.
19. IWSM, TK 75.14a.
lowering of British prestige and an intensification of the anti-
British sentiment of the people. As far as the "entry question"
was concerned, Davis trusted that the success of British entry to
Canton would influence the prestige of Britain in China.
The British treated their failure to rent land in Honan District
as being due to the treaty stipulation that they would only be allowed
20
to obtain land with the consent of the natives. In the following
disputes of the "city question" with Ch'i-ying, Davis stressed that
the British entry right was based on the stipulation of the Nanking
Treaty.
On 18th March 1845, R. Montgomery Martin, the colonial treasurer
of Hong Kong, R.B. Jackson, the British consul of Canton, and the Rev.
Vincent Stanton, the British chaplain at Hong Kong, were assaulted by
the Cantonese on the city wall in the north side of Canton when
21
taking a stroll there. Davis took the opportunity offered by the
incident to demand redress. At the same time, he urged Ch'i-ying
22
to honour the right of British entry to the city.
Ch'i-ying answered that he himself did not object to the British
entry. But the popular sentiment was still agitated, as the people
would not tolerate such a violation of the traditional rules. If
the British forced their entry, he could not guarantee their safety.
However, Ch'i-ying told Davis that when the situation allowed, he
20. By Article VII of the Supplementary Treaty of October 1843, it
was further provided that when the British subjects took up
residence in the treaty ports, the rent or price of the ground
and houses was to oe fairly and equitably arranged for and the
number of houses rented should not be subject to any limit.
See Treaties, I, 392.
21. See Morse, International Relations, p.374.
22. F0682/1198, Davis to Keying, date TK 25/2/15 (22 March 1845).
saw no reason for the Canton authorities to refuse the British entry
23
to the city.
Davis had a wrong conception that the Canton officials could use
their prestige to impel the 'people's wishes' to allow the British
entry. As shown in the San-yuan-li battle, several thousand militia¬
men who surrounded'a weary British squadron on 31st May 1841 were
dispersed by a single She Pao-shun. As for the matter of entry, if
the British authorities were able to urge the officials to admonish
the people, the British might enter the city.
The success of the British entry into the city of Foochow in 1844
had given Davis much confidence. When Cousul Lay arrived at Foochow
in June 1844, Hsu Chi-yu (<$£&■$) the provincial financial commissioner
of Fuchien told him that the British entry was against the 'people's
wishes.'^ Hsu and his colleagues helped the British consul to find
a common house on Nantai Island. When Davis took a trip to Foochow
in October 1844, he instructed Lay to demand British residence inside
the city by saying that the consular residence at Nantai Island was
25
not hygienic. Hsu argued that the Treaty of Nanking had not
clearly provided for the British subjects dwelling within the city
walls, adding that Foochow being the provincial capital of Fukien was
"The area where people densely gathered. If the people and the
26
foreigners are mixed together, disturbances will arise."
23. Insults, p.121.
24. F0682/1128, Davis to Liu (Yiin-k'e), date TK 24/5/6 (6 May 1846).
25. F017/l09» Davis to Aberdeen,8 January 1846.
26. P'eng Tse-yi, "Chung-ying wu-k'ou t'ung-shang yen-ke k'ao" (A
study of the five ports opened to the British in China) in Chun^-
kuo chin-tai Fhih lun-ts'ung (A collection of articles on modern
Chinese history)(Taipei, 1958), Series 2, v.l, p.69.
Hsu told Lay that he could arrange a big clean house for the consular
residence in Nan-tai but this proposal was rejected by the consul.
In order to block the British entry, Hsu secretly instructed Pao tai
magistrate of Hou-kuan Hsien (the birthplace of
Commissioner Lin) to gather gentry to organize a petition to stop Lay's
entrance. ' On the other hand, the gentry manoeuvred about two hundred
people to give a-street demonstration to show the people's disinclin¬
ation to accept British entry. But the insistence of Lay had
eventually made the Poochow authorities give way. The British were
confused as they entered the city, "not a single member of the gentry
nor a citizen appearing at the city gate to stop the entry of the
27
foreigners."
Later, Pao Tai and other magistrates manoeuvred another popular
movement. They instructed the people in Poochow and its suburb not
to trade with the British merchants and not to buy British commodities.
When Lay asked the Foochow authorities to help support Sino-British
trade, Hsu told him that he could not force the people to trade with
the British. However, some traitorous Chinese disclosed to Lay that
the reason for the unpromising British trade was that the officials
had instructed the people not to deal with the British merchants; the
boycott of the British commodities was masterminded by the Foochow
28
authorities.
The angry Consul immediately reprimanded Hsu V his machination,
but the latter pretended that he did not know the whole course of the
27. Ibid., p.70.
28. Ibid., p.71.
matter. Lay urged Hsu to issue official proclamations to persuade
the people to barter with the British merchants. After the issue of
proclamations the British commodities attracted a lot of Chinese
patrons.
Davis might have thought that a certain pressure on the Chinese
authorities had brought about the entry of the British to the city of
Foochow. Even though the British demands were sometimes against the
"people's wishes", the prestige of the Chinese authorities, as
demonstrated in form of proclamations, was able to thwart it. The
Canton authorities also used the "people's wishes" to refuse British
entry to Canton. If the British consul had succeeded in entering
the city of Foochow by coercive measures, why not the British
plenipotentary in the city of Canton.
Davis in June 1845 instructed Consul MacGregor at Canton to put
pressure on the magistrates of Nan-hai and Pan-y'u to post official
proclamations outside the city wall to induce the people to accept
British entry to the city. The magistrates eventually agreed to do
29
so. They told the consul that they had posted 70 proclamations.
But MacGregor later found out that only about ten proclamations had
30been posted in unnoticeable places.
When MacGregor reported this matter to Davis, the latter decided
to coerce Ch'i-ying to post the proclamations again. The British
plenipotentary sent notes to Ch'i-ying arguing that, the Chinese
29. F0682/1253, Davis to Keying, date TK 25/ll/22 (20 December 1845).
30. FO 228/51, MacGregor to Davis, Desp. 93, 19 November 1845.
authorities should not use the 'people's wishes' to resist the
British entry so as to spoil the spirit of the Sino-British peace
*Z"]
treaty (Nanking Treaty). He warned his Chinese counterpart that
the "city question" was a matter of "principle" and that the rights in
the treaty must be upheld. Later, he plainly told Ch'i-ying that
unless the "right of entry" was granted, the British authority would
withhold the return of the Chusan islands which had been occupied by
British forces during the Opium War and were being held until the last
32
instalment of the indemnity had been paid by the Chinese government.
The negotiation between the two plenipotentaries was held on 21st
November 1845, Davis told Ch'i-ying that if he was not able to
achieve the entry for his people, that meant he could not fulfil the
obligation which had been assigned to him by his government. He
warned that if Chinese authorities refused the British entry, war
33
seemed the only means to settle the issue.
In order to avoid further conflicts with Britain and to secure
the recovery of the Chusan islands upon the final payment on 22nd
January 1846, Ch'i-ying eventually agreed to issue other proclamations
by himself. He sent a note to Davis telling him that he had ordered
the gentry to stop all seditious speeches that would arouse the
34
people's resistance to the British entry. On 13th January 1846,
31. F0682/1254, Davis'to Huang (En-t'ung), date TK 25/ll/23 (21
December 1845).
32. FO 17/102, encl. 2. in desp. 179, Davis to Aberdeen, 22 December
1845.
33. IWSM, TK 74.31a.
34. F0682/1257, Keying to Davis, date TK 25/12/14 (ll January 1846).
Ch'i-ying issued an official proclamation announcing that according
to the Treaty of Nanking, the foreigners were allowed in to the treaty
ports including Canton. The people of the other four ports had not
resisted the British entry to their cities; the people in Canton should
not make an exception. He extorted the "gentry and people to lay
35
aside their suspicions and cease their opposition."
The issue of proclamations was of course against the will of
Ch'i-ying. Peking in early 1843 had warned' the officials at Canton
not to cause displeasure among the people, saying that if they were
repressed they would no longer be of one mind and determination, thus
36
being of no use to the officials. It is important to note that
when Ch'i-ying came under pressure from Davis in the issue of entry to
the city, he did not want to expose the inability of the Canton
authorities to suppress the "ardour of the people", fearing that if
the British authorities realized that he was not able to control the
people, it was not only a matter of loosing face enormously, but also
Davis might refuse to negotiate with him. But in a letter to the
American Consul, Forbes in March 1845, Ch'i-ying told him that: "the
people of Canton are of a ferocious disposition... and if the laws
are contrary to their inclination, they will not regard them. Now
hitherto, they have not wished foreigners to be permitted to enter
37
the city, and the officers of the government cannot force them."
35. CR, 15:47.
36. IWSM, TK 64.27b.
37. CR, 18:277.
However, he decided to use his prestige to issue proclamations to
bring about British entry. In a report to the throne, he explained
his decision; "The barbarian chieftain (Davis) was obsessed by the
misconception that the (Canton) authorities were making use of the
pretext of the reluctance of the people to obstruct the 'right of
entry' of the British barbarians. The failure to issue an official
70
proclamation may put more doubt in their minds."
Before the issue of the proclamations, Ch'i-ying had reported to
the Emperor: "the feeling of the Cantonese is unpredictable and if
we do hot comply with the public sentiment and suddenly allow the
39barbarians to enter the city, I am afraid that agitations will arise."
In this respect, Ch'i-ying had taken precautionary action. On the
eve of the issue of the proclamations, he gathered the prestigious
gentry and instructed them to persuade the people to allow the entry
of the British to their city. But Ch'i-ying did not realize that
before his appointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton on 30th May
1844, the popular sentiment had been ferocious in the "anti-land-
renting movement". When the Canton officials told the people to
consider the hardships of persons from afar (British) and not to
40
altercate with them in the matter of renting land. The people
rebuked the yielding officials: "Your unconditional surrender( to the
barbarians) demonstrates your timidity; in dealing with the barbarians,
you always decide , matters by your ouJn W'H
38. IWSM, TK 75.11b.
39. IWSM, TK 74.46b.
40. YPCC, 4:8.
41. YPCC, 4:9-
The furious reaction of the people upon the official
proclamations was beyond Ch'i-ying's expectations. They tore down
the proclamations and replaced them with their own placards, stating
that they abhorred the perfidy and brutality of the English
barbarians and warning that if the barbarians entered their city,
the people had decided "first to decapitate and exterminate the odious
race, (the English) and then to burn and destroy their habitations."
The people also warned the Canton authorities that "If the foreigners
are allowed to enter the city; (the righteous people) will capture
42the officials and slaughter them."
On 15th June, Liu Hsin (^J ), the prefect of Canton, when
passing through the city in the official state, found his way was
obstructed by an insolent coolie (Wang Ya-p'ing 1 f), sitting in the
middle of the road. Liu ordered his retinue to drive him away, but
the coolie refused to give way and a quarrel thus started. When
Liu blamed the coolie for his wrong doing, the latter offended the
prefect with bitter words. The enraged prefect immediately ordered
his men to flog the offensive coolie and take him back to the yamen
(office building). The onlookers began to mutter; they followed to
the yamen and requested the release of the poor coolie. When more
and more people gathered in front of the yamen, some suddenly shouted
that the prefect had secretly brought the barbarians with him to the
yamen. They pushed the yamen guards aside and broke into the living
quarters forcing the fearful prefect ignominiously to flee by the
42. IWSM, TK 75.11-12.
back door. Before the arrival of the Chinese troops the whole
43
building had already been gutted by fire.
After the riot on 15th June, Ch'i-ying painfully told Davis that
the people had shown vigorous resistance to the British entry and
burned the yaroen after his issue of proclamations. He requested
44
Davis to give up the right of entry. However, Davis seriously
informed Ch'i-ying that the British entry would not be waived; the
British troops would withhold the Chusan islands if the British
45
subjects were not allowed into the provincial capital. Davis
himself had the idea that the people of Canton were "always taught
46
to hate and despise the foreigners." Especially when he received
the comment of the Canton government from Lord Aberdeen, the then
British foreign secretary, saying that "those (Canton) authorities
seemed to have the power, when they have the inclination, to keep the
47
people in order he decided to put more pressure on Ch'i-ying about
the matter of entry. He even suggested that his counterpart should
consider the use of British troops to thwart the people's resistance.
This time Ch'i-ying responded in an. argumentative fashion. He
told Davis that if he allowed the British enter into the city, "not
43• IWSM, TK 75«9b-10a; cf. F0682/1267, Keying to Davis, date TK
26/l/7 (2 February 1846).
44. FO 682/1259> Keying and Huang to Davis, Date TK 25/12/21 (18
January 1846).
45. FO 682/1284, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/l/l2 (7 February 1846).
46. Davis, China during; the War, I, 33.
47. Insults, Aberdeen to Davis, 8 August 1845. p.23.
only would the British then be in a dangerous situation; but he
himself, the governor of Kuangtung, all other various ranking Chinese
officials and other foreigners at Canton would also be in a perilous
48
situation." Ch'i-ying went on further to use the stipulation of
the (Nanking) Treaty to embarrass the British plenipotentary: "...
the first article of the Treaty of Nan-king provided that there shall
be peace and friendship between Britain and China. The foreign
subjects in both countries must be protected by the local government"
he argued, "the atmosphere can only be called 'peace and friendship'
on condition that the 'willingness' exists between the two nations.
Now the Cantonese are not willing to allow the British to enter their
city, but the British people demand entry. How can this situation
49
be named as 'peace and friendship'?" However, Ch'i-ying soothed
the British plenipotentary with the cliche that he himself did not
resist British entry, but he feared that if the British subjects
forced their way into the city, the ferocious Cantonese would attack
them. As for the dispute about the return of the Chusan islands,
Ch'i-ying separated it from the matter of entry. He argued that
according to the twelfth article of the Treaty the British troops
should be withdrawn from the Chusan islands after China's final
payment of the indemnity. The British authority should not mix the
48. F0682/1259, Keying and Huang to Davis, date TK 25/12/21 (l8
January 1846).
49. F0682/l2677 Keying to Davis, date TK 26/l/7 (2 February 1846).
50
Chusan matter with the "city question".
Ch'i-ying bluntly rejected. Davis's proposal to use the British
troops to thwart the anti-British sentiment of the Cantonese. He
answered Davis in this matter with a satirical tone: "This minister (he)
is responsible for the protection of the territories and people of
Kuang-tung. There is no reason for the Empire to invite any foreign
force to suppress its own people. Supposing that your honourable
minister is not able to control the British subjects and asks assistance
51
from the Chinese authority? It is nothing but a laughing stock."
Ch'i-ying's strong argumentation had embarrassed Davis's coercive
demand for entry. Davis by this time realized that Ch'i-ying was in
fact not able to suppress the ferocious Cantonese enough to allow the
British into the city. As matters stood, Liu Hsin had been sacrificed
by the anti-foreign sentiment of the people. If he continued to
place pressure on Ch'i-ying in the entry matter, it would not be
surprising if this spokesman of the peace party in Canton became the
next victim. Of course Davis could take repressive measures to
secure the British entry, but he had to consider that once the conflict
between the British and Cantonese started again, British trade in
Canton would be affected. Although Lord Aberdeen supported his firm
stance in the matter of entry, the foreign secretary had reminded
him "to conduct any discussion with Kiying on the subject (the city
question) with the utmost temper and on every account to avoid pushing
the matter to the extremity of interrupting the free course of trade
50. Ibid.
51. F0682/1263, Keying to Davis, Date TK 25/12/25 (23 January 1846).
52in Canton waters." Besides, Ch'i-ying had told him the Emperor's
position on the matter of entry in the correspondence of 1st March:
"the entry of the Englishmen to the provincial city of Kuang-tung is
not alluded to the (Nanking) Treaty. Besides, the odium of the
people is so strong, the British entry to the city would cause
disturbance. In order to avoid friction (between the two nations).
the Governor-general (Ch'i-ying) should cautiously handle the affair
in Canton in order to maintain the mutual friendship. As for the
matter of the return of Chusan, it should be settled once and for all
by the final instalment of the indemnity. It has no connection with
53
the matter of entry."
Davis knew that Ch'i-ying would never dare to transgress the
imperial instruction. On 26th March he eventually agreed to discuss
54
the postponement of the British entry with Ch'i-ying. After
preliminary negotiations between the British representative and Huang
Efi-t' ung, Davis and Ch'i-ying on 4th April signed the so-called Bocca-
Tigris Convention in which it was mutually agreed that the exercise
pf the right of entry should be indefinitely postponed, but not waived.
As the first article of the convention reads:
"His Imperial Majesty having stated that after a
lapse of time when tranquility is ensured it
will be safe and right to admit foreigners into
the City, and the Chinese Government being unable
at present to coerce the people of Canton, the
52. Insults, Aberdeen to Davis, 8 August 1845, p.23.
53. F0682/1274, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/2/4 (l March 1846).
54. F0682/1295, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/2/29 (26 March 1846).
Plenipotentiaries agree it be posponed, though
the claim is not yielded by Her Britannic
Majesty." 55
Davis's insistance on British entry had seriously damaged the
prestige of the Canton authorities. The issue of the proclamations
resulted in the attack on the yamen by the populace. The feeling of
the people at that time was so ferocious, Ch'i-ying had to announce
that he would abide by the feelings of the people and that the
56
foreigners would not be permitted to enter the city. At the same
time, he sacked Liu Hsin in order to calm the populace.
VJhat was the attitude of the Emperor towards the anti-official
action of the Cantonese? Their attack to the yamen was no doubt an
, offensive movement to the local authorities. But if the Prefect
was too pro-foreign and hostile to the people, the action of the
people was right and patriotic. When the coolie was being flogged
by the retinues of Liu Hsin, the onlookers muttered: "The official
57
'ch'ing-tao' to greet the foreign devils; they treat us
people as fish and meat." The attackers of the yamen in the Liu
Hsin incident while burning the official robe of the prefect in his
living quarters shouted: "If he is going to serve the barbarians, he
55. Treaties, I, 208. A proclamation by Sir John Davis, dated 18th
May after the convention had been ratified by Peking, stating:
"the previously questioned right of entry to Canton city is
conceded and established under the Emperor's own hand, and the
exercise of that right is agreed to be postponed only until the
population of Canton shall be more under the control of the local
government." See Morse, International Relations, p.580.
56. FO 228/61, Keying's proclamation translated by the British.
Iocl. 1, Desp, 15, 23 January, 1846; _CR_, 15:54-55.
57. The Chinese characters "ch' ing-tao" ( J~§i i|/) in this sentence
means "making a clean sweep of (ch'ing) the way (tap) - the
resistance of the people to the British entry." However,
Y/akeman. wrongly translates as. "dispense with the tao of
Ch'ing." See 'Jakeman. Strangers, p.77. Unfortunately,
Wakeman's tao here is in a metaphysical sense. It is not
applicable to the Liii Hsin incident.
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is no more the official of Great Ch'ing." The populace during the
actions expressed a strong sense of protection to the country and
loyalty to the existing government. Should the Emperor punish them?
It was certain that the ill-feeling of the Emperor towards the
British had brought about some sympathy for the yamen attackers. In
the final stage of the Opium War, the Chinese troops received
continuous defeats from the British forces. I-li-pu succeeded in
imploring the Emperor to allow him to arrange a peace conference with
59
the British chieftain. Whenever the British negotiators behaved
arrogantly at the conference table, the Emperor ordered an end to the
60
conference and resumed warfare. Not until the fall of Woo-sung
(the port of Shanghai) in June 1842 , did the Emperor consider
sacrificing Chinese interests to buy off the British threats. But
the face-saving Emperor could never forget such an insult. Now the
Cantonese had embarrassed the arrogant British barbarians in the
entry matter and the Emperor was pleased with their achievement.
Unfortunately, Ch'i-ying after the Liu Hsin incident argued in
his report that Liu Hsin was basically a responsible prefect, mindful
of local administration. In order to maintain local order, he
punished obdurate persons with heavy penalties. Ch'i-ying mentioned
that in the Liu Hsin incident the punishment of flogging of the
obstructing coolie was justifiable.^ The wretched dismissal of Liu
58. KCFC, 81:43a; Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih, 13:2b & 3a.
59. See IWSM. TK 52.17a.
60. IWSM, TK 52.18a.
61. IWSM, TK 75.10b,
Hsin after the riot was to calm the ferocious feeling of the people.
Ch'i-ying distinguished the law-abiding people from the trouble¬
makers in the riot. The former, when hearing that the flogged
coolie was taken to the yamen, made a petition to the prefect for the
release. Ch'i-ying commented that their action was reasonable and
tolerable. The troublemakers on the other hand appeared in the
yamen after the release, and they used the hunt for foreigners as a
pretext to force their way into the inner yamen. When they broke
into the living quarters, Ch'i-ying reported: "they either destroyed
the ornamentation and house-fittings to give vent to their anger or
63
snatched valuables to feather their nests." Ch'i-ying argued that
during the incident: "the prefect bore no responsibility for
stirring up the agitation, but the troublemakers deserved the blame
64
of raising disturbance."
After the Liu Hsin incident, Ts'ao Lu-t'ai, censor of the Hu-
kuang circuit, criticized that the people and the local officials
were not with one accord in the entry matter. He opined that since
the Cantonese were not willing to accept the barbarians into their
city, "the officials should not oppose the 'people's wishes' in order
to please the barbarians." Ts'ao used a Chinese proverb: "Tu-pang
Hsiang-ch'ih #4-^01=^6 5 (literally, the contest between the snipe
and the clam with both ending up as captives of the fisherman —. a.
62. IWSM, TK 75.34a.
63. IWSM, TK 75.12a.
64. IWSM, TK 75.12a.
65. IWSM, TK 75.14b.
quarrel which benefits only a third party) to describe the contention
between the people and the officials in Kuangtung, as Britain
66
(fisherman) would get benefits from the contest. Ts'ao implored
the Emperor to keep a special eye on the defence force of the people
in Eastern Kuangtung, saying that the security of China's coastal
67
defence depended on it.
In an imperial edict to Ch'i-ying, the Emperor enclosed a copy
68
of Ts'ao's memorial and asked Ch'i-ying to make comments on that.
Ch'i-ying vigorously rebuffed the groundless charges of the censor.
He said that the local officials did not contest with the people in
the matter of entry. It was only that "the officials want to use
artifice to control the barbarians, while the people want to carry
69
out their will without deviating." In domestic matters the law-
abiding people and the righteous gentry stood in line with the local
officials. But the vagabonds who participated in burning the
foreign factories (in December, 1842) and yamen had placed the local
government in a very embarrassing position in foreign and domestic
70
affairs. Ch'i-ying insisted that these yamen attackers must be
66. IWSM, TK 75.14a.
67. IWSM, TK 75.14b.
68. IWSM, TK 75.15a.
69. IWSM,-TK 75.35b. This technique of Ch'i-ying was misunderstood
by the people. In his proclamation after the Liu Hsin Incident,
Ch'i-ying proclaimed: "We, the governor-general and governor
are ashamed and covered with perspiration while we think of our
inability, on the one hand to make the foreigners yield, and on
the other to secure the confidence of our own Chinese. It is
utterly impossible for us to exhibit to you, the people, all the
toils and troubles connected with pending affairs..." See CR,
15:54.
-70. IWSM, TK 75.37b.
severely punished. He told the Emperor that he had already
instructed the local officials secretly to apprehend the ringleaders
71
and they would be sentenced according to the strictest of law.
As for the local defence, Ch'i-ying hinted that the strength of the
people was not sufficient to cope with the British forces. Ch'i-
ying explained subtly that the people possessed a strong anti-
foreign sentiment, based on their prejudice: "(in the past hundred
years) even though the people had social intercourse with the
'barbarians, they still call them fan-kuei. They do not even
72
consider them to be human beings." Furthermore, their anti-
foreign feeling had led to the creation of militia units which were
sources of disorder and rebellion. On the other hand, the militia¬
men had not experienced actual contact with the British troops and
their victory in the San-yuan-li incident was an accidental success.
(The British troops were not able to use their fire-arms because of
the heavy rain) Ch'i-ying commented that after the incident, the
people had an idea that the barbarians were not to be feared. Ch'i-
ying warned the Emperor that "the idea that the people are strong
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THE AGREEMENT OF 6th APRIL 1847
After the signing of the Bocca-Tigris Convention on 4th April
1846, Ch'i-ying told the Cantonese that the British had forever
given up their right to enter the city of Canton."'' The Cantonese
did not know that the British only agreed to postpone their entry,
but not to waive it. With this misconception the hostile attitude
of the Cantonese to the British had been improved. On the other
hand, the British merchants who did not succeed in entering the city,
started to behave ruthlessly to the Cantonese.
On 4th July, Charles S. Compton, a British merchant, while
walking along the Old China Street near the foreign factories, found
his way obstructed by Chinese vendors. When one vendor refused
to give way, Compton kicked over his stall and went to the nearby
Chinese guard house to demand removal of the vendors and their
stalls. The Chinese officers of the guard house refused his demands
2
arid the case was dropped. On 8th July another affray started
between Compton and a vendor. This time fighting was the result.
Compton together with some other colleagues from the Mingqua's
Hong, dragged the vendor to their building and tied him up. The
onlookers, including labourers and stall-owners collected on the
street outside the Hong and threw showers of stones and brickbats. Tfie
Chinese Repository records:
1. PO 682/1340, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/3/5 (31 March 1846):
2. For details of this affray, see FO 17/120, passim; IWSM, TK 76.
15a-b.
"Cries of 'Kill the foreign devils!' 'Beat the
foreign devils {' rang and re-echoed through all
the streets in the vicinity of the foreign
factories. Hundreds of the basest of men were
already collected, and many hundreds more were
hastening to the scene of the riot. It was now
past 8 o'clock, and the action of the mob was
every moment becoming more violent and more
extensive. The gates and outer wall of Mingqua's
hong had been demolished; one of the walls of the
cook-house battered down; some of the iron-barred
and stone-cased windows of the house dug out of
the solid wall, against which a heavy battering-
ram was being plied with great fury..." 3
The mob first attacked the Hong into which their countryman had
been dragged, later they spread their attack to other foreign
establishments. The British consul sent a messenger to the
authorities, asking for protection and this was followed by a similar
appeal from the American authority. A petty official from the local
authority appeared with one police runner but was soon driven off
by the mob. The foreign residents, therefore, armed themselves and
shot from the factories, killed three and injured six of the
4
Chinese.
After the affray, Davis gave his feelings concerning his fellow
merchants to Palmerston: "I am not the first who has been compelled
to remark that it is more difficult to deal with our countrymen at
5
Canton than with the Chinese government." The British merchants
3. See Morse, International Relations, p.381.
4. Papers relating to the riot at Canton in July 1846 (pres. to H.
of Commons 1847), "Proclamation of Namhoi-hien", p.7, hereafter
cited as Papers rel.riot. See also IWSM, TK 76.15a-b.
5. PO 17/115, Davis to Palmerston, 12 November 1846. Cf. Holt
Edgar's comment: "In the gunboat years after the Treaty of
Nanking the temporary Anglo-Chinese harmony was often disturbed
not only by Canton Chinese attacks on foreigners but also by
the provocative ways of the younger British residents who, as
Palmerston sharply complained, used to amuse themselves 'by
kicking over fruit-stalls and making footballs of the Chinese.'"
See Holt Edgar, The Opium Wars in China (London,1964), p.171.
at Canton showed a bullying manner towards the Cantonese. One of
the old China hands at that time remarked: "We never paid any
attention to any Chinese law that I know of."^ W.C. Hunter also
remarks: "Should a foreigner get into a disturbance in the street,
and it was generally safe to say that it was through his own fault,
7
the Chinamen went to the wall."
In the affray on 8th July, 1846 it was obvious that Compton took
the initiative to attack the Chinese vendor. ' His action of dragging
and tying a Chinese subject was serious offence on Chinese soil.
The British merchants did not suffer from injuries in the affray,
except that one Indian got a broken leg. But the arrogant
merchants after the affray requested their consul at Canton to have
a man-of-war stationed off the factories, so that it would be
helpful for their protection when their safety was challenged by the
Cantonese. When the consul refused their request, they directly
8
addressed their request to the Foreign Office.
The attitude of the Foreign Office in London headed by Lord
Palmerston was equally militant. Palmerston was back in the
Foreign Office in July 1846 after the fall of the Conservative
Government of Peel in which Lord Aberdeen had been in charge of the
Foreign Office. When he received the reports concerning the riot
on 8th July and the request of the British merchants for a man-of-
war in Canton water, he instructed Davis to inform the Chinese
authorities that the mobs in the riot of 8th July should be punished.
He declared: "British residents are not to be attacked or insulted
with impunity... and the greater the violence of the mob the greater
will be the loss of life, which will be inflicted upon them."
6. FO 17/120, Davis to Palmerston, 12 November 1846.
7. Hunter, Fan Kwae, p.26.
8. Papers rel. riot, p.8, 11.
Palmers-ton also instructed Davis to inform the Chinese authorities
that a man-of-war would always be stationed in front of the
9
factories.
In order to defend the British action during the affray and
fulfil the instructions of Palmerston, Davis argued with Ch'i-ying
that the use of weapons by the British in the affray was necessary
as the attack of the people on the factories challenged the safety
of his fellow countrymen. Davis went further to demand that
Ch'i-ying maintain Chinese police patrols in the factory area and
the vicinity of the city, otherwise the British would take action
to defend themselves in the next conflict."^ When Ch'i-ying
explained that the Chinese officer and his men were not able to
arrive on the scene until after the shooting had occurred because
the guard houses were far from the scene and that the troops
available for such duty were widely dispersed throughout the city,
Davis remarked that the officer on guard at the scene should be
seriously punished as he failed to stop the incendiary actions of
the mob.^
Davis actually took a leaf out of Celeb Cushing's book in
arguing with Ch'i-ying in the affray. When Cushing was
9. PO 17/l20, Palmerston to Davis, 3 October 1846.
10. FO 682/1305, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/6/23 (14 August 1846).
11. FO 682/1307, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/7/5 (26 August 1846).
12. FO 682/1308, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/7/21 (ll September 1846}.
negotiating with Ch'i-ying on the Sino-American treaty in June
1844, a Cantonese, named Hsu A-man was killed by the Americans
in an affray on 16th June. When Ch'i-ying demanded the surrender
of the American culprit, Cushing counter-demanded that Ch'i-ying
13
take appropriate action to guarantee the safety of Americans.
Ch'i-ying eventually bowed to the pressure of Davis. After
*
the negotiations with Davis, he sent a memorial to the Emperor,
saying that the Cantonese were of hasty character and whenever
14
there was a chance, they would make use of it to create trouble.
In order to avoid further conflict between the Cantonese and the
British merchants, Ch'i-ying told Davis that he had increased
the number of the garrison troops to a total amount of 100 in the
15
factory area and its vicinity.
Ch'i-ying's action had aroused the consternation of the
Cantonese. The local gentry and the Cantonese at first expected
Ch'i-ying to take retribution for the three dead Cantonese, but
the result turned out to be the opposite. Ch'i-ying and other
high-ranking officials decided to use garrison troops to protect
the British murderers. Wasn't it a direct contrast to the action
of Commissioner Lin in June 1839 who used garrison troops to
surround the British in the factory area in order to bring about
the surrender of British opium. The angry Cantonese produced
angry placards blaming the high authorities for "ranking the Chinese
13. See Chapter VIII.
14. IWSM, TK 77.4b.
15. FO 682/1344, Keying and kwang (En-t'ung) to Davis, date TK
26/9/19 (7 November 1846).
people as fish and flesh and treating human lives as contemptuously
16
as hairs in a cap." The gentry on the other hand proclaimed that
they would take matters into their own hands to massacre the
guilty barbarians. Just several months previously, these
ferocious words were applied to the prefect of Canton, Liu Hsin;
this time Ch'i-ying was not lucky enough to escape from them.
The Cantonese did not know that Ch'i-ying had demanded the
surrender of the British culprits who shot three Cantonese to
death. In a note to Davis, Ch'i-ying told his British counter¬
part that the death of the three Cantonese had already aroused the
indignation of the people, he expected the surrender of the British
17
culprits to calm the Cantonese and maintain local order. Davis,
who treated the shooting by the British subjects as a matter of
self-defence, of course would not surrender his countrymen to
Ch'i-ying. What was his appraisal of the shooting during the
affray? We can learn it from his words to Consul Macgregor after
the affray,' "The Chinese must learn to be convinced that if they
attack our people and factories they will be shot; and that if
they maltreat unoffending Englishmen, who are quietly exercising
their right of walking about the town and neighbourhood of Canton,
IS
they will not escape with impunity."
• On 17th October 1846, a minor outrageous incident took place.
Two seamen from the British ship, Mary Bannatyre, secretly left
16. See To 17/l20, "Proclamation of the Local Community Schools
dated September 15," Incl. 2, Desp. 12.
17. FO 682/l335» Keying and Kwang to Davis, date TK 26/8/4 (23
September 1846).
18. Correspondences relating to the operation, Davis to Macgregor,
26 March 1847, p.12, hereafter cited as Corr.rel.operation.
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their ship for the city of Canton. Later they were maltreated
19
in the back streets by the Cantonese.
After the incident Davis demanded that Canton authorities
reinforce the police patrol around the districts of the city. On
30th January 1847, Davis went further to caution Ch'i-ying that if
the Canton authorities were not able to protect the British subjects
at the suburb of Canton, he would follow his home government's
20
instructions to use British forces to protect his people.
When Palmerston received the reports concerning the incident
of 17th October, from Davis, he went two separate dispatches to
the latter on 9th and 12th January; the one on the 9th reads:
"We shall lose all the vantage ground we have
gained by our victories in China, if we take
a low tone. We must take especial care not
to descent from the relative position which
we have acquired. If we maintain the position
morally, by the tone of our intercourse, we
shall not be obliged to recover it by forcible
acts; but if we permit the Chinese, either at
Canton or elsewhere to resume, as they will no
doubt always be endeavouring to do, their
former tone of affected superiority, we shall
very soon be compelled to come to blows with
them again." 21
The other on the 12th reads:
19. YPCC, 6:85; IWSM, TK 77.35b.
20. FO 682/1354, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/12/14 (30 January
1847).
21. Corr.rel. operation, Palmerston to Davis, 9 January 1847,
p.2.
"I have to instruct you to demand the punish¬
ment of the parties guilty of this outrage;
and you will moreover inform the Chinese
authorities, in plain and distinct terms,
that the British government will not tolerate
that a Chinese mob shall with impunity maltreat
British subjects whenever they get them into
their power; and that if the Chinese authorities
will not, by the exercise of their own
authority, punish and prevent such outrates, the
British government will be obliged to take the
matter into their own hands, and it will not
be their fault if in such a case the innocent
are involved in the punishment which may be
sought to be inflicted on the guilty." 22
Before these despatches reached Hong Kong, Davis had already
had another anti-foreign incident in hand. On 12th March a party
of six Englishmen (including a lieutenant-colonel, Chesney of
Royal Artillery and officer of the steamer "Pluto" and four other
British subjects) and one American took a trip to Pat-shan l,)
a city fifteen miles above Canton. A Chinese mandarin and his
followers went with them in order to protect the party. However,
the foreigners were still stoned by the natives. Some of the
23
mandarin's followers were severely wounded.
Davis's immediate action was to demand the punishment of
those aggressors. He sent a note to Ch'i-ying on 22 March
stating: "If they cannot be punished for this my Government will
be obliged to take further measures for the protection of British
24
subjects." In the coming week Davis received Lord Palmerston's
22. Corr.rel. operation, Palmerston to Davis, 12 January 1847, p.3
23. Corr.rel. operation, Davis to Palmerston, 27 March 1847, p.8-9
24. Corr.rel. operation, Davis to Keying, 22 March 1847, p.10.
despatches of 9th and 12th January, he assumed a stronger tone
and demanded reparation as instructed, for the attack of 17th
October. He warned Ch'i-ying: "If your Excellency will not
punish and prevent such outrages, it will be necessary for the
British government to punish them... Should your Excellency not
redress these matters, it is my duty to inform you that you will
25
bring down calamity on the Chinese people."
Ch'i-ying replied that the attack of the natives on the
British was because their sudden arrival at the villages Had created
astonishment. He argued: "the ringleaders who first gave rise
to the riot, must be clearly ascertained, and then I shall be able
to act, as it would really be unadvisable to seize and proceed in
this matter at random, without making any distinction between the
guilty and innocent, and thus occasion an insurrection. Would you
the Honourable Envoy, who thoroughly understand reason and justice,
26
not also act thus?"
Davis was not satisfied with Ch'i-ying's reply, he decided to
back up his demands by a show of force. Major-general d'Aguilar,
who was in command of the Hong Kong garrison led a sudden and
slashing attack on Bogue effected with 900 soldiers, three steamers,
27
and a brig. As a result of his operations, the whole river to
25. Corr. rei. operation, Davis to Keying, 27 March 1847, p.11.
26. Corr. rel. operation, Keying to Davis, 50 March 1847, p.15-16.
27. It was an economical operation carried out for the modest cost
of £700. Davis proudly reported to Palmerston that the attack
to Bogue on 1st April was a great military success, adding that
similar success in 1841 was won by 3000 British troops, three
line-of-battle ships, eleven frigates ana sloops ana four
steamers in many days. See FO 17/125, No.10, Davis to
Palmerston, 12 April 1847.
Hong Kong to Canton within thirty-six hours was in British hands,
827 guns had been spiked or captured and the forts disabled. At
10 p.m. on 2nd April Davis sent an ultimatum to Ch'i-ying to force
him to accept this demand within 8 hours, otherwise the British
force would attack Canton. The demands were:
1. The punishment of the aggressors at Canton on the
17th October.
2. The punishment of those at Fatshan on the 12th March.
3. Sufficient ground for the dwellings of British merchants
at Canton.
4. The practice now, or at a fixed period, of the right of
free entry in the city. 28
The frightened Imperial Commissioner could not but agree to
negotiate with Davis. On 3rd April Davis told Ch'i-ying that the
negotiation would take place at the British Consulate within the
city, with the purpose of increasing the British privileges and
lowering the dignity of Canton authorities. Seeing there was no
alternative, Ch'i-ying went to meet Davis at the Consulate. On
6th April an Agreement was signed by the two plenipotentaries.
Ch'i-ying accepted the terms which Davis demanded on 2nd April.
Other items, such as the offer of sites for a church and a cemetery;
the building of a bridge over Hog Lane; the clearing of boats from
the river before the factories were added to the agreement. Ch'i-
ying also agreed that the British would have free entrance into the
28. Corr. rel. operation, Davis to Keying, p.19-20.
city in two years from the date of the agreement.^
Before the agreement, Ch'i-ying always believed that disagree¬
ments between China and Britain could be solved through
negotiations. However, the sudden attack of the British had
smashed his belief. In his memorial to the Emperor, he told the
30
Emperor that the assault was quite unexpected. The Chinese
commander-in-chief at Canton, Lai En-chue(i(^fr) also gave his
comment on this unexpected operation s "The said barbarians after
their pacification showed no sign of military molestation the recent
31
actions of the British troops are very unusual."
Why did Ch'i-ying bow to the British military action? If
Ch'i-ying had counter-attacked the British, the belligerent
Cantonese would support him. But Ch'i-ying did not dare to take
military action against the British. The British success in
spiking Chinese cannons and occupying forts within thirty-six hours
demonstrated that the Chinese defence was fragile. At that time the
total number of military personnel in Kuangtung was about sixty-
eight thousand three hundred, but only about two thousand four
32
hundred soldiers were stationed at the provincial capital. The
Canton authorities were not able to increase the military strength
in the city, as soldiers at other strategic points of the province
had to deal with local unrest. In a memorial to the Emperor,
29. See G.E.P. Hertslet, Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and
China and between China and Foreign Pov.Ters (London, 1908), I,
17-18. ' ~ ~ " ~
30. IWSM, TK 77.37b.
31. IWSM. TK 78.1b.
"32. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35. ti, 301b.
Ch'i-ying remarked: "Once peace had been broken, unrest on the
country's frontier (Kuang-tung) would have started. It is
difficult for us to cope with such a situation. Besides, the
j
combatant strength of the Chinese forces along the coastal provinces
are still doubtful. After serious consideration, I decide not to
33
embark upon reckless and emotional acts towards the British."
Before the sudden British attack on Fat-shan, Ch'i-ying, time
and again refused the British entry to the city under the pretext of
"the people's will Although he did not believe that "the ardour
of the people" was able to cope with British military strength, he
had an idea that "If 'the ardour of the people' was too much
34
suppressed, the barbarians will become more overweening." But in
the negotiations with Davis in early April, the British plenipotentary
told him that the British military action on 1st April could be
regarded as a sign that the British authorities were no longer
willing to keep a weak attitude in front of the Cantonese, so that
after the Fat-shan incident, the British sent their troops to Fat-
35
shan, looking for a chance to contest with the local people.
Since the hostile action of the Cantonese had invited the British
invasion, Ch'i-ying decided to suppress the people in order to avoid
further conflict between the two nations. Shortly after the British
military action, Ch'i-ying instructed the district magistrates of
33' Shih-liao hsun-k'an, '35, ti, 295b.
34. IWSM, TK 75.36b.
35. IWSM, TK 77.37a.
Nan-hai and P'an-yu hsien to issue proclamation to warn the
people not to molest the British excursionists who appeared in
the vicinity of the city. Part of the proclamation reads: "If
foreigners should in future proceed to the said places to walk for
amusement, do not as heretofore assemble to look at, wrangle with
and rail at them, so as to give rise to other troubles and draw
down on yourselves inquiry and punishment. Be particularly careful
to yield a reverential obedience I Make no' opposition to this
36
special proclamation!" On the other hand, Ch'i-ying had to
impress the Emperor that the order of the issue of proclamation was
reasonable. In one of his memorials after the Agreement on 6th
April, he complained about the hostile attitude of the Cantonese
towards the foreigners: "It is a common matter for the foreigners
to go to look at places and to walk about inspecting them (in the
vicinity of Canton), but the people responded to their actions by
immediate grouping, and driving the foreigners away with offensive
actsCh'i-ying continued, "the people had in fact gone too far
in this respect. The ringleaders of the attack (in Fat-shan)
should be punished lest the barbarians should not be appeased.
The barbarians who have 'the nature of dogs and sheep" will arouse
the anger of our countrymen (in the matter of the Fat-shan incident)
the rascals who participated in the attack should be punished by
flogging. At the same time, report of the punishment should be
rzrj
delivered to the barbarian chieftain to allay his resentment.1
36. Com, rel. operation, "Proclamation issued by the District
Officers of Canton", p.32.
37. ItfSM, TK 77.38b.
to
The coercive measures by Ch'i-ying/suppress the people to
please the British were manifested, in the course of helping the
British to rent land for warehouses, churches and residences in
Honan District and Hog Lane after the agreement of 6th April.
As we have mentioned before^ the British for a long time had been
looking for land to rent in Honan District but in May 1844 they
did not get even an inch of land.
The people did not want to rent their land to foreigners for
western buildings fearing that such kinds of constructions would
70
disturb the feng-shui ffl.xK (geomancy) in their land. When
Ch'i-ying ordered tenements of the vagabonds in Hog Lane to be
cleared away in order to offer spaces for British buildings, the
Cantonese condemned Ch'i-ying for allowing the barbarians to annex
39their land. On the other hand, the house owners and landlords
of Honan District and Hog Lane on hearing that the British intended
to rent their land gathered at the Consoo house to discuss how to
refuse them. They eventually agreed to hire braves to protect
their properties. The house owners and the tenents agreed to
share one month's rent to sponsor weapons and mercenaries while
artisans pledged not to construct any building for the foreigners
40
in those areas. Several gentry were selected to superintend
38. IV/SK. TK 78.10b.
39. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.85.
40. YPCC, 3:410.
those preparations to cope with the british requests for renting
41
their land.
However, Ch'i-ying decided to help the British to get access
to land for buildings. Through the arrangement of Ch'i-ying, the
British got some spaces in Hog Lane and Honan District by offering
42handsome rent to covetous land owners. While the British set
up their buildings in those places, Ch'i-ying sent garrison troops
43
to take precaution against possible attacks, from the people. In
one of his memorials to the Emperor, Ch'i-ying frankly told the
Emperor that he had instructed civil and military officials to
supress those people who resisted the British efforts to set up
/ \ 44
buildings (.in Hog Lane J. At the same time, he had ordered the
gentry to admonish the people not to create trouble. Ch'i-ying
concluded: "Whenever the people deal unreasonably with the




WhyACh'i-ying decide to please the British by suppressing the
Cantonese after the sudden and slashing attack of the British troops
on 1st April? On 2nd April Davis demanded beyond punishment of
the aggressors in their attacks on the British, a fixed period
within which the British should gain entry to the city of Canton.
41. Lieh (tao), Ya-p'ien chan-cheng, p.299.
42. FO 682/1366, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/4/9 (22 May 1847).
43• FO 682/1368, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/5/10 (22 June 1847).
44. Hog Lane located between the British and American factories.
A lot of Chinese hucksters gathered in that lane. It had been
the centre of disturbance between Chinese and foreigners.
See IWSM, TK 78.9b; FO 17/114, Davis to Aberdeen, 31 October 1846.
45. IWSM, TK 78.6b.
Davis later fixed the period to one or two years. However, Ch'i-
ying was not confident that he was able to persuade the Cantonese
to accept the British entry in such a short period. He told
Davis that he would request the Emperor to allow the British entry
ill four or five years and to issue distinct orders to admonish the
46
people and gentry to accept the British into their city. Davis
refused his suggestion by saying that Ch'i-ying himself was
Plenipotentiary and therefore did not need to refer it to the
47
Emperor but could decide the entry matter himself. Later, Ch'i-
ying plainly stated his difficulty to Davis that if he did not
consult the Cantonese and allowed the British entry, the Cantonese
48 *
would raise a rebellion. Although Huang En-t'ung at the
negotiation table before the establishment of the Agreement of 6th
April insisted that the Chinese authorities needed four to five years
to arrange everything to accept the British entry, Davis did not
agree but insisted on entry in two years. Due to the pressure of
his British opponent, Ch'i-ying accepted the advice of Huang En-t'ung
and Ch'ao Chan-ning to allow the British entry in two years.
Within the two years, Ch'i-ying would scheme to leave Canton and
wash his hands of foreign affairs by petitioning for transfer back
49
to the capital with the excuse of old age and infirmity.
46. Corr. rel. operation. Keying to Davis, 2 April 1847, p.21.
47. Corr. rel. operation, Davis to Keying, 5 April 1847, p.22.
48. FO 682/1357, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/2/20 (3 April 1847).
49. Wu Chih,"Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou kuang-chow ju-ch'eng chiao-
sh£" (Negotiations concerning the entry into Canton after the
Opium War) in Ts'un-ts'ui hsueh-she comp., Ying-fa lien-c-hlin
(Anglo-French Army), (Hong Kong) p.5.
T.F. Chiang holds the view that Ch'i-ying dared not report
to the Emperor that he had permitted the British to enter Canton in
50
two years. It is understandable that permission for British
entry in two years was no doubt a sign of capitulation policy in
the eyes of the war party members. However, Ch'i-ying had told
the Emperor in a special memorial that after circumspect discussion
with his subordinates (including Huang Ef)-t'ung, Chiao Chan-ning
and Pan Shih-ching) he eventually agreed to allow the British
entry in two years. He also mentioned that he could not guarantee
that the sentiment of the Cantonese would be calm enough to accept
51
the British into their city after two years. In the same
memorial, Ch'i-ying expressed his eagerness to leave his post of
managing foreign affairs at Canton. He told the Emperor: "Your
slave has already passed the age of 60, the closing years (the west)
of my life are forthcoming. In the recent years, all the (foreign)
matters I dealt with were difficult to handle. Owing to my
anxiety over the barbarian affairs, my spirit is not as good as
before; besides, anguish from the troublesome barbarian affairs has
caused irritation and constant pain in my eyes, especially the left
one. I still exert myself to the job which I am responsible for
and become exhausted. Your slave has always received massive
imperial grace. I dare not shirk my responsibility so long as I
still keep a breath. But the barbarian affairs are of utmost
50. T.F. Ch'iang (T.F. Tsiang), comp., Chin-tai chung-kuo wai-
chiao-shih tzu-liao chi-yao (A source book of important
documents in modern Chinese diplomatic history), I, 147.




importance, I just fear that when one day my spirit is exhausted,
at that moment it may be difficult to find someone to take over
the responsibility. I really beg my enlightened Emperor can choose
a man of ability as a reserve so as to heighten the majesty of the
52
empire and to pacify the barbarian affairs."
The Emperor was anguished when hearing about the sudden British
attack on the Bogue on 1st April. He was angry at the loose
defence in Canton that enabled about 900 British troops easily to
go ashore to capture the forts and spike the guns along the city
53
river. The Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying and Lai Bn-ch'ueh to
investigate the reason for the British military success in such a
short period (36 hours) and punished those garrison troops who took
loose defence. At the same time, he admonished Ch'i-ying and Lai
En-ch.ueh to take strong defence preparation in Canton, adding that
they should memorialize the plan for strict defence at double quick
54
time. The Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying to choose an able character
from the camp of generals in Kuangsi Province to train a corps of
two to three thousand members, preparing to reinforce Canton when
52. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35? ti, 296a.
53♦ Cf. Ts'ao Lu-t'ai's memorial stating that when the English
troops attacked the Nuddy Town near Kuangtung in May 1841, the
garrison troops did not even fire a single shot to stop the
advance of the invading soldiers. Wang T'ing-lan also
commented: "If today's troops are like this, then we can
expect what those of later days will be like; if one province's
soldiers are like this, then we can imagine what those of the
empire will be like." See Hsiao, Chin-tai t'ung-shih II, 953*
54. IWSM (Pu-wei), TK, p.175.
it received any further sudden British attack. Li Hsing-yuan
), Crovernor-general of Liang-Kiang was also ordered to make
military preparation in order to reinforce the enforced military
55
strength in Kuangtung when necessary.
We can observe that after the British attack on 1st April,
while Ch'i-ying tried his best to satisfy the British demand by
suppressing the anti-foreign movement of the Cantonese; the Emperor
adopted a strong policy to prepare a defence force in order to cope
with possible British attacks. It is important to note that when
Ch'i-ying severely reprimanded the Cantonese for bluntly refusing
the British to rent their land for building; the Emperor once
praised such action of the Cantonese as being driven by "their
56
righteousness and indignation." As the garrison troops were not
able to obstruct the British attack, the Emperor once again
considered the use of militia to defend Canton. When the Emperor
received Ch'i-ying's report concerning the British attack in late
,the then Governor of Kuang-tung,
April, he order Hsu Kuang-ch'in/but not Ch'i-ying to notify the
Cantonese to form militia to protect themselves, on condition that
they should not use the pretext of establishing militia to gather
together to molest the travelling barbarians so as to give the
57
barbarians a pretext to create trouble and attack Chinese territory.
In an edict to Ch'i-ying and the grand councillors, the Emperor
emphasized; "To get hold of the ardour of the people as the
58
foundation (of defence)." In May Hsu Kuang-ch'in approved a plan
55. IWSM (Pu-wei), TK, p.175; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p.276.
56. IWSM, TK 78.13b.
57. IWSM, TK 77.39b-40a.
58. IWSM, TK 77.42b.
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drawn up by Wang Pei-chi for the collecting and training of
59
militia.
Why did the Emperor prefer to use Hsu Kuang-ch'in rather than
Ch'i-ying to form the militia? The prestige of Ch'i-ying in
Canton since the Liu Hsin incident in January 1846, had much been
lowered. He was condemned by the Cantonese for helping British
barbarians to enter their city without regarding the "people's will."
Shortly after the incident, Ch'i-ying tried to order the local
gentry to halt the anti-foreign sentiment of the Cantonese, but
the gentry did not listen to him. He had lost much face before the
gentry and the Cantonese. On the other hand, the British attack
on the Bogue on 1st April had severely injured Ch'i-ying's prestige.
This time the Cantonese complained that he was not able to defend
their province. Ch'i-ying's harsh method of suppressing the
hostilities of the Cantonese towards the British after the agreement
of 6th April demonstrated that he had lost power to discipline the
Cantonese. In his memorial to the Emperor, he admitted that he
could only use the gentry to soothe the anti-foreign sentiment of
the people as the latter did not take any notice of official
instructions after the Fat-shan incident. Besides, Ch'i-ying
disclosed that the gentry had a better relationship with the
people than the officials (including himself). The former were
fit to take up the task of persuading the people to give up
hostilities to the foreigners and to warn them of the punitive
consequence if they attacked the barbarians.
59.
In short, Ch'i-ying's public image was irreparably damaged
after the signing of the Agreement on 6th April 1847. The
Emperor had withdrawn his trust from him. The British
plenipotentiary and Foreign Office in London had decided to force
him to suppress the Cantonese in order to achieve security for the
British at Canton. On the other hand, the Cantonese were out of
his control, and the gentry were not willing to discipline them.
After.the Agreement, the British shifted their excursions from the
vicinity of Canton to the rural areas where the anti-foreign
sentiment was ferocious and official rule was weak. Ch'i-ying was
bound to face more difficulties in handling the affrays between the
country people and the young British merchants. It was under this
condition that Ch'i-ying met a most trifling matter in one of the
villages on 5th December 1847: the Huang-Chu-Ch'i incident.
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CHAPTER 11
THE HUANG-CHU-CH'I INCIDENT OF 5TH DECEMBER 1847
The most serious hostility in the 1840's as far as loss of
British lives was concerned, occurred on 5th December 1847, when
six British merchants were killed in Huang-chu-ch'i (Hwang-chu-
ke) village.The second article of the Agreement on 6th April
reads: "Whenever English go on shore to walk and meet with insult,
the local authorities must investigate the matter and punish the
aggressors; and the space of one day's journey, just as at Shanghai,
2
is also assigned at Canton for such excursions." The country
life beyond the factory area had always attracted the curiosity of
foreigners. Along the city river, there was a large population of
families which were born, lived and died in their floating houses.
Other scenes of the rural area, such as the market place, festival
celebrations, district temples and other characteristics of the
teeming life of the villagers, were of course alluring to the
British. Foreigners before the Agreement were limited in the
factory area. In early 1847 Davis and Consul MacGregor proposed
1. See Davis's note to Ch'i-ying on 11th December 1847: "This is
perhaps the most grievous outrage that England has experienced
from the Chinese, and if it is not immediately and fully
redressed, war will be inevitable." Papers relating to the
murder of six Englishmen in the neighbourhood of Canton in the
month of December 1847 (London, 1848), p.26, hereafter cited as
Papers rel. to murder.
2. Corr. rel. operation, "Commissioner Keying's Agreement" (6
April 1847), p.25. After the opening of the port at Shanghai
in November 1843. mutual agreement had been reached between
the local authorities and the consuls so that the foreigners
were allowed to go and return within a day in the country-side.
Later, the space was fixed at a conventional distance of thirty
miles, see Alexander. Michie, The Englishman in China during
the Victorian Era, as illustrated in the career of Sir
Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L., many years consul and minister
in China and Japan (London, 1900),I, 126.
the use of Whampoa as a recreation ground for the British community
at Canton, but the idea was eventually turned down by the community
3
on the ground that Whampoa was too far from Canton. Hoi/ever, the
British were prepared to take the risk of being attacked by villagers
by venturing in rural areas when travelling or shooting birds.
After the Agreement in April the British merchants lost no time in
4
using their so-called "unquestionable right" to make their
excursions along the river to the villages. As a matter of fact,
the attacks on the British after the Agreement was made mainly along
city river districts instead of in factory areas and their suburbs
as before the Agreement.
The harsh punishment inflicted upon the Chinese aggressors by
Ch'i-ying had eased the fear of the British to take excursions along
the city river. For example, on 13th May 1847, a lascar, belonging
to a British Lorcha lying off the factories, came ashore at Canton
to purchase some articles. He soon became the centre of a large
5
crowd of Cantonese. One or more of whom attacked and robbed him.
The principal culprit was apprehended by the police and municipal
constable on the spot and severely punished by the Canton
authorities.^ Later, Davis sent a note to Ch'i-ying, saying:
3. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p.272-273*
4. The British merchants claimed their "Unquestionable right" on
the ground that "the Agreement of April last founded on it;
for it is there expressly stipulated that British subjects
shall have the privilege of going to a reasonable distance into
the country." See Papers rel. to murder, p.45.
5. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 September 1847, p.2.
6. Insults, p.66.
"Her Majesty's Government have learned with great satisfaction the
promptitude with which your Excellency punished the party who
injured a Malay sailor in British employ, on the 13th May... If
you will on every occasion thus vigorously employ your power to
prevent and punish all acts of violence and wrong on the part of
Chinese towards British subjects, Her Majesty's Government will
take care that British subjects shall act justly and properly towards
the Chinese and thus peace and good-will must continue to be
maintained between the two nations for the profit and advantage of
both.
Although minor attacks on the British still persisted, since
13th May prompt redresses were made by Ch'i-ying. From a
8
statement of A.R. Johnston on 19 November, we realize that the
British were rather sure of their safety in Canton and the suburbs
beyond it. The statement reads:
"There is a very observable improvement in the
temper of the people at Canton; and after a
few days' stay at that place, I was so struck
by the improvement that I walked with the most
perfect confidence round the city through the
extensive suburb to the east and west of it;
and I also visited the Buddhist Temple at Honan,
where I remained for upwards of two hours.
These expeditions were both made without meeting
the slightest opposition or molestation. Some
children occasionally called out after us in
their usual way, but I several times observed the
■people correct and check them." 9
7. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 September 184-7, p.2.
8. A.R. Johnston was the deputed officer to Davis, see Papers rel.
to murder, p.41.
9. Papers rel. to murder, "Statement of Mr. Johnston" (19 September
1847), p. 16.
Johnston's statement was confirmed by a minor disturbance on
the same day: While on a walk round the city, Consul MacGregor
and his party became a target for stones thrown by two boys.^
In reporting this occurrance, one of the party declared that the
people all along the path of the journey were civil and quiet and
that the stones were thrown, "evidently to the annoyance of all the
Chinese present, some of whom I observed depriving the boys of the
stones.""'"''' Although no one was hurt,MacGregor's protest to Ch'i-
ying resulted in the severe punishment of members of the garrison
12
troops who failed to stop the boys from throwing stones.
The city of Canton and the factory area were in good order
after the reinforcement of garrison troops. Ch'i-ying reported to
the Emperor after the Agreement in April: "The buildings in the
foreign factories which are located at the outskirts of Canton city
are the residence and warehouse of the barbarian merchants. In
recent years, the vagabonds of the province (Kuang-tung) frequently
gathered together to molest the barbarians and gave them pretexts
13
to create troubles." He had transferred 600 soldiers from the
camps of Cha.O-ching JW (a district in Kuang-tung) to Canton
to strengthen its police patrol in order to suppress possible
14
hostilities of the Cantonese towards the British. However,
10. FO 17/131, encl. 2 in No.205, Davis to Palmerston, 27 November
1847.
11. Papers rel. to murder, "Extract of a letter from Captain
McDougall", p.17-18.
12. The punishment was given to twelve soldiers who received thirty
lashes each from some people for not stopping the boys' stone-
throwing, see FO 17/131, encl.2 in No.205, Davis to Palmerston,
27 November 1847.
13- IWSM, TK 78.9b.
14. IWSM, TK 78.4a.
Ch'i-ying did not pay much attention to the rural districts above
the city of Canton where bitter anti-foreign sentiment existed
among inhabitants. Some young British merchants, with the idea
that the Chinese who attacked them would receive severe punishment
from their own government, dared to make their excursions to these
districts.' Six of them unfortunately lost their lives in Huang-
15
chu-chi village on 5th December 1847.
Huang-chu-ch'i was one of the eleven villages in Huang-chu-
ch'i Fao (petty military station) which was located in the south¬
west of Nan-hai hsien of Kuang-tung. The village was about 3
17
miles above the factory area.
On the morning of 5th December 1847, six young clerks, John
Bellamy, Henry Balkwill, Patrick McCarte, William Brown, William
2 8
Rutter, Alexander Small of Blenkin, Rawson & Co., at Canton, hired
two native boatmen, Chow-A-pow and Hong A-much and proceeded several
miles up the city river in a Hong boat, intending to take a country
walk and shoot birds. After landing near the village of Huang-
Chu-Ch'i, the British asked the boatmen to wait for them in the boat.
The boatmen watched their employers passing through a stone archway
of- the village and never saw them again. The boatmen, while waiting
in their boat, heard the sound of gongs in the village, and presumed
15. Two of the six Englishmen -who got killed on 5th December had
joined a party to make an excursion to Huang-chu-ch'i village
on 8th August 1847.
16. Cheng Meng-yu, ed. Hsu-hsiu Nan-hai hsien-chih (Revised gazetteer-
of Nan-hai district") (l872), 4:17b.
17. IWSM, TK 79.12a-b.
18. Names of the six Englishmen may be found in Papers rel. to
murder, p.22.
19
that the villagers were pursuing the foreigners. The villagers
after discovering the boatmen had brought the foreigners to their
village, stoned them from shore. Later, they even tried to catch
the boatmen with two small boats. The two boatmen escaped to
another nearby shore and waited for their employers until day-break.
They eventually sailed back to Canton and reported the whole matter
to the comprador of that British company at noon time on 6th
December. Shortly, the British in Canton were told that the six
20
young British got killed in the village which they had entered.
The killing of the six Englishmen was a shock to Ch'i-ying.
He could not forget the British military action on 1st April.
Fearing that Davis would use the killing as a pretext to start another
21
war, Ch'i-ying immediately after the killing ordered occupation
22
of Huang-chu-ch'i village by banner troops. Ch'i-ying dispatched
the prefect of Canton to investigate the murder and seize the
culprits with the help of local gentry. He told Davis: "Should
19. Papers rel. to murder, "Boatman's evidence" (ll December 184?)» P
20. Papers rel. to murder, MacGregor to Davis, 7 December 1847, p.23.
21. IWSM, TK 78.27b.
22. It was not impossible that Davis would send troops to occupy the
offending villages, as he had warned Ch'i-ying in a note on 18th
August 1847 that if the Chinese authorities failed to punish the
aggressors of British subjects, the British authorities would
settle matters by themselves, see FO 682/1381, date TK 27/6/25
(5 August 1847). As a matter of fact, the British merchants at
Canton after the murder intended to proceed to the villages
to take retaliation, see FO 228/73, desp. 254, .MacGregor to
Davis, 7 December 1847. Since Ch'i-ying had showed his serious
concern in the investigation of the murder by sending banner
troops to occupy the village, Consul MacGregor therefore
disapproved the request of the merchants, see Pacers rel. to
murder, p.49-
they not submit, soldiers will instantly be appointed to surround
and apprehend them and not one individual shall escape. Thus the
national laws will be vindicated and the hearts of men will rejoice.
23
The honourable Envoy need not entertain any anxiety on this point."
Later, Ch'i-ying fearing that the prefect might not be able to
handle the case, further appointed the provincial judicial official
24
to help the investigation.
What had been happening in the Huang-chu-ch1i village on the
afternoon of 5th December? The British merchants at Canton
suspected that the six young British were not all killed at the
same time on 5th December. They thought that some of them were
able to run away and were taken and confined. They believed that
the confined persons were still alive even until 8th December.
These merchants blamed the Chinese troops saying that even when they
were despatched to the location of the killings in the evening of
7th December, they waited at some distance away from the village;
even on the morning of 8th December the troops did not enter the
village. The merchants thus insisted: "During this time the
unfortunate gentlemen must have been living and in the hands of the
country people, but the Chinese Government did nothing..." the
British merchants continued, "the Chinese Government, who can
hardly have failed to receive intelligence, even on Sunday night
(6th December) of the commencement of .the affray through their own
23. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 7 December 1847, p.24.
24. Papers rel. to murder, Kaying to Davis, 8 December 1847, p.25.
well-organized, police and on the Monday (7th December) must have
known of some of the foreigners being still alive, since they were
in correspondence with Her Majesty's Consul about their release,
could not or would not effectively interfere, their soldiers
25
remaining entirely supine at some distance from the spot."
On the other hand, Ch'i-ying after investigating the killing,
<
sent a note to Davis on 17th December, confirming that all the six
British were killed on 5th December, His statement reads: "Six
Englishmen went into the village of Hwang-chu-ke and on the villagers
shouting out to drive them away, they, the Englishmen, in the first
instance fired upon them, killing one of the people and wounding
another; whereupon the villagers, becoming on the spur of the moment
enraged, put the Englishmen to death." Ch'i-ying insisted that
the result of the killing "was a case of mutual fighting between the
two parties.
We cannot have a clear picture of the killing until reading
Ch'i-ying's special memorial to the Emperor. The killing started
when in the afternoon of 5th December, the six Englishmen (McCarte,
Rutter, Bellamy, Balkwill, Brown and Small) carrying pistols went
ashore from the Hong boat. They took a stroll and shot birds in
Huang-Chu-Gh'i village. The villagers fearing that their presence
and shooting would scare other people and cause an accident, went up
to stop their actions. But the Englishmen ignored them. A quarrel
thus started. Four villagers Leang A-lae (-lif\), Chin A-chin
25. Papers rel. to murder, British merchants to Palmerston, 20
December 1847, p.44.
-26. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.
( fit ft Hfl), Vang A-ling (± ft % ) and Le A-keen ( fiS. ) joined the
quarrel and turned it into an affray. Brown shot at Chin A-chin
with his pistol and killed him on the spot; Small wounded Le A-keen
to the ground with his pistol. At that moment Leang A-lae
together with Chin A-hae Le A-ying and Vang A-man
(Jfe"!') instructed other villagers to pursue the Englishmen. Le
A-gan ( ) first hurt Brown with his grain spear. Brown
finally succeeded in snatching the spear, Chin A-tae af
this foment speared Brown to the ground. Brown shouted at his
27
assailants. Le A-ying becoming on the spur of the moment
enraged landed a fatal chop on Brown's head. Vang A-ling
approached another English shooter, Small, but was struck by his
fists. Vang A-ling then hurt Small on the back with his spear.
While Small was pounding Vang A-ling with his fists, Ho A-shing
(® #) attacked Small's midriff in order to help Wang make an
escape. When Small turned to fight Ho, Wang A-ling drew his rice-
field knife to stop Small and killed him. At that moment, McCarte,
Rutter, Bellamy and Balkwill went all out to fight the assailants.
McCarte first got hurt on his head by Leang A-lae's rice-field
knife. When McCarte rocked and fell to the ground and berated
them, Leang A-lae becoming on the spur of the moment enraged, took
the spear from Chin A-tae (because the handle of Leang's rice-field
knife had fallen off) and speared McCarte to death. Chin A-hae now
hurt Rutter on his chest and legs with his spear. Rutter pounded
Chin with his fists, the latter dodged quickly and hurt Rutter on
his back. When Rutter succeeded in seizing the spear, Chin drew
27. Villagers underlined with red lines were those who killed
the young British.
his rice-field knife and chopped Rutter on his shoulder, Rutter
fell down and shouted at Chin, the latter got enraged, and Chin A-hae
gave the Englishman a chop on the head and killed him. Le A-ying
used his spear to hurt Bellamy on his back first and when Bellamy
turned around to strike Le he got another wound on the front of
his body, Bellamy then abused his assailant, Le A-ying became
infuriated, he dropped his spear and taking out a small knife
killed Bellamy. Wang A-man hurt Balkwill first on his body.
Balkwill beat Wang heavily but was badly hurt on his throat and
chest by Wang's spear. Balkwill fell down and berated Wang, the
latter Wang: A-man became enraged and landed fatal chops on his
forehead with his knife. At this time, a villager named Leang A-
urh ) passed by and caught sight of the murder. Leang A-lae
(who was supposed to be the leader of the assailants) fearing that
the local authorities would discover their murder of the Englishmen,
suggested throwing the corpses into the river in order to destroy
any trace of their crime. Leang A-lae consulted Leang A-urh on
how to manage this. The latter knew that the village river flowed
into the ocean. The corpses being thrown into the river would be
carried downstream and disappear. Leang A-urh then asked his
reliable villagers Ho A-teen ( ft S7 ), Leang A-e Chin
A-kurn (f$&f>/), Chin A-wan fs] ), Leang A-chi (-=$: iff- ^ ) and
Leang A-fung (>$:!§■ if.) to help in the cover-up. The group hired
an unacquainted Tanka boat to carry the corpses to the centre of
the river and drop them into the water. Afterwards, all the
members dispersed.^
28. ■ IWSM (Pu-wei), TK p.198-199.
There was no doubt that the six Englishmen were killed in
29
cold blood. But the case was not a sudden matter. After the
British had got the right to take excursions on shore along the
city river by virtue of the Agreement of 6th April, the natives of
towns and villages warned them by showing hostility to their
excursions. On 8th August, a party of eight young foreigners,
mostly British took a water tour along the river. When their boat
went Close to the Huang-chu-ch'i village, the villagers fired
blank shots from their native guns to warn the party not to go
• 30
ashore. Although Ch'i-ying took rapid action to punish the
aggressors, the hostility of the natives did not decrease. On
21st November, placards were spread to condemn the molesting
behaviour of the British in the interior along the river:
"They first commenced with fishing and fowling, but
in course of time they actually seized and stole
fruit, cut trees, wounded boys.with fire-arms,
insulted females and by getting intoxicated, they
acted as savages; in short there is no wickedness
but what they have been guilty of; they are there¬
fore in the highest degree detestable...
"The different townships had large commercial
marts having already organized Braves, if Chinese
traitors should still dare to guide the devils
into these towns, and thereby cause mischief, then
the towns in question must immediately sound their
gongs in order to spread the intelligence and the
adjoining towns must, on hearing the sounds,
likewise immediately sound their gongs, so that
29. The permission of the British entry to the city of Canton and
their success in setting up buildings in Honan District and
Hog Lane with the assistance of Ch'i-ying made the Cantonese
develop their phobia of territorial loss towards the British
encroachment. On the other hand, the natives in the rural
areas felt constrained by the presence of British in their
villages, see Papers rel. to murder, "Printed handbill
circulated and sold at Canton", p.41-42.
30. FO 682/1393, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/7/22 (l September 1847).
Cf. n.15 of this chapter.
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from far to near every one may know of their
presence. The Braves must at the same time
be led out; one half must be placed so as to
cut off their retreat, and the other half must
pursue them in order to kill them. The Braves
must not on any account rest until they have
completely destroyed the Chinese traitors and
devils." 31
This placard is very similar to those ferocious ones that
condemn^the misdeeds of the British after the San-yuan-li incident
in May 1841: the natives had decided to kill the intruding
foreigners and the traitors who brought them to their villages in
32
cooperation with members of neighbouring villages. The killing
in Huang-chu-ch'i village on 5th December occurred in this way.
When the two boatmen were waiting for the return of their British
employers to their boat, a kind-hearted old man near Huang-chu-
ch'i village, warned them to return home as soon as possible,
saying that the villagers would immediately seize them and kill
33
them if they stayed there. Shortly, other villagers after
realizing that the boatmen had brought the British to their village
stoned them from shore. Within a brief period another group of
villagers tried to catch them with two small boats, shouting:
1/ 34
This is the boat which brought the foreigners." The two boatmen
31. Papers rel. to murder, "A placard" (21 November 1847), p.51.
32. The murder to a certain degree was influenced by the San-yuan-
li incident. Ch'i-ying told the Emperor after the murder
that the common indignation felt by the people of Kuangtung
and their view of the British as foes, dated from the serious
outrage to which San-yuan-li was subjected, see IWSM, TK 79.12a-b,
33. See FO 17/132, encl.l, in No.220 of 1847, Davis to Palmerston,
29 December 1847.
34. Papers rel. to murder, "Boatman's evidence" (ll December 1347).
p. 43.
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could only escape by a hairs breadth. On the shore the villagers
who pursued and killed the British were from different villages.
The six culprits who hacked or speared the British to death got
capital punishment (four of them were beheaded on 21st December).
Among these condemned convicts, only three of them (Leang A-lae,
Chin A-hae and Wang A-ling were villagers of Huang-chu-ch'i.
The other three were Le A-gan,(H)wang A-man, from Hang-keaou ()
7C
village; Le A-ying, from Keaou-peaou (','•% ) village.
Ch'i-ying's prompt reaction and harsh punishment of the
Chinese culprits however seemed too mild to Davis. The British
plenipotentiary demanded that all the culprits of the killing
should be executed at Huang-chu-ch'i village. At the same time,
he insisted that the villages of Huang-chu-ch'.i, Hang-Keaou, (Ceaou-peaou
be razed to the ground, saying, "I have abundance of force to act
as a guard, and prevent disturbance at the execution, if you so
*Z/T
please." When he realized that the culprits were not executed
nine days after the killing, Davis threatened Ch'i-ying with
possible British military action. He subtly warned his opponent
on 14th December: "I have one steamer already arrived, and can
assist your Excellency immediately with 400 men to support your
authority. It is plain to me that you are unable to act, and
37
hence the delay in executing the guilty." The next day, Davis
35. FO 682/1411, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/ll/l3 (20 December
. 1847). Huang-chu-ch'i, Hang-keaou, Keaou-peaou were neigh¬
bouring villages.
36. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 12 December 1847, p.27.
37. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 14 December 1847> p.30.
sent another note to Ch'i-ying, threatening; "It is time that I
should, now fix a limit beyond which I cannot communicate on this
subject with your Excellency. I have therefore to state
explicitly, that unless the murderers are executed at Hwang-chu-
ke in the presence of my deputed officers before the 22nd instant,
I must cease our correspondence and inform my Government that proper
redress cannot be obtained."
Ch'i-ying replied to Davis with great statesmanship: he
accepted the less important demands but turned down the harmful
ones as far as sovereignty was concerned with convincing argument.
As for the execution of the culprits, Ch'i-ying did not oppose the
idea of carrying out the execution in Huang-chu-ch'i village, but
he only agreed to execute the four principal culprits. His
argument was "a life for a life" stating that: "In the present case
the Englishmen have wounded two Chinese with fire-arms, one of
whom has already died, and it is uncertain whether the other will
live or die; while the Chinese beat six Englishmen to death....
four of them (the culprits) have been convicted as principals in
the murders and it is proper that these be forthwith severely dealt
39
with, their punishment being increased in degree."
Ch'i-ying refused to destroy the villages of Huang-chu-ch'i,
Hang-keaou, Keaou-peaou. He told Davis: "As in every debt there
38. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 15 December 1847, p.32.
39. Papers rel. to siurder, Keying to Davis, 16 December 1847,p.32.
In another note to Davis, Ch'i-ying argued that the British who
killed Chinese subjects never forfeited a life for a life, adding
that the death punishment to the four murderers was serious
enough to cover the death of the six Englishmen, see FO 682/1409,
date TK 27/ll/l0 (l7 December 1847).
is a debtor, so in all wrongs there are chief culprits. Nov?,
the number of people in the village in question is great and if a
whole village is destroyed, without distinction of good and bad,
on account of a case of people being beaten to death, how could
the azure heaven above which witnesses it possibly endure such an
40
excessive implication of the innocent?"
The fact of not executing all the culprits before 22nd December
was a most serious matter to Ch'i-ying. If he was not able to give
convincing reasons to Davis, the latter would take action to settle
the case of the murder at his own will: military action was the
most likely way. Ch'i-ying told Davis that according to Chinese
law, the execution of convicts sentenced to death had to await
approval of the Board of Punishment at Peking; there was no clause
directing immediate execution. However, Ch'i-ying agreed to
carry out immediate execution of the four principal culprits as a
41
specially severe punishment, adding that: "the remainder of the
criminals will either be sentenced to decapitation, strangulation,
military slavery or transportation for life, in every case awaiting
42
the confirmation of the Criminal Board."
Fearing that Davis was not satisfied with his answer, Ch'i-ying
sent another note to the British plenipotentiary, saying that he
had paid great attention to the safety of the foreigners after the
40. Papers rel■ to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.
41. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/ll/l0 (17 December 1847).
42. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.
Agreement on 6th April by increasing the military forces to suppres
the hostilities of the Chinese in the factory area. It was only
that the six British did not notify the Chinese authorities of
their excursion and entered the rural districts (above the city of
Canton) by themselves. In this case, the Chinese officers were
43
not able to save their lives in time.
<
Davis accepted the argument of Ch'i-ying. He gave up the
demand for the destruction of the three villages, but insisted on
the immediate execution of the four principal culprits in Huang-
chu-ch'i village as a matter of "example for the future." Davis
had lost much ground already, and he now warned his counter-part:
"If your Excellency will not make the example at the place where
44
the crime was committed, our present negotiation ought to stop.
The execution took place on 21st December in the front of the
Hall of Ancestors of Huang-chu-ch'i village. One hundred Chinese
soldiers were drawn up along two sides of the Hall. A.R. Johnston
was sent by Davis to attend the execution with other British civil
and military officers and a guard of thirty-three soldiers from a
British regiment. In his report to Davis after the execution,
Johnston especially mentioned that the culprits were "all stout men
45
in rude health, having the appearance of able-bodied countrymen."
This may wrell have served as confirmation to Davis that these were
43. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/ll/l0 (17 December
1847).
44. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 18 December 1847, p.36
45. Papers rel. to murder, Mr. Johnston to Davis, 21 December 1347
P.37.
the real culprits. For he had feared that criminals might be
4-6
substituted.
One thing is worth mentioning in Ch'i-ying's management of the
Huang-chu-ch'i incident. It concerns the number of culprits for
execution. As we have noted above, six culprits took part in
killing the Englishmen. On the Chinese side, one villager was
killed and another was seriously wounded during the course of the
murder. The Chinese code for homicide was based on a life for a
life. When Lin Wei-hsi was murdered on 12 July 1840, Commissioner
Lin reiterated the Chinese principle: "He who kills a man must pay
the penalty of life." Ch'i-ying at first agreed to pass a death
sentence on four culprits so that the number of the Chinese culprits
could cover the death of six Englishmen. The sentences of the
other two murdered culprits were not mentioned. However, Davis
insisted on the execution of all culprits. In his note to Davis
on 17th December, Ch'i-ying told his counter-part that he managed
the execution of the culprits according to the rate of forfeiture
of "a life for a life", adding that Englishmen of recent years had
killed Chinese not merely on one or two occasions, but that they
47
had not forfeited a life. It is understandable that Ch'i-ying
would feel that the demand of Davis was unfair. In 1840 Elliot
46. Davis's suspicion was not groundless. The corrupted district
magistrates in Kuang-tung always accepted bribery from
criminals to find other people to bear crimes for them, so
that the latter were able to get away scotch free. When Davis
expressed a suspicion that the culprits in the killirg might
be substituted, Ch'i-ying argued that all the culprits were
apprehended in the offending village, saying that "it would
be impossible to close people's eyes and ears to the facts."
See Papers rel. to murder, p.35.
.47. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/ll/lO (l7 December
1847).
did not surrender the murderer of Lin Wei-hsi. When three
Cantonese were shot dead by British merchants in their attack on
the factory in July 1846, instead of giving up the British killers,
Davis demanded enforced protection from Ch'i-ying of the British
community. However, Ch'i-ying eventually confirmed the death
sentence of the other two culprits. Davis was able to see
Ch'i-ying's unwillingness to agree to the extra punishment. In
his reply to Ch'i-ying's note of 17th December, he warned Ch'i-
ying of what he had written to him: "the remainder of the
criminals will either be sentenced to decapitation, strangulation,
military slavery or transportation for life, in each case awaiting
48
the confirmation of the Criminal Board."
Davis did not allow Ch'i-ying to dodge the issue of executing
the other culprits. When he did not hear any report of the
execution, in late January 1848 he cautioned Ch'i-ying in one of
his notes:
"As regards the late murders at Hwang-chu-ke,
the principal thing now is the punishment of
the eleven criminals. My Government will
consider this as the proof of sincerity on the
part of your Excellency. I have already
repeatedly declared that if punishment is not
rigorously and publicly carried out against
these criminals, peace and friendship cannot
continue; and therefore I shall not be answer¬
able for the results. More than a month has now
elapsed, and I daily wait to hear the sentences
reconfirmed. This point can never rest until
they have been punished." 49
48. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 18 December 1847, p.36.
49. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 24 January 1848, p.75.
When Hsu Kuang-chin replaced Ch1i-ying as Imperial
Commissioner and Governor-general of Liang-Kuang in late February
1848, Davis pressed him to settle the punishment of the remaining
eleven culprits. Even on the eve of his retirement as British
plenipotentiary, Davis told Ch'i-ying that he wanted the remaining
Questionof the Huang-chu-ch1 i killing to be ironed out before his
50
departure. The Board of Punishment in early March confirmed the
punishment of the eleven culprits (two more Chinese culprits were
sentenced to death). Only on this condition did Davis agree that
the case was well settled.
Ch'i-ying's management of the killing had completely lost him
the hearts of the people of Kuangtung. A characteristic martyr
according to the people of Kuang-tung was a hard fighter who not
only resisted the local rebels but also the foreign invaders.
The local gazetteers abound with examples of those martyrs'
51
participation in the campaigns against the foreign encroachment.
In 1840 Commissioner Lin offered awards for the killing of British
military personnel and they were honoured to defend their country.
When the British seamen killed a villager, Lin stopped provisions
to the British and expelled them from Macao to force the surrender
of the British culprit. Nov? the Manchu Imperial Commissioner did
every thing in direct contrast. Once they had a patriotic
commissioner, now they had a traitorous one.
50. FO 682/1428, Davis to Keying, date TK 28/1/22 (26 February
1848).
51. Examples may be found in NHHC, 14:35a-3bb; T-.F. Liang, ed.
P'an-yu hsien-hsu-chih (Revised gazetteer of P'an-yu district),
19:16—19b.
The ancestor-worshipping villagers fought bravely against
the British soldiers with their inferior weapons when those
soldiers molested their ancestral halls during the San-yuan-li
incident. They would never forgive the crime of Ch'i-ying,
sending banner troops to their village to close their Ancestral
Halls to force the surrender of the "defenders" of their villages
who killed the Englishmen. During the course of the interrogation,
the culprits endured much torture before speaking of the true
facts.
The villagers of Huang-chu-ch'i showed their uncooperative
manner in Ch'i-ying's investigation of the killing. Ch'i-ying
memorialized to the Emperor saying that in the course of the
investigation, "most of the village escaped from the investigators,
except a few who were old and weak. When they were questioned
about the killing, they replied that there was no fighting or
killing between the villagers and the foreigners, adding that they
53
did not even see any foreigner go ashore for a stroll."
Eventually, Ch'i-ying arrested some suspects. Although they
admitted that the killing happened under their eyes, they still
were not willing to say exactly who else had taken part in killing
54
the British.
The villagers could not pardon Ch'i-ying for permitting the
52. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 16 December 1847,
p. 32.
53. IWSM, TK 78.27a.
54. IWSM, TK 78.29a.
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British officers and their troops to attend the execution
of their countrymen on 21st December. In 1840 the patrio¬
tic Commissioner Lin invited foreigners to watch the des¬
truction of opium at the harbour of the Bogue. This time
the Ch'i-ying allowed their arch enemies to witness the
execution.
55
The whole execution was performed in silence.
The villagers did not draw near but watched the decapi-
56 c
trtion from a distance. Although no accident occurred
during the execution, the anger of villagers near Kuang-
tung soon developed into a full scale anti-foreign
movement after the departure of Ch'i-ying in late February
1848.
When Ch'i-ying and Davis argued with heat on the
number of culprits for execution, the latter shocked the
former in one of his despatches by saying: "The wrong
committed by the Imperial Commissioner Lin was not greater
than the present. You either cannot or will not protect
the lives of British subjects by proper control over the
country-people. It is now time for the British Govern¬
ment to require not only satisfaction for the past, but
55. Papers rel. to murder, Mr. Johnston to ^avis, 21
.December 1847, p.37*
56. Ibid.
security for the future. Proper security must be given that my
countrymen will not be maltreated and murdered by the Chinese of
57
this province, in violation of the First Article of the Treaty."
Fearing that further attacks on the British subjects by the
villagers would result in serious retribution, Ch'i-ying told Davis
that he had gathered the most prestigious members of the gentry
class at the Ta FO Ssu (Great Buddha Temple) to draft a
proclamation, warning the people that they would suffer the same
fate as the culprits in the Huang-chu-ch'i murder if foreigners
58
were further molested. At about the same time he instructed those
gentry to send a suggestion to Davis offering the idea of getting
Chinese gentry and literati and British merchants together for a
meeting so as to establish a compact of Peace with the gentry and
literati admonishing the elders of the villages to order their sons
and brethren not to molest the British parties in their country
walks. If the lawless infringed these prohibitions, the elders
of the villages should tie them up and deliver them to the yamen.
On the other hand, the British plenipotentiary should instruct his
59
countrymen not to commit irregularities in the villages. The
suggestion, however was rejected by Davis on the grounds that the
gentry members and the British plenipotentiary were not of equal
official status; the gentry were also not entitled to correspond
57. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 December 1847, p.33'
58. YPCC, 6:86-87. Later three of the province's highest officials
personally visited the major towns of Nan-hai and P'an-yu to
warn the inhabitants in the same tone, see FO 228/73. desp.
207, MacGregor to Davis, 27 December 1847.
59. See the enclosed copy called "a proclamation issued by all
gentry in Kwangtung" in FO 682/141.4, date TK 27/ll/ll (l8
December 1847).
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with the British consul at Canton. Later, Davis insisted that
Ch'i-ying inflict serious punishment on those who were offensive
to the British, adding that by so doing hostilities would be
thwarted.^ It is important to find out the reason why Davis still
insisted that Ch'i-ying suppress the people of Kuangtuang. In
one of his notes to Ch'i-ying before the execution of the four
Huang-chu-ch'i killing, Davis reprimanded Ch'i-ying's Pharisaism:
"Your Excellency, in addressing your Emperor, appears to have
stated as follows: 'Should the foreigners chance to have any object
in view, such as the renting of lands, the erection of buildings,
or the like trifles, the Canton people collect a mob, and interfere
with them by making a disturbance. The local authorities, holding
the people to be foremost in consideration, think it inexpedient to
thwart their inclinations seriously, or to show a devious compliance
with the requests of the foreigners.' This indeed is the real
truth and being contrary to the Treaty, it is the whole cause of
the constant troubles at Canton, while at the other ports there is
perpetual quiet.
As the murder in Huang-chu-ch'i had already demonstrated that
harsh punishment was not able to halt the hostilities of the
people, poor Ch'i-ying was not able to impress his British counter-
60. FO 682/1414, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/ll/26 (2 January
1848).
61. FO 682/1417, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/12/5 (lO January
1848).
62. .Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, p. 36.
part with his difficulties. In order to avoid further affray
between the people and the British he suggested that whenever the
British took their excursion to the villages, the magistrates of
Nan-hai and P'an-yu should each send ten experienced cadres to
63
look after the excursionists. His suggestion was deeply
appreciated by Davis. However one man's meat is another man's
poison. The people of Kuang-tung could never bear the annoyance
<
of a small group of British coming to their territory with twenty
yamen cadres.
Y/hen the Emperor first heard of the killing in Huang-chu-ch'i
village, he basically agreed with Ch'i-ying's policy that the
aggressors should be punished in order to avoid a possible British
attack on Chinese territory. But he instructed Ch'i-ying that
affrays between the people and the barbarians must be fairly
64
handled so as not to lose the loyalty of the people. However,
when the Emperor learned of the execution of 21st December, he was
angry with Ch'i-ying's harsh punishment, saying that his practice
would lose the people's loyalty. The Emperor also blamed the
presence of the British in the rural areas. He angrily told his
grand councillors: "The barbarians rambled through Chinese
territory at their will. If the barbarian chief had disciplined
his countrymen and restricted their roaming, how could the affray
(Huang-chu-ch'i incident) have happened? As the people and the
barbarians (in Canton) are mixed together, further conflicts are
63. FO 682/1419, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/12/8 (l3 January 1848).
64. IYJSM, TK 78.28a-b.
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bound to happen. The said Governor-general (Ch'i-ying) should
explain this matter to the barbarian chief and instruct him to
restrict his people: except for trading purposes the barbarians
6b
are not allowed to enter inhabited farms and dwellings."
Ch'i-ying was able to sense the dissatisfaction of his Emperor
with his conciliation policy. Huang En-t'ung, his dexterous hand, in
the foreign affairs had been degraded in January 1847. Huang's
degradation could be treated as a warning to Ch'i-ying as far as
his conciliation policy is concerned. Hsu Kuang-chin was ordered
to take over the post of governor from Huang. On 7th March 1847,
the Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying to appraise the ability of Hsu in
the management of the foreign affairs. Ch'i-ying by that time
could feel that the Emperor was seeking a suitable person to take
over his job. After the signing of Agreement on 6th April 1847, he
had first planned his retirement. Especially after the
Huang-chu-ch'i incident, the people of Kuangtung, the British plenipotentiary
and the Emperor, all disagreed with his management of foreign
affairs. In his misery, Ch'i-ying once again expressed his eager¬
ness to leave Canton on grounds of old age and infirmity. In a
memorial to the Emperor, he wrote that the troublesome foreign
affairs had already damaged his health in the past years. He
added: "Since last year (1846) my hair and beard has turned white
because of the burdensome management of the barbarian affairs.
The deterioration of my hepatitis caused the exhaustion of my mental
65. IWSK, TK 79.5a.
66. The reason of Huang's degradation was that he strongly disagreed
with the idea that "the ardour of the people" was^strong enough
to resist the British barbarians, an idea much favoured by the
members of War Party especially after the Liu Hsin incident in
January 1846. At the beginning of 1847, he was degraded to sixth
grade, see Wang Chih-chu'an, Kuo-ch'ao .iou-yuan chi (Record of
the ruling dynasty's graciousness to strangers), 12:10.
67. See chapter IX.
capabilities. At first it started with blurred vision, but
recently it has resulted in my eyes streaming with tears. At the
beginning, dizziness occurred, but now vertigo (giddiness) falls
upon me suddenly. Although I always take medicine to release the
pain and exert myself in my work, my vigour has decreased and my
weariness has become obvious. It is in fact very difficult for
me to continue my present jobs."^ On the other hand, Ch'i-ying
highly praised the ability of Hsu Kuang-chin' in the foreign affairs,
saying that the latter was getting on well with foreign affairs.
Ch'i-ying remarked that Hsu's taking part in investigating the
69
Huang-chu-ch'i killing evinced his extraordinary ability.
Ch'i-ying specially suggested that Huang En-t'ung should
continue assisting with foreign affairs. He told the Emperor that
Huang was an indispensable figure, saying; "When he was in the post
of the governor of Kuang-tung, I felt easy to leave for Kuangsi to
inspect the drilling of the recruited troops there. (After the
sudden and slashing assault of the British troops in April 1847) ...
Hostilities exist between the people and the barbarians and frontier
crises were twice bound to happen. But under the skilful and
scrupulous management of that official, the crises were thwarted.
In another memorial to the Emperor, Ch'i-ying once again praised
Huang: "The said official has been helping your slave in handling
the barbarian affairs for years. He. knows very well the nature of
the barbarians and has developed great knowledge in getting the
68. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, jti> 298a-b.
69. Ibid.
barbarians under his control. Besides, he had been in charge of
financial and judicial administration for a long period and had
been in the post of governorship. With such experience, he knows
every inch of provincial affairs. Although he was deprived of his
previous posts because of misdeeds, he has been acting as my adroit
helper."^
In late February, Ch'i-ying received an imperial edict,
permitting his transfer to the captial. In early march Ch'i-ying left
Canton for Peking. The change of imperial commissionership was a
great joy to the people of Kuang-tung. The shameless capitulationist
was down, then came the faithful follower of their respected
Commissioner Lin; Hsu -Chm.
To the old Manchu clansman, Ch'i-ying's office in Canton since
April 1844, had been a nightmare. In one sense, his resignation was
no better than Richard Nixon's in 1973 when the latter became
unpopular with his people. Ch'i-ying once was so confident that only
71
he was well-qualified to manage the post-war foreign affairs, but
now he left amidst the condemnation of the Cantonese and the British
plenipotentiary, and even his childhood playmate - the Tao-kuang Emperor.
70.
71.
Shih-liao hsun-k'an. 35, ti. 302b.
See Chapter VII. '
CONCLUSION
Success or Failure
We may ask, how anti-British was Ilsii when he succeeded Ch'i-yung
as acting imperial commissioner to take charge of the foreign affairs
in March 1848?
Judging from his memorials to the Emperor, Hsu did not appear to
have a homicidal hatred towards the British as the c ensors in Peking
shared; nor did he indiscriminately support the anti-foreign feeling
after he took up the governership of Kuang-tung in 1846. In the
Huang-chu-ch'i killing, Hsu agreed with Ch'i-ying's idea that only an
immediate punishment of the four culprits could have forestalled a
British attack on the city of Canton.''" In this matter, he won praise
from Ch'i-ying and earned his recommendation to succeed him as the
2
governor-general and imperial commissioner.
However, the Emperor after the Huang-chu-ch'i killing had decided
to go along with the feelings of the people to take action against the
overhearing manner of the British. When appointing IIsu Kuang-chin
and Yeh Ming-ch'en ( % as acting governor-general and governor
respectively, he issued an edict to impress the grand councillors:
"The most important matter is to appease the people's emotions. If
the 'ardour of people' is not lost, then the foreign barbarians can
be handled."^
1. IWSM. TK 78.30a-31b.
2. Shih-liao hsun-kan. 35, ti. 2y8a-b.
3. IWSM, TK 78.36a.
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On the other hand, Hsu was able to see the miserable result of
Huang En-t'ung, who once criticized the "anti-foreignism" of the
people. The Emperor reminded him of the remorse of Huang in the
same edict:
"Hereafter if Hung En-t'ung exerts himself
.energetically and shows perfect sincerity, the
said governor-general (Hsu) will naturally be
able to surmise his remorse, and relying on the
facts, recommend him in a memorial and await our
granting of favour. If he does not know how to
be diligent and relied on words to shirk respons¬
ibility, other cannot help but be aware of it.
In that event, let him be memorialized for
impeachment. (T4e) shall have to see whether or
not Huang En-t'ung is capable of meeting this
serious punishment. TrembleI" 4
However, Hsu had stayed long enough in Canton. He observed the
British pushing their warships and soldiers into the inland river of
Canton when their entry to the city was denied; their demands on
n l, "
punishing Chinese attackers were ignored. These two issuesAannoyed Cno-ymg
a.ncL Hsu. In his first meeting with Sir George Bonham, who
succeeded Sir Davis as British Plenipotentary in March 1848, Hsu made
a statement which did not offend both the British authority and his
government. He declared that he was determined to abide by the
provisions of the treaties and to make "no distinction between the
central and outside people, so long as the foreigners were properly
restrained."*' Bonham did not find his statement evasive, as Hsu at
that time was still acting a,S governor-general,
Hsu was made governor-general on 4th July. Three days later
Bonham wrote to Hsu suggesting preliminary arrangements should be made
4. IWSM. TK 78.56b.
5. See Costin, Great Britain and China, 1853-1860 (Oxford University
Press, 1937), p.135.
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to give effect to the Ch'i-ying-Davis Agreement that allowed the
British entry to Canton in 1849. It came the time Hsu had to show
his standing on this aspect. Later in the same month, he picked
brains in this matter from his friend, Lin Tse-hsu. The latter
replied him with a terse suggestion: Yueh-min k'o yung '?] (lit.
the people of Kuang-tung are reliable), adding that they were the
only available forces to cope with the aggressive barbarians.^
Hsu accepted Lin's suggestion and adopted a.bold stance toward
the British entry.
Hsu first memorialized the Emperor in November that"the temper
of the Cantonese is stubborn," adding that "to prevent the British
entering the city might not precipitate war, but indiscreetly to
consent to their demand would certainly give rise to immediate
7
hostilities from the people." On 17th February 1849 a meeting
between Bonham and Hsu took place aboard the HMS Hastings. When
Bonham reminded Hsu of the British entry, the latter replied that
in view of the strong opposition of the Cantonese, the Chinese
authorities could not act against the will of the people.
After the meeting Hsu once more reminded the Emperor that public
opinion in Canton had been highly emotive in 1847 when Ch'i-ying
agreed to open the city two years later, and that if the British were
ever permitted to enter, the city the problem would be much more
8
serious.
6. Chen, "Lin Tse-hsu ti i-sheng". p.25; Ch'iang, Chin-tai chung-kuo
wai-chiao-shih tzu-liao chi-yao, I. p.163.
7. IWSM. TK 79.24a. See also 79.43b.
8. IWSM. TK 79.38a.
Hsu decided to strengthen the militia to cope with the British
entry. Soon after his meeting with Bonham, he ordered Hsu Hsiang-
kuang ( Tf iu), a prestigious gentry, to re-activate the local
militia of the surrounding countryside. At about the same time, he
instructed another gentry, Liang T'ing-nan -£5. tfy) to supervise the
militia within the city. In late March about 100,000 militia-men were
g
organized as an armed force in and out the city. Other gentry had
contributed the enormous sum of 440,000 taels to the militia to help
in the defence of the city. Canton merchants were ordered to stop
trade with the British.
Evidence shows that the Canton authorities had offered the militia¬
men arms to strengthen their forces. A foreigner in Canton wrote in
26th March that "the people have begun to ... parade the streets at
night in uniform, and armed with spears, match-locks and muskets.""^
Such weapons as match-locks and muskets were only available to the
regular Chinese Soldiers. As we can observe the weapons which the
people used in the incidents of San-yuan-li and Huang-chu-chi were
unsophisticated - merely cudgels, clubs, field-knives and spears.
Hide
Confident by the reinforcement of the militia Hsu on 1st April
(falsely) told Bonham-that he had been forbidden by the throne to
open the city to the British, adding that the government could not
ignore the spontaneous and unanimous opinion of the people of Canton in
order to comply with the wishes of "men from afar."^
9. YPCC. 6:96.
10. F.W. Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams,
LL.D. (Hew York, 1889), p.169.
11. F0682/1537, Seu (Hsu) to Bonham, date TK 29/3/9 (l April 1849).
For a detailed review of his episode, see John J. Holde, "The 'False
Edict* of 1849/' Journal of Asian Studies. 20:299-315.
What frightened Bonham were the large body of militia, and the
inflammatory placards carried by the people threatening to attack the
British if they entered the city. Besides, he feared that the entry
would jeopardize the prosperous British trade. Thus, he informed Hsu
on 9th April that "the entry rests where it was and must remain in
abeyance.""^
When the jubilant Hsu and Yeh reported to the Emperor that the
British plenipotentary had agreed to give up the entry to Canton, the
Emperor rewarded Hsu with the title of viscount and Yeh with that of
baron. At the same time, Hsu Hsiang-kuang and Liang T'ing-nan were
13also awarded, upon the recommendation of the Governor-general.
The "victory" in Canton received applause from all parts of the
country. It is worth mentioning that Tseng Kuo-fan (H ©!&■), the
later Taiping rebel suppressor gave his comment on this aspect shortly
after the "victory". Tseng was serving as junior vice-president of
the Board of Rites in Peking at that time. He wrote in one of his
family letters: "... the English barbarians reclaimed their entry to
the city of Canton. Viceroy Hsu handled this matter with dexterity,
that the barbarians agreed to give up their entry. From now on, the
crisis caused by the foreign devils can be halted. The Emperor is
very much delighted." ^ The local gentry and the Cantonese too were
grateful to Hsu and Yeh for mobilizing the popular action of
resistance, and spiritually regenerating the province. They decided
12. FO682/1539» Bonham to Seu, date TK 19/3/17 (9 April 1849).
13. IWSM. TK 80.15b.
14. Quoted from Tseng-wen-cheng kung ch'uan-chi (The complete work of
Tseng-Wen-Cheng Kung).
to erect monuments of the two heroes.
There appearecito be a great difference between the policy of
suppressing the people to appease the barbarians and that of
mobilizing the people to resist the barbarians. Ch'i-ying tried his
best to appease the British but they still,rocked the city with their
warships and marines. He himself was repudiated by the people and the
imperial trust upon him had been removed. On the contrary, by showing
a bold stance to the British, Hsu was able to make the British put aside
their entry, and was applauded by the Emperor and the people.
After the "victory" Hsu reminded the Emperor that "the people are
15
the foundation of the state." The Emperor did see eye to eye with
him in this respect. He honoured the people of Canton with votive
tablets inscribed: "The people's will is as strong as a walled city."^"
The "victory" in 1849 heralded the resurrection of Lin Tse-hsu
and the downfall of Chi-ying in 1850. The Tao-kuang Emperor stayed in
his throne only several months more after the "victory." He died on
25th February, 1850 and was succeeded by his fourth son, the Hsien-feng
Emperor (1850-1860). The new emperor held a different point of view
on foreign affairs from his father. The Tao-kuang Emperor had
experienced the Chinese defeat in the Opium War. He realized the
military strength of China was no match to that of Britain. In the
post-war period, he supported Ch'i-ying's conciliatory policy during the
latter's tenure of Office in Canton and continued his personal favour
to him until his death. On the other hand, the new emperor was young
and arrogant. He appeared to have been definitely hostile to
15. IWSM. TK 79.44a.
-16. IWSM. TK 80.14b.
foreigners. His view on foreign affairs was vindictive and chauvinistic.
After the "victory" in 1849, he was confident that the strong and
uncompromising policy which Lin and Hsu had been implementing was
■j in
suitable in conducting foreign affairs. He acquiesced the provocative
anti-foreign feeling of the War-Party at the court.
In early 1850 a xenophobic official suggested to the new emperor
that Lin Tse-hs'u be summoned to serve in the capital as a warning to
the British: "The management of the barbarian affairs at Canton were
begun by Lin and concluded by Hsu; both were most feared and respected
17
by the British." The Emperor agreed with his opinion. He summoned
18
Lin to await an appointment in Peking. However, Lin had been in bad
health since the summer of 1849. He was not able to answer the
imperial summons.
In mid-1850 the Taiping rebels were so active that officials cried
19out for attention to the chaos in Kuang-si. The court reacted with
alarm. The Emperor ordered the Kuang-si officials get hold of the
20
local militia to face the Taiping challenge.
17. See Hsu,- Rise, p.251-252.
18. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-ta chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, I, p. 162.
19. Dr. Charles A. Curwen has a terse explanation for the outbreak of
the Taiping Rebellion: "The opium War and the intrusion of
imperialism exacerbated the strain on the state, damaged the
prestige of the dynasty and made deeper and more complex the crisis
of the economy. The most immediate influence of the West was felt
in the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Ho other region
of China had. quite the same coincidence of favourable circumstances
with combustible material: distance from the capital (often
resulting in administrative vacuums), increasing land concentration
(therefore increasing tenancy), economic and social troubles
connected with the disruption of trade after the Opium War and, in
addition, famine, flood and plague, from which Kwangsi in particular
was rarely free. There was moreover, in this region, a long tradition
of anti-Manchu sentiment." See C.A. Curwen, Taj-ping Rebel, the
Deposit-on of Li Hsiu-ch'eng (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.2.
20. Ta-ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Veritable records of successive reigns
of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Mukden, 1937), Hsien-feng. 12*.5b.
In Canton Hsu was exhausted in dealing with foreign and domestic
affairs. It is natural that Hsu was eager to have his old
friend, Lin, to join him in the South, so that he could consult the
latter in both the foreign affairs and the Taiping campaign. What
Hsu planned in this respect was subtle and tactful. He first impeached
the Governor of Kuang-si, Cheng Tsu-ch'en as "weak and
21
incompetent" in fighting against the Taiping rebels. He then
implored the Emperor to appoint an able official to replace his post.
The Emperor this time appointed Lin as Imperial Commissioner and
acting governor of Kuang-si to take charge of the suppression of the
Taiping rebels in October 1850.
On the other hand, the downfall of Ch'i-ying was due to the Hsien-
feng Emperor's discontent with. of his policy of conciliation and the
result of the British complaint after the "victory".
It had become customary for a new emperor to seek advice from
high-ranking officials. One suggestion came from Ch'ir-ying, who in March
I 8 5> O advised the young Emperor to discard men of little ability, even
though they were known as "models of high conduct" (chun-tzu % -f ) and
to appoint men of talent, even though others called them "inferior men"
(hsiao-jen 'Jv/n). Ch'i-ying,being a wily diplomat, meant that although
Some war advocates were regarded as "models of high conduct", they were
not suitable to conduct foreign affairs. Instead, officials of
conciliatory policy whom others condemned as "inferior men" should be
appointed. Ch'i-ying's saying was similar to Teng Hsiao-ping's:
"No matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, the one that can
21. Hummel, Emine1".! Chinese. I, p.520.
catch mice is a good cat." But to the fanatic Red Guards during the C*(tura.(
Revolution, Teng's saying was regarded as anti-revolutionist poppycock.
The xenophobic new Emperor of course did not like Ch'i-ying's saying.
He waited for chances to dismiss the "ridiculous capitulationist."
After Hsu had rejected the British entry to the city, Bonham
warned him in a correspondence on 9th April: "I can but repeat my
regret at the unsatisfactory report (Hsu's), which this evasion of the
22
Treaty will compel me to make to my own Government."
In London, Lord Palmerston did not take the refusal of the British
entry lightly, and especially when he received a Chinese document from
tnieK-tlcn o~f AAe.
Bonham concerning the„people of Kuang-tung to honour Hsu
and Yeh, he expressed: "If that document is to be considered as
expressing in any degree the sentiments of the Chinese Government or of
the great officials at Canton, Her Majesty's Government would despair
of being able to continue to maintain relations of peace between Great
23
Britain and China.".
He instructed Bonham to send separate protest notes to Hsu, and
the Peking government. Bonham could not send the protest to the
Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs as there was no such designated
officer in Peking. In May he however succeeded to forward the notes
addressed to Ch'i-ying and Mu-chang-a via the Governor-general at Hanking,
Lu Ch'ieh-ying ( Ik). The Emperor's anger on receiving the British
protest was directed at the two officials. He angrily told the grand
councillors that only the appointed imperial commissioner was entitled
22. F017/l54» Bonham to Hsu, Inci. 4» 9 April 1849.
23. PO17/152, Palmerston to Bonham, 18 August 1849.
to deal with foreign affairs. As Mu-chang-a and Ch'i-ying were no
longer imperial commissioners, how could they have sayings in foreign
matters.^
&I6
The laws ofjianchu government stipulated that Jen-ch'en wu szu-chiao
A ft ft, X. (lit. common officials are excluded from foreign affairs.)
The government officials outside the court of Peking who were allowed
to deal with foreign affairs were designated as the imperial
commissioners of ch1 in-ch'ai ). Theoretically speaking, Hsu was
the only imperial commissioner for foreign affairs at that time. All
the British correspondence therefore was to have been addressed to him.
The British protest seem to have resulted in the discharge of Mu-
chang-a and the degradation of Ch'i-ying. On 30th November Ch'i-ying
was denounced by the Emperor for having oppressed the people to please
foreigners and for having exaggerated to the throne the power of the
British. In the same edict Mu-chang-a was condemned for making false
reports to the Tao-kuang Emperor and for suppressing Lin Tse-hsu
and other patriots.
Ch'i-ying's official humiliation followed in June 1858 when the
British and French allies forced their way from Tientsin to Peking as
the result of the initial Arrow incident and the killing of the French
missionary, Father Chapedelaine in 1856. Ch'i-ying was sent to
Tientsin to negotiate with the allies. However, both the British and
French plenipotentiaries refused to meet him because they had
discovered from one of Ch'i-ying's memorials in 1844 that his friendly
gesture to Sir Henry Pottinger was only an ostentatious manner.
24. IW5M. HF 1.13b.
Ch'i-ying left Tientsin without the imperial permission. He was
arrested and v/as punished to death after a trial headed by I-hsin
( "tfj"), the half-brother of the Hsien-feng Emperor.
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Patriot or Canitulationist
China's defeat in the Opium War was instrumental to the decline of
the empire. However, the whole nation did not grasp the meaning of it.
They simply did not believe that several thousand British expeditary
soldiers were able to humble the world's mightiest empire to accept the
Treaty of Nanking which was the most striking symbol of its submission
to the British encroachment. Moreover, both the scholar-official
censers and the people of Kuang-tung thought that China's defeat was
mainly, because the "shameless capitulationists" were in power at that
time. They removed the tough fighter - Lin Tse-hsu from the battlefield
at the early stage of the War.
The Opium War hurt the pride of the nation and increased its hatred
against the Westerners. Enraged and humiliated, the Chinese hailed
Lin as patriot because of his undaunted resistance and his mobilization
of the people to curb the British invasion. On the other hand, they
condemned Ch'i-ying as capitulationist for being the signatory of the
Treaty and the propagandist of his policy of conciliation in the post¬
war period.
In retrospect, how can we appraise Lin Tse-hsu and Ch'i-ying?
Hsin-pao Chiang says: "the real contribution of Lin to his country was
his timely warning of the pernicious effect of Opium on the health of
25
the people and the economy of the nation." However, it was Huang
Chuen-tzu, who first pointed out sharply that the British opium had
brought disaster to the Chinese nation and implored the Emperor to
25. Cheng, Commissioner Lin, p.215.
eradicate the opium smuggling. Lin echoed Huang's idea with
enthusiasm and was appointed to extirpate the opium smuggling.
We praise Lin because of his patriotism and his mobilization of
the people that brought them into practical political life which was
traditionally dominated by the ruling class, bureaucracy and gentry.
£?/L
Unfortunately, Lin was too patriotic. He insistedAcombatting the
British although he realized that the firepower of the British warships
outclassed that of the Chinese. Before the coming of the British
expeditionary fleet, Chinese junks had clashed on several occasions
with the petty British warships in Canton waters. Each time the Chinese
suffered from serious loss of junks and personnel. However, Lin
reported to the Emperor claiming smashing victories, putting the whole
country in avery optimistic mood.
When Lin was exiled by the Emperor to Hi in late 1842, he wrote
a letter to a close friend in which he sadly admitted the might of the
British weapons and recounted all the Chinese military shortcomings.
But he asked his friend to keep all these in confidence.
On the other hand, when the Chinese communists praise Lin for his
mobilization of the people to fight the British, they have to consider
his motivation. To the communist criterion, the Tanka people whom
Lin recruited to form "water-braves" in Canton were the most "exploited"
class of people. Because of their strange customs and the style of
living, they were dismissed as "an insignificant race" and excluded
from the Chinese society. They were not allowed to live ashore; they
could not sit for the imperial examinations, become civil servants or
marry land people.
However, Lin regarded them as "traitors" and "poison". He
recruited, them because there were other "traitors" and "poison" - the
British invaders. When Lin ordered them to attack the British ships,
he appointed one or two officers to command the Tanka recruits in each
boat. Obviously, Lin did not trust them.
After his exile to Hi, Lin devoted his attention to local
affairs. He had improved the civil administrations and opened up a
lot of lands to cultivation. In late 1845 he was rewarded for his
efforts with the post of acting governor-general of Yunnan and Kueichow
in 1847. In Yunnan Lin was noted for his suppression of uprisings of
the local Muslims. With such merits he was rewarded with the title of
Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent in 1848.
In October 1850 Lin answered the imperial summons to combat the
Taipings in Kuang-si from his sickbed. However, he died on his way to
the Taiping base and was canonized as Wen-chung (?&.)• Had he
survived a few years more, he must have received the same notorious name
which the Chinese communists CA.ll Tseng Kuo-fan: the "revolution
suppressor." But, Lin's name continued to remain in high esteem
amongst the people and the scholar-officials.
On the other hand, Ch'i-ying did everything to embitter the nation.
He discredited the traditional policy of "using barbarians to control
barbarians" which Lin advocated during the Opium War. He implemented
in
the policy-of conciliation which was^direct contrast to Lin's
resistance to the British.
The traditional policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians,"
was reinspirited by Lin's literary colleague, Wei Yuan, in his Hai-kuo
t'u-chih (An illustrated gazetteer of the maritime countries), in which
Wei had hopefully opined that "there is no better method of attacking
England than to use France or America." However, Ch'i-ying saw things
mere
with^far-sightedness and perception than the others. He refused to
implement this policy because he doubted the sincerity of French in
helping China against the British and he believed that "the French
barbarians would not ignore an immediate neighbour (England) to please
a distant country'(China) by harming their brethren*" Fn fact, French
interest in China was dove-tailed with that of the British. When Sir
Boham and Hsu Kuang-chin argued vehemently on the British entry to
Canton in late 1848, the French plenipotentiary in China, Forth-Rouen,
impressed his superiors in Paris that if Britain was forced to abandon
her entry, she would sink and lose all her influence. This would be
an event much to be regretted by other Europeans. He concluded that
the Western nations had a joint interest in China and he did not share
26
the view of those who held that they could profit by England's loss."
xribute system was inapplicable in China's post-war relations with
the West. The Freaty of Nanking had stipulated new diplomatic relations
"Me
between China and Western countries based on^modern Western pattern of
diplomacy. Ch'i-ying's policy of conciliation threw new light on
Chinese foreign affairs. Nineteenth century Westerners had already
believed in change and progress as the basis of all modern human life.
However, the Chinese of Tao-kuang Emperor's reign could not yet conceive
of it. The scholar-officials and the censors could not accept
critical changes in policies. They changed only within the tradition,
€ci
meeting new challenges by turning to the past for time-test^solutions.
Chinese past experience had convinced them that foreign victors in China
26. See China dispatches to and from the Kinistere des Affaires
Etrangeres (Quai d'Orsay), vol.5, Forth-Rouen to Kin. Aff. Etr.,
5 November 1848.
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might rule for a while, but sooner or later they would be absorbed
A.
into Chinese polity. AIne Opium War rocked China, did not
deliver the coup de CTace. They did not agree that the time-honoured
tribute system should be terminated only because of the "accidental"
defeat caused by the capitulationist. Ch'i-ying's brilliant
diplomatic talents and his conciliatory policy, were misapprehended by
his contemporaries. When he showed a sign of good will to the British
plenipotentiary, both the censors and the people of Kuang-tung got
angry. They called him a traitor and "ally of the Barbarians."
I-hsin might be the first person in modern Chinese history who
realized the farsightedness of Ch'i-ying in his diplomacy. Like Ch'i-
ying, he was also a devoted v/ar advocate when he first faced the British
encroachment. Before 1860 he had shown an attitude of disdain mingled
with hatred and prejudice in his contact with foreigners. In 1858 he
headed the commission to conduct the trial of Ch'i-ying and petitioned
the capital punishment onto the aged diplomat. However, when he was
entrusted the onerous task of negotiating with the Anglo-French alliesA
in Peking in 1860, he realized that only a treaty with these Western
powers could save the existing government. He agreed to open more
trading ports to the Westerners including Tientsin which is close to
Peking. He also approved permanent residence for Western envoys in
the capital. In January 1861 he proposed to establish an office to
take charge of foreign affairs: Tsung-li ko-kuo shih-wu ya-men
(&&. Tf , During his tenure in this office, China's
foreign policy was one of conciliation, adjustment and realism. However,
the same policy of Ch'i-ying wasAdenounced by the censors at Peking as
pusillanimous. In 1870 Tseng Euo-fan was appointed to investigate the
Tsientsin Massacre in which several French missionaries were killed
by the Chinese. Tseng prevented a war with the French by executing
the Chinese who were responsible for the killing. By so doing, Tseng
was seriously attacked by the censors though he had once saved the
empire from the Taipings. In this case, I-hsin protected Tseng and
agreed with his idea that a conciliation policy towards the Western
powers should henceforth be implemented.
Poor Ch'i-ying entered his diplomatic career two decades earlier.
Had he managed China's foreign affairs after the Treaty of Peking in
1860 instead of the Treaty of Hanking in 1842, he would have earned the
to
praise from I-hsin instead of a petition for,,capital punishment.
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